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SUMMARY
The external debt of the developing countries has become a 
major issue mainly because of the possible repercussions the 
debt may have on the international financial system. This 
situation is a direct function of the changes which have taken 
place in the international financial system beginning in the 
late sixties. Before 1975 more than 50% of the external 
obligations of the developing countries was with the official 
lenders. There had however, been a shift away to private 
lenders in the international capital market beginning from the 
late sixties. The large deficits experienced by the non 
oil developing countries in 1974 after the first oil price 
rise as well as the placement of a large percentage of the 
OPEC revenues in the international capital market encouraged 
the shift away from official sources of finance to private 
sources. The banks lent large amounts of finance to a small 
group of countries so that some individual banks became 
closely linked with the economic conditions of the borrowing 
country. The fate of one bank would not necessarily have 
any effect on the financial system. However, there was 
the fear that if a country failed to meet its obligations to 
the detriment of a major bank this would lead to uncertainty 
in the banking system, leading to some banks moving out 
from international lending and a decline in interbank lines.
The possibility of financial instability was also increased 
by the possible domino effect which would occur if one large 
debtor was able to default successfully. As a result of this 
it was imperative that large debtors which faced payment problems, 
be helped to resolve these problems so that there was no possibility 
of a default occurring.
The result of these events has been that the large debtors
have been put into the limelight. The small debtors may
not have large debts to cause undue worry to the banks, in fact
some of them may owe very little to the banks. However, in terms
of the effect which this debt may have on their external account
and domestic economy, they should be no less important than
the large debtors.
(xii)
Borrowing by the developing countries is not a new phenomena.
It is the concentration of a large amount of debt amongst a 
few countries, as well as the exposure of some of the banks 
to these countries which is causing concern.
External debt itself is not disadvantageous to an economy.
What is important is that the borrowing conditions are such 
as not to make repayment difficult, and that the external 
funds obtained are used in such a way as to make repayment 
possible and not costly to the domestic economy. This 
implies that an explicit policy may be required before borrowing 
on a large scale is embarked upon.
In the developing country context, although growth may be a 
necessary requirement for external borrowing to be successful, 
it is also important that foreign exchange is available for the 
country to be able to service and repay the debt in the currency 
stipulated in the loan terms. This introduces a broader aspect 
to the issue of external borrowing. (For those currencies 
whose local currency is accepted in repayment this is not a 
very important issue.) The role of the international economy 
in the debt repayment process of the developing countries 
is important in this context. Even if the country may have a 
favourable export sector policy, if there is no growth in the 
income of the major trade partners and there is an increase 
in protectionism it will be difficult for the debtor to 
repay the required foreign exchange debts.
The capacity of a country to borrow and not experience 
repayment problems depends on three variables. The first 
variable is the conditions existing within the international 
private capital market. This affects both private and official 
commercial loans. Higher interest rates and short maturity 
terms implies that the country will soon have to transfer 
resources out of the country not long after the loan has been 
incurred. This is especially important in determining how a 
country allocates the finance obtained among uses. The 
allocation of funds amongst possible uses and the management 
of the domestic economy is the second important variable in 
determining ability to pay. A mismatch of the loan conditions
(xiii)
and the rate of return of the loan use may cause difficulties, 
especially if there is no growth in the rest of the economy 
from which to syphon off resources to service the debt.
The third variable is the state of the international economy.
The domestic performance of the major economies is reflected 
in the international economy. This can be illustrated by the 
effect which the interest rates of the USA due to its domestic 
monetary and fiscal policy has had in increasing the 
indebtedness of the developing countries. The prospects 
for world trade are also dependent on the state of the domestic 
economies of the OECD countries. This last variable cannot 
be determined by the developing countries, so it introduces 
an element of uncertainty into their borrowing programmes.
The first and third variable are interlinked since changes 
in the latter have large effects on the former. All these 
three variables need to be favourable at the same time in 
order for borrowing to occur without excess costs being 
imposed on the borrower.
This thesis is concerned primarily with the first and the 
third variables. The issues which will be considered are the 
rapid increase in private lending to the developing countries, 
which reflects the change which took place in the international 
financial system in the 1970’s, and the emergence of OPEC 
as a net supplier of funds to the international financial 
system and the implications which this had for the developing 
countries.
The external borrowing of the developing countries and the 
resultant debt is discussed in Chapter One. Chapter Two looks 
in some depth at the growth of the OPEC surplus and the links 
between the OPEC and the non oil developing countries which 
resulted from this. Although the total flow of finance to 
the developing countries from OPEC grew after the first oil price 
rise this was concentrated mainly amongst a few developing 
countries. Even though the oil deficits did have a large 
impact on the balance of payments of the non oil developing 
countries, they also, at the same time, experienced large 
deficits with the industrial countries who are their major 
trading partners. It is thus not possible in these
(xiv)
circumstances to accept some of the statements which suggested 
that OPEC be responsible for financing the major part of the non 
oil developing countries external financial requirements. The 
relationship between OPEC and the developing countries is 
considered in detail, because the OPEC action was responsible 
for some of the changes which took place in the seventies. It 
is also an attempt to show that the present debt problems of 
the developing countries is not due only to the action of the 
OPEC countries as regards the oil prices and that any changes 
which need to occur should involve all parties in the 
international economy, namely the non oil developing countries, 
the OPEC countries and the developed market economies. (The 
centrally planned economies also have a part to play in the 
international economy, but will not be discussed here.)
The growth of the Brazilian debt, its structure and the 
conditions of the loans incurred, as well as the policy towards 
external borrowing is the subject of the third Chapter. The 
response to the two large oil price rises in the seventies and 
the changes in world trade are discussed and suggested as 
possible explanations for the present large debt outstanding of 
Brazil as well as the present payment difficulties. Brazil 
was chosen as a case study of external indebtedness because it is 
the largest non oil developing country. Secondly a survey of the 
growth of debt of Brazil over the period 1970 - 1981 illustrates 
the changes which took place in the international financial 
system which are discussed in Chapter One. The large debt 
outstanding of Brazil is itself a reminder of the biased nature 
of the flows of finance to the developing countries, itself a 
function of the decisions of the lenders and the borrowers.
Various suggestions have been made to attempt to alleviate 
the present debt problems of the developing countries. There 
were suggestions for an increased role of OPEC by directly 
financing more of the financial needs of the developing countries 
The role of OPEC was limited in the past and is even more 
limited now. Chapter Four looks at various suggestions made, 
i.e. OPEC participation, and an increase in the efforts of the 
developed market economies and the official agencies. The 
possible advantages that these will have for the developing
(xv)
countries in general and Brazil in particular is evaluated.
An increase in the flows with longer maturities going to 
the developing countries will improve the structure of the 
debt and help reduce the immediate pressure to repay the debt 
Lower interest rates will reduce pressure on the current 
account. In order for the recent Brazilian policy towards 
the external sector to be successful there needs also to be 
a growth in world trade. This may require some change in the 
domestic policies of the industrial countries and their 
attitudes towards competitive imports from the developing 
countries. An increase only in financial flows and an 
increase in the number of official agencies will not resolve 
the situation. What is required is a better combination of 
financing and domestic and international adjustment.
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Chapter One
External Borrowing by Developing Countries
1.1 The reasons why developing countries borrow abroad
Developing countries may borrow abroad in order to increase 
the resources available to embark on their development programmes. 
In some models of external borrowing for example the gap model, 
the external resources contribute towards growth in the economy.
In the Pearson Report (1969) external resources were recognised 
as contributing positively to the development of the poor 
countries. The Brandt Commission Report (1980) eleven years later 
continued to emphasise this point. It stressed the need for a 
"massive transfer of resources" from the developed to the 
developing countries. The benefits which would result from this 
were considered to affect both groups and not just the developing 
countries. Borrowing from abroad is not typical of the present 
day developing countries only^. The United States of America 
also borrowed abroad at the time when it was a colony. It was 
at the turn of this century that the USA became a net exporter of 
capital. Western Europe received large sums of finance from the 
USA in the Marshall Plan at the end of the Second World War 
for reconstruction purposes. It has been argued that the success 
of the Marshall Plan contributed to some extent towards the 
decision to send financial resources to the developing countries 
in the form of aid ^.
The developing economy is characterised as having constraints 
which can be overcome with the inflow of external resources:
" By relieving these constraints, foreign assistance 
can make possible fuller use of domestic resources 
and hence accelerate growth. Some of the potential 
bottlenecks - of skills, savings and foreign exchange 
- can be temporarily relaxed by adding external 
resources for which current payment is not required." 
(Chenery and Strout 1966 pp 690 - 681)
Studies have been made to find out to what extent external
borrowing contributes to growth. (Papanek 1973; Pesmazoglu
1972). For instance in Papanek’s study a cross country regression
showed that net transfers and official long term borrowing
explained a large amount of the growth. The reason for the
large co-efficient of the foreign savings variable was
attributed to the fact that external resources were usually
directed towards development projects and filled both the
savings and foreign exchange gap. Even in the situation where
there was a net repayment of funds, it was claimed that external
borrowing still contributed to growth of income (Ball 1962).
Growth would be at least equivalent to that which would have
occured had there been no net capital inflow in the first
place, i.e. similar to the situation of a closed Harrod-Domar
model. Ball's analysis was criticized by Massel on the grounds
that it failed to distinguish between the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and the Gross National Product (GNP) as the growth variables
(Massel 1964) The difference between these measures of growth
is important since by definition it is possible for the
inflow of external resources and the repayment process to
result in growth in the GDP without there being growth in the 
3GNP . Whether or not external borrowing will lead to growth 
in the GNP will depend on how the resources were used, i.e. the 
mix between investment and consumption and on the rates of return 
on such investments. Even if the resources are not used directly 
in growth generating activities,but stimulate growth within the 
economy then borrowing will assist the development process.
The additional resources which external borrowing makes available 
to the domestic economy, can allow the intertemporal allocation 
of consumption. Areskoug (1969) explicitly includes borrowing 
for consumption purposes in his model of external borrowing.
A country can borrow today for consumption purposes and accept 
less consumption in the future to repay the loans. Less 
consumption need not imply a reduction in the absolute level of 
consumption. Some of the additional resources could be used 
for consumption purposes and the rest for investment. The 
effect which borrowing for consumption purposes will have on 
the economy in the future depends to quite a large extent on 
the conditions of borrowing for consumption and also the state
of the domestic and world economy at the time of repayment.
Borrowing may also occur for balance of payments purposes. If 
there is a current account deficit and there is an insufficient 
amount of autonomous capital flows  ^ thecountry can run down 
it s reserves or borrow abroad to finance the deficit. Borrowing 
may also occur specifically for the build up of a country's 
reserves. Reserve building may, however, reduce the potential 
for growth. This is because instead of the funds received, being 
used for instance for real investment, they will be lying idle 
receiving a rate of interest which is less than the cost of 
borrowing the funds to build up the reserves in the first place.
The decision to borrow for balance of payments purposes reflects 
the choice of the policy makers between adjusting to the dis­
equilibrium and maintaining it by financing the deficit. The 
choice of the mix between adjusting and financing can be based 
on whether the disequilibrium is structural or temporary and the 
cost in terms of income lost of whatever policy is adopted.
Whatever combination is chosen reflects the preference of the 
decision makers between income stability and growth (Bird 1980 p 15?) 
The devlopment process can be defined as one of structural 
change and disequilibrium. The resources available to the 
economy should, ideally be sufficient to facilitate this change. 
Borrowing should be undertaken in such a way that the country 
can service the debt without imposing costs on the domestic 
economy. For example if a country should embark on a borrowing 
programme, without adjusting to some changes, it will be possible 
that the burden of servicing the debt in the future, may be so 
large that the country will have to adopt an adjustment policy 
with costs in terms of a reduction in growth which it might 
not have had to incur had it followed a borrowing policy which 
involved more adjustment than had taken place in the past.
For some developing countries, borrowing for consumption purposes 
may be a form of investment. For example,borrowing to finance 
imports of food and medical equipment will help improve the 
quality of the labour force. In order to differentiate between 
investment and consumption, the category of consumption needs 
also to be considered.
Within the developing country context it is difficult to determine 
whether borrowing is for investment/consumption purposes or
balance of payments purposes. It can be argued that this 
differentiation is spurious. This is because if the developing 
country wants to pursue a programme which involves more resources 
than it has available to it domestically, this will necessarily 
be reflected in its external account.
The gap models are used to measure the need for borrowing as well 
as to measure the resources required by the borrowing country.
The recognised gaps are the savings gap (i.e. the difference 
between the domestic savings and the investment requirements 
given a target growth rate) and the foreign exchange gap 
(i.e. the difference between the export earnings and the 
required imports given a target growth rate .) Several models 
have been developed, based on the savings and foreign exchange 
gaps (Chenery and Strout 1966; Fei and Paauw 1964; McKinnon 
1965) The gap models are criticised on the basis of the 
rigidity of parameters which make the basic assumptions. These 
limit the predictive ability of the models as well as their 
relevance to the real situation. (Bruton 1978; Findlay 1971;
Joshi 1970) The models are based on the premis that external 
borrowing by the developing countries is a finite process and 
will come to an end when certain conditions have been met.
However, external borrowing by any country need not come to an
end. The need for external resources may diminish as the
economy develops but it is quite possible for the country to
have a net capital inflow at some point in time. Avramovic (1964p6S)^
in his debt cum growth model, recognises the possible factors which
might cause a country to continue being a net importer of capital.
The gap models also assume that borrowing is only for investment 
purposes, but as discussed above this has not always been the 
case and need not always be the reason why external borrowing 
occurs. Borrowing for consumption purposes may occur when there 
is a shortfall in export earnings due to temporary factors, for 
example bad weather. Borrowing will come to an end when export 
earnings revert back to the trend. Another shortcoming of the 
models is that they are demand determined since they assume that 
once the need for external resources is identified,the resources 
will automatically become available. However, if there are no 
willing lenders or the conditions of the loans are very stringent, 
this will lead to a reduction in the gap by the authorities 
irrespective of the 'needs’ of the domestic economy.
The existence of the gaps per se and the subjective element 
involved in deciding the size of the gap is also questioned 
(Bruton 1978; Joshi 1970 and Streeten 1972).
Some writers on the subject do not consider that borrowing 
contributes to economic growth. There are some countries like 
China which have experienced growth with the minimum of external 
resources which might indicate that external resources are not 
always necessary in the development process. What this might 
illustrate is that external resources are part of a package which 
assists a country in its development programme. Evidence is 
also given to show that external borrowing coincides with a 
decline in the domestic savings ratio (Griffin 1970). Newlyn'(p 
1977) disproves Griffin's conclusions showing that what may 
seem to be a reduction in domestic savings may only be a case 
of foreign savings being used for consumption purposes.
1.2 The External Debt Position of the Developing Countries 1970-1981
The external debt of developing countries reflects capital
5inflows into these countries in the past . Both the World 
Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop­
ment (OECD) have calculated the figures for debt outstanding and 
debt service payments for the developing countries in general 
and individual developing countries. The figures obtained 
by each of these organisations differ on an aggregate basis 
because of the different coverage of countries. The World Bank 
in 1980 was covering 96 countries and the OECD was covering 
143. The definition of the external debt differs between the 
two agencies thus explaining some of the difference in the 
values obtained. The World Bank's definition covers all 
publicly guranateed debt whilst the OECD covers all type of 
debt whether publicly guaranteed or not. They both exclude 
debt of less than one year to maturity, funds borrowed from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and debt resulting from 
military transactions.
Congdon (1982) suggest that the external deficit between private 
individuals in different countries should not be considered
important in the balance of payments. In this case the 
exclusion of non guaranteed private debt from the definition of 
debt by the World Bank would be accepted. On the other hand, 
since the activities of the private sector are reflected in 
the visible trade sector, then their financial transactions are 
also relevant. If the country should experience exchange 
controls, the foreign exchange demands of the private sector 
to service the external debt will put pressure on the existing 
reserve holdings of the authorities. For these reasons due 
account should be taken of the privately held debt.
The total nominal disbursed debt outstanding of the developing 
countries rose from 74.1 billion US dollars in 1970 to 524 
billion dollars in 1981. In real terms the rise was not as large. 
The debt rose from 137 billion dollars in 1970 to 331.6 billion 
dollars in 1981. The nominal figures were deflated by the 
unit value of exports. This was in order to measure the value 
of the debt in terms of the earning capacity of the developing 
countries ^. The real debt service rose at a slower pace over 
the period than did the nominal debt service , even though it 
had a larger value in 1970 compared to the nominal values.
The higher values for the real total debt and debt service 
are due to the low unit value of exports for the period 1970-
1973. Between 1973 and 1978 the growth of nominal debt out­
standing was on average about 22%. Real debt on the other 
hand, experienced a fall in annual growth for the years 1973 and
1974. These were the years of high commodity prices. It was 
not until 1975 which also coincided with the recession in the 
industrial countries when the prices of commodities declined 
that real debt and debt service payments rose. During the second 
oil price rise in 1979/1980 the growth of nominal debt was lower 
than in the previous two periods and there was a slowdown in 
growth in real terms. Measuring the growth of debt outstanding 
in real terms reduced, to some extent, the enormous size of
the debt of the developing countries. The difference between the 
values of the real and nominal debt figures are greater for the 
debt service than for debt outstanding ( See Table 1.1). This 
can be explained partly by the fact that after 1979 the rate of 
interest paid on the loans was greater than the rate of growth 
of export unit values.
The growth in the debt over the period 1973 to 1981 may be 
explained firstly by the decision as regards how to respond to 
shocks to the domestic economy, and secondly on the financing 
of the deficit after any adjustment which had taken place.was 
carried out.
Table 1.1
Total Debt Disbursed at Year End and Total Debt Service of 
Developing Countries, (in billion US dollars)
preliminary)
estimate)
Year
Nominal
Total
Debt
Annual
Change
%
Real
Total
Debt
Annual
Change
%
Nominal
Debt
Service
Real
Debt
Service
1970 74.1 137 9.0 16.6
1971 86. 6 16 162 18.2 10.9 20
1972 98.2 13 177 9.2 13.5 24
1973 118.9 21 160 -9.6 17.2 23
1974 144.6 22 139 --13.9 22.1 21.2
1975 179.1 24 179.1 29.1 26.2 26.3
1976 216.9 21 204.5 13.9 32.2 30.6
1977 264.6 22 217.3 6.0 41.0 33.7
1978 336.6 27 267.1 22.9 56.9 45.1
1979 397.3 18 272.1 1.8 73.6 49.3
1980 456.2 15 271.5 -0.22 91.2 54.2
1981 524.0 15 331.6 22.1 111.7 74.0
Source: OECD (1981) Development Co-operation and Efforts,
Paris.
P
In 1970 the current account deficit of the low income developing 
countries was 3.6 billion dollars,in 1978 dollars. This was 
equivalent to 1.99% of the GNP. By 1975, after the first oil price 
rise the de£5ici.t was 7 billion dollars, in 1978 dollars and 
equivalent to 3.99% of the GNP. The middle income countries in 
1970 had a deficit of 14.9 billion dollars which declined to
6.7 billion dollars in 1973, but rose again to 42.8 billion 
dollars in 1975 (World Bank 1981). Assuming that a certain 
amount of adjustment had occurred, the structure of the current 
account financing can give some explanation for the growth of the 
debt.
For the non oil developing countries as a group financing 
of the deficit and reserve building through non debt creating 
flows has declined since 1973. In 1973 these flows accounted 
for 47.5% of the total ^. By 1975 they had declined to 26.4%
(IMFd 1982.^ .16%)For the low income countries there was a decline 
from 52% in 1973 to 35% in 1975 and 30% in 1982. The exporters 
of manufacturers, a sub group of the middle income countries had 
40% of their flows falling into the non debt category in 1973.
By 1975 this had fallen to 17.2%. The non debt creating flows 
were 26.4% of total flows to all non oil developing countries 
in 1980 (IMFd 1982 .n 168)
This difference among country groups in the method of financing 
the current account deficits is to some extent reflected in the 
distribution of debt held by the non oil developing countries on 
the basis of income groups (See Table 1.2). In 1971 the low 
income, countries as defined by the OECD held about 24% of the 
total debt of the non OPEC developing countries. In 1975 their 
percentage of the total debt had risen to 26%, but by 1980 
it had declined to 22.3%. The newly industrialising countries 
on the other hand had an increasing proportion to the total non 
OPEC developing country debt. In 1971 they were holding 42.6% 
of the total debt which rose to 50% of the total in 1980. As a 
percentage of their GNP the debt of the low income, middle income 
and newly industrialising developing countries in 1980 was 27%,
28% and 19% respectively (OECD 1982p5S)On the basis of these 
figures, although the absolute debt of newly industrialising 
countries was the largest of the three groups of countries, when 
the debt is considered on the basis of the size of the domestic 
economy, this group of countries had the least burden of debt 
compared to the other two groups of countries.
The .skewdness in the distribution of the total debt amongst 
the developing countries can also be explained to some extent 
by the, size of the economies and the absorptive capacity, the 
choice of the mix of adjusting to or financing of the disequlibrium, 
as well as access to external funds which to some extent will 
determine the policy mix of the country concerned.
The burden of debt of a country can be measured using several 
ratios. The most common one used is the debt service ratio.
This is the ratio of debt service payments to the exports of 
goods and services. It indicates the extent to which export 
earnings are diverted from other possible uses, for example 
financing of food imports, or the imports of capital goods to 
the payment of past loans.
Table 1.2
Total Debt Disbursed at Year End of Non OPEC Developing Countries 
By Income Group. (Billion US Dollars)
1971 1975 1977 1980 1981^ 1982
Low Income Countries 18 40 56 86 95 110
Middle Income Countries 25 40 60 107 124 144
Newly Industrialising 
Countries 32 72 111 192 226 266
Total 75 152 227 385 445 520
Note: ^ preliminary
estimate
Source: OECD (1982) External Debt of Developing Countries 1982
Survey, Paris, p 34
Table 1.3
Debt Service Ratio On Long Term External Debt of Non Oil 
Developing Countries
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Debt Service
Ratio 14.0 11.5 14.0 13.9 14.0 17.3 18.1 16.3 21.0 22.3
Interest Payments
Ratio 4.2 3.8 5.0 4.7 4.6 5.5 6.2 7.2 8.5 8.5
Amortisations
Ratio 9.8 7.7 9.0 9.2 9.4 11.8 11.9 9.2 12.5 13.8
Source: IMFd (1982) World Economic Outlook. Washington D.C. P 173
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Another measure used is the ratio of interest payments to the 
export of goods and services. Interest payments need to be met 
so this indicates the rigidity within the current account.
Table 1.3 shows the debt service ratio for the non oil developing 
countries from 1973 to 1982. Although the debt service ratio 
has increased over the period it has not ddne so dramatically.
It was below the 20% critical zone until 1981. The 20% mark 
is usually delineated by some authorities as the point above 
which a country is expected to face difficulties. Whether a 
country will soon be facing debt problems cannot be determined 
on the basis of the debt service ratio figures alone. The 
debt service ratio only takes into consideration three of the 
several components which make up the balance of payments 
position of a country. Avramovic (1964 pp 13-37) outlines 
these components. Thus, even if there should be a debt service 
ratio of say 25% for a country which can afford to reduce its 
imports without imposing undue costs on the domestic economy, 
then the effect which the debt has on the economy differs from 
that of a country with a similar debt service ratio but 
which is able to import only the essentials needed. A decline 
in the debt service ratio over time may actually be reflecting 
payments arrears rather than an increase in export earnings (Nagy 
1976). This is of particular importance in the present situation 
where quite a few of the large debtors have arrears in their 
payments. The maturity structure of the debt also influences the 
debt service ratio. This can result in inaccurate conclusions 
being formed when countries are being compared. Inflation 
causes an upward bias in the ratio (Kincaid 1981 ; Nowzad 1981). 
Floating interest rates are widely used to protect the creditor 
during periods of unanticipated inflation. The higher interest 
rates and interest payments compensate for the reduced value 
of the principal causing the debt to be amortised .faster., than 
it would have in a non inflationary situation. The result of 
this is that when measuring the ratio of interest payments to 
the value of the current account deficit the figure obtained 
is higher than it would have been in the non inflationary 
situation (Freedman 1979). In discussing the debt service 
ratios effectively and in order to get an accurate view of the 
debt burden of a country it would be useful to consider what the
prospects for the country’s exports are, and whether they are 
subject to fluctuation. Other important variables are the 
maturity structure of the outstanding debt, the extent to which 
the country is susceptible to a decline in food imports, the 
extent to which the country can depend on temporary balance of 
payments of relief and whether imports are compressible (Avramovic 
op cit; Nagy op cit).
On an aggregate basis apart from making the comment that the 
debt service ratio has increased for the group of non oil 
developing countries little more than that can be said. However, 
to move into the field of speculation it can be said that if 
the exports position of the countries does not improve in the 
near future then the rather low debt service ratio may be more 
of a disadvantage than the figures themselves seem to indicate.
The low income countries debt service ratio was on average 
smaller than that for all the non oil developing countries 
during the entire period under review. In 1973 it was 12.6% 
and in 1982 it had risen to 14.1% (IMF opcit). The major 
exporters of manufactures on the other hand, had a debt service 
ratio which was closer to the average for all the non oil 
developing countries i.e. 14.8% in 1973 and 20.1% in 1982.
(IMF op cit). There was a downward trend in the interest 
payments ratio of the low incokie countries. In 1978 it was 
3.1% This trend may be explained by the fixed interest rate 
debt of these countries and the concessional loans which they 
received. This differs from the situation of the ’exporters 
of manufacturers’. The interest payments ratio rose faster 
than the amortisation ratio. The former was 4.7% in 1973, 
rising to 8% in 1982. whereas the amortisation ratio rose from 
10.2% to 12.1% during the same period. This reflects the 
structure of the debt of this group of countries. They have a 
greater proportion of their debt of floating interest rate 
terms (see pp 14 - 16).
The low income countries are mainly exporters of primary 
commodities which are prone to fluctuations on both the supply 
and demand side. Some of them depend on only one crop for at 
least 50% of their export earnings. Even though the absolute
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value of the debt may be small compared to other groups 
of countries, the size of the economy is small and theexport 
base is narrow and weak compared to say the newly industrialising
countries. On the basis of this it could be assumed that the
low income countries are more likely to face debt problems.
The middle income countries however, have taken the lime 
light in the debt arena. This is because they are more 
dependent on the supply of finance and the conditions affecting 
the supply of funds. The supply constraint has been a very 
important ingredient in the present debt crisis faced by the 
middle income developing countries.
Private sources of finance to the non oil developing countries 
have overtaken official sources in the seventies. In 1972 
less than half the debt was owed to private lenders. By 1979
this had increased to about 60% (see Table 1.4). The average
rate of change of private lending over the period was 25.9% 
compared to 16.8% for official lending. The growth of private 
market lending to the developing countries has been increasing 
since the late sixties. It became of increasing importance in 
the 1970’s due to the large current account deficit experienced 
by the developing countries, as well as the supply of funds by 
the OPEC countries (which had large surpluses due to the oil 
price rise) on the international capital market. The supply 
and demand conditions were thus favourable for the growth of 
private market lending to the non oil developing countries.
Table 1.4
Debt of 87 Non Oil Developing Countries. By Type of Lender 
(Billion US Dollars)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Debt
Outstanding 75.9 91.4 113.5 140.1 173 204.1 254.9 299 
Official
Lenders 40 46.7 55.3 64.9 75.9 90.5 107.6 118.8
Private
Lenders 35.9 44.7 - 58.2 75.2 97.1 113.6 147.3 180.2
Source: Nowzad,. B and Williams R.C. (1981) External Indebtedness
of Developing Countires. Occasional Paper No.3 p 7 
International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
The demand for finance from the private lenders on the part of 
the non oil developing countries is usually explained by 
referring to the decline in Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the 
multilateral agencies to the developing countries. The percentage 
of ODA to net resource flows from the DAC countries was 
calculated on the basis of figures given by the OECD. In 1970 
ODA was 44.8% of total net resource flows. It declined to 
38.4% in 1973, was 33% in 1975 and declined further to 30.4% 
in 1978. It rose in 1980 to 37.6% of the total. There is no 
doubt therefore, that in the seventies there was a downward 
trend in the proportion of ODA going to the non oil developing 
countries. There was a decline during the time of the first 
oil price rise, when the developing countries experienced 
large current account deficits. On aggregate this might explain 
why there was a rise in private lending to the non oil developing 
countries. However, lending from the international private capital 
market was only restricted to a few developing countries. Only 
1% of the debt of the low income developing countries was owed 
to the private capital markets in 1971. By 1975 it had risen 
to about 5% of the total and in 1980 had risen only slightly 
to 5.2% (OECD 1982p.40).In 1977 Argentina, Brazil, South Korea and 
Mexico received 44% of the loans extended by the banks. By 1982 
this was estimated to be 52% of the total (OECD 1982). Thus, 
given that the growth in the private market lending was only 
towards a small group of developing countries, who are unlikely 
to have received a large percentage of the ODA anyway since 
they are middle income countries, the increase in private 
lending cannot be viewed as a substitute for ODA in the case 
of all developing countries. Given that there was an increase 
in funds within the private capital market, borrowers were 
attracted to this market because of the characteristics of the 
market. The Eurocurrency market is characterised by speed and 
flexibility. It does not take a long time for the loan to be 
negotiated and disbursed compared to arrangements with multilateral 
organisations. Secondly, there are few strings attached concerning 
the use of the loan. The international capital market is 
considered to have an advantage over the IMF and World Bank for 
instance, because it does not have any conditionality terms.
This view is contradicted by Friedman (1981) who states that
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since the bank lenders screen the potential borrowers to a 
certain extent (for example credit-worthiness. See Chapter 
3 for a discussion of this) a certain amount of conditionality 
is involved in bank lending. A poor income country would have 
to improve its export earnings and ensure that foreign exchange 
would be available to repay the loan in order for it to be 
considered for a loan by any of the leading international 
banks. Since some of these countries are unable to meet 
the criteria laid down by the banks, they are automatically 
not eligible for loans from the private capital market. On 
the demand side the terms of lending may be too stringent 
for some of the poor countries.
The terms of loan incurred by the non oil developing countries 
have changed over the seventies. This change has been 
influenced to a great extent by the large amount of borrowing 
done on the international capital.
Table 1.5
Average Terms of Debt Commitments For 94 Developing Countries
Interest Rate% Maturity (Years)
Official
Creditors
Private
Creditors Average^
Official Private 
Creditors Creditors Averaj
1972 4.3 7.3 5.6 24.2 8.9 17.6
1973 4.2 9.1 6.7 25.4 10.8 18.0
1974 4.4 9.7 7.0 23.4 10.1 16.9
1975 4.9 8.8 6.9 23.5 7.8 15.3
1976 5.5 7.9 6.8 22.1 8.1 14.3
1977 5.2 8.0 6.8 22.6 8.0 14.0
1978 5.0 9.4 7.9 24.8 8.9 14.5
1979 5.0 11.6 9.3 25.0 8.9 14.6
Annual
Averagei 4.8 9.0 7.1 23.9 8.9 '15.7
1. Exclude private non guaranteed debt
Source: Nowzad j B and Williams R.C., (1981) External Indebtedness of 
Developing Countries. Occasional Paper No.3, International 
Monetary Fund. Washington D.C. p 9
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The terms of the private lenders are harder than those of the 
official lenders èee Table 1.5). Over time, both sources of 
finance have experienced increasingly harder terms, although the 
rate of change in terms has been faster for private loans compared 
to official loans. The situation for individual countries depends 
on the structure of their debt protfolio. The middle income and 
newly industrialising countries have more commercial loans with 
hard terms compared to the low income countries. The changing 
conditions of the loans, especially those from private sources, 
can be explained by the conditions within the international 
capital markets and the world economy. The bank loans and the 
Eurocredits usually have floating interest rates to protect 
the creditors against inflation. The high interest rates 
experienced in the United States and the United Kingdom as 
a result of domestic polciy are also responsible for the high 
interest rates which the developing countries had to pay on 
their loans. In 1982 41% of the debt held by the non oil 
developing countries had floating interest rates. This had 
risen from 23% in 1978, The low income countries had 2% of 
their debt on floating rates in 1982, compared to 55% for the 
middle income countries. Brazil, Argentina and South Korea 
and Mexico had 110 billion dollars of their net liabilities 
on floating interest rate terms at the end of the 1980-1982 
period (OECD 1982). Even though the floating interest rates 
were adopted to take account of the rate of inflation, the real 
rate of interest was only positive in 1972 and from 1979 
onwards. On the average therefore, a large number of the 
developing countries had negative real interest rates on their 
loans (see Table 1.6). The nominal fixed interest rates did 
not change by as much over the period, as did the floating 
rates. This is to some extent, reflected in the interest rate 
figures of the private and official lenders in Table 1.5.
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980 
(preliminary)
1981 
(estimated)
Table 1.6
Current (Nominal and Real) Interest Cost to Developing Countries
Nominal Real^
3
Nominal Real Total Total
Fixed Fixed Floating Floating Nominal Real
Interest Interest Interest Interest Interest Debt
% % % % on Debt% %
4.2 -1.6 7.9 2.1 4.6 -1.2
4.5 -5.1 9.0 -0.6 5.4 -4.2
4.6 -11.0 10.0 -5.6 6.1 -9.5
4.8 -8,9 11.0 -2.7 6,6 -7.1
4.8 -5.7 8.5 -2.4 6 .6 -4.3
5.0 -6.1 7.8 -3,3 6.6 -4.5
5.2 —4.2 9.0 -0.4 7.5 -1.9
5.5 -6.3 12.0 0.2 7.7 -4.1
5.7 -9. 4 15.3 0.2 8.8 -6.3
6.2 -7.3 18.0 4.5 10.2 -3.3
 ^Annual interest payments and other changes as a percentage
of the debt outstanding at 
for exchange rate changes.
the beginning of the year, adjusted
^ Real interest rates were obtained by subtracting nominal
rates from the rate of change of industrial country consumer 
prices obtained from the IMF, International Financial 
Statistics Yearbook,1982
3 .Weighted average annual cost to debtors (including spreads 
and fees) based on average LIBOR during the period July 1st to 
June 30th; six month average.
Source: OECD (1981) External Debt of Developing Countries,r ?1
Paris,
Even though the developing countries had in aggregate shifted 
to private sources of funds, they need not have incurred such 
a large percentage of their debtona floating interest basis. 
This is because they could have tapped the bond market which 
loans out funds for longer maturities than does the credit 
market and on fixed interest rates. Some of the bonds also 
have floating rates, but they are not in the majority. 
Unfortunately for the developing countries, they do not have 
easy access to the bond market, so are restricted mainly to
g
the credit side of the international capital market .
The major creditors of the developing countries are the DAC 
countries. In 1981 about 75% i.e. 332 billion dollars of non 
oil developing country debt was owed to this group of countries 
and their capital markets. About 86% i.e. 70,3 billion dollars 
of the total debt service was paid to these group of countries. 
The multilateral organisations were the second largest group of 
creditors. In 1981 the non oil developing countries owed them 
60 billion dollars. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) only became major creditors to the developing 
countries after the 1973/74 oil price rise. In 1975 the non 
oil developing countries owed them 6 billion dollars, 
equivalent to 3% of their total debt outstanding. The debt 
service payments were 0.2 billion dollars. In 1980 debt 
outstanding of the non oil developing countries to OPEC was 
21 billion dollars which was about 4.4% of the total debt 
outstanding. The DAC countries have a long history of lending 
to the developing countries, thus partly explaining the large 
size of the debt owed to them. A large amount of the OPEC 
funds which could have been lent directly to the non oil 
developing countries were deposited in the financial markets of 
the DAC countries. These funds were thus redirected by the 
lending agencies within the DAC countries to borrowers
thus explaining, to some extent, the growth in lending from 
this source in the mid seventies.
The framework of the international financial system within 
which developing countries have participated has changed in 
the seventies. The post war period up to the 1960’s was 
characterised mainly by the flow of concessional finance to
the developing countries. It cannot be claimed that this
was done on an equitable basis, i.e. the poorer countries
receiving a greater percentage of the aid. The seventies has 
seen a shift away from concessional finance and official 
lenders as the main source of finance to the developing countries. 
The supply of finance to the developing countries has become 
more skewed to a few countries. The description of the debt 
situation of the developing countries illustrates these points 
fully. This development is due to the prominence of the private 
lenders in the business of transferring financial resources to 
the developing countries and the decline of the official
lenders. OPEC has added a new dimension to the financial
system (see Chapter 2), It was feared that the low absorptive 
capacity of the OPEC countries would make it difficult for the 
deficits experienced by the rest of the world after the first 
oil price rise to be removed without the world economy going 
into a deep recession. The deep recession did not occur, 
mainly because OPEC countries increased their absorption by 
greater than had been expected and also because of the 
recycling of the OPEC cash surplus by the banks. (This is 
the part of the cash surplus which had been deposited with 
industrial countries). The banks thus took up the role of 
helping the developing countries, to whofe they would loan 
funds to finance their current account deficits and so 
prevented the deep recession, even if it was not their prime 
intention. In some quarters the entire cause of the rise in 
developing country external indebtedness has been blamed on 
the oil price rises. The disequilibrating effect of the oil 
price rise cannot be denied. However, the entire cause of 
the indebtedness cannot be put on the OPEC action because 
some countries could have adjusted the disequilibrium but had 
the choice to finance it instead. The possibility or the 
requirement that OPEC should directly have been responsible 
for financing the current account deficits is not justified 
given the profits that the banks made from lending to the 
developing countries and the fact that the entire deficits were 
not caused by the oil price rise.
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The unit value of manufactured exports from the developed 
countries was also rising at the same tine as was the oil 
prices. In 1974 the unit value of manufactured exports from 
the developed countries rose by 31% above the previous year.
They rose further by 12% in 1974-1975, Since the industrial 
countries accounted for at least 60% of the imports of the non 
oil developing countries, this increase in the price of 
manufactures would have had a substantial impact on their 
trade account and terms of trade. The increase in the value 
of manufactured imports of the non oil developing countries 
which occurred between 1973 and 1975 was due mainly to price 
changes than to changes in volume. In the period 1974 - 1975 
the value of exports from the non oil developing countries had 
declined by 2.4% due to volume and unit value changes. The 
former had declined by 1.4% and the latter by 1%. On the 
other hand the exports of the industrial countries had increased 
in value terms by 6.7%. This was mainly due to price changes 
since the volume had declined 4.2% between 1974 and 1975.
In Chapter 2 the relationship between the non oil developing 
countries and OPEC will be discussed in some detail. An 
attempt will be made to link the debt of the developing 
countries with the growth in the current account surplus of 
the OPEC countries. The relationship between OPEC and the 
non oil developing countries is of importance because it 
firstly illustrates OPEC’s place in the international financial 
system and explains developmentswhich took place there in the 
seventies.
NOTES
1. For a discussion of this see Abbot (1979; Hughes (1979) 
and Sampson (1981 p. 50-7l)
2. The flow of concessional finance from the developed 
market economies to the developing countries has also 
been attributed to the desire on the part of the US, 
especially to reduce the possible Communist influence 
within the developing world, (Spero 1982 pp 152-157),
3. The difference between the GNP and the GDP is net factor 
payments abroad. For external borrowing to generate 
growth in the GNP, the output capital ratio needs to be 
greater than the rate of interest (Massel 1964
4. Autonomous flows are defined as those flows which occur 
irrespective of the balance of payments position. The 
difference between autonomous and accommodating flows is 
rather fudged. This is because the former may be the 
result of actions taken by domestic authorities, for 
example interest rate differentials to induce an outflow 
or inflow of capital.
5. This does not include direct private investment, but 
includes bonds, financial loans from private and official 
sources and suppliers credit.
6. An UNCTAD study (1979) has shown that deflating the nominal 
figures by the export unit value or the import unit value 
for instance, to take account of inflation does not 
necessarily indicate the real value of the debt. For 
instance an increase in export unit values may also coincide 
with either a reduction in the export volumes or a greater 
rise in import unit values, so that the burden of debt
may not necessarily have been reduced, A model which has 
the relevant variables to be considered has been developed 
in the study.
7. In 1973 the current account deficit of the non oil 
developing countries was 11.6 billion dollars (IMF^  ^1982)
10.1 billion dollars was financed through the non debt 
creating flows. In 1975 11,8 billion dollars of the 
46,5 billion dollar current account deficit was financed 
using non debt creating flows. Over the period 1973-1982 
non debt creating flows rose in value from 11 to 27.8 
billion dollars. This further explains the growth of debt 
for the developing countries,
8. See section 4,2.1,
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Chapter Two
OPEC and the Non Oil Developing Countries
The fkxw of financial resources from the OPEC countries to
the rest of the world is a novel phenomena in the international
financial system. This is the first time that a group of
developing countries have been directly responsible through
their own actions for such a large flow of finance within the
financial system^. Sobhan (1980 pp 201), described it as a ’historic
transfer in the ownership to investable resources.,’. The OPEC
countries as capital exporters are considerd to be different
from the majority of capital exporters, i.e, the developed
economies. They do not have a strong military force to back
them up if they should have need to put pressure on any
defaulting debtors, they have a weak technological base and
do not have a developed industrial base with which to tie aid
disbursements. They have limited financial structures of
their own and so are forced to put the bulk of their funds
outside their national economies, their currencies are not
widely used and the wealth from which this surplus finance has
been derived is based on a non renewable resource (Bacha and
Alejandro 1982 pp 7 - 9), Bacha and Alejandro consider whether
the period 1973 - 1981 may be described as Pax Arabica,
Although immediately after the oil price rises there was a
large amount of funds in the hands of the OPEC countries,due
to the characteristics of the OPEC countries as capital exporters
and the fact that they were not responsible for the majority of
the funds within the financial system, it is doubtful that this
description of the era would be an apt one. The OPEC countries,
however, did influence or play a large part in how the system
functioned. This had repercussions for both the developed
2and developing countries alike
The increasing links between OPEC and the developing countries 
can be illustrated by the rise in ODA from OPEC which occurred 
after 1974. It also illustrates OPEC's growing importance 
within the sphere of total financial flows to the developing 
countries. In 1973 ODA flows (net) from OPEC were only 11% 
of the total ODA going to the developing countries, 79,6% 
of such flows were from the DAC countries. By 1975 the OPEC 
ODA was 27,4% of the total going to developing countries 
and non concessional flows had increased from 1,75% to 7.6% 
of the total over the same period (OECD 1979)
2,1 The OPEC Cash Surplus
The increase in the financial flows from OPEC to the rest of 
the world is a direct function of the quadrupling of the oil 
prices in 1973/74. This increased overnight, the revenues 
of the oil exporting countries. For example in Kuwait the 
revenue from oil in 1973 was 1780 million dollars. In 1974 
with a fall in the volume of oil exports, oil revenues rose 
to 6,545 million dollars (Petroleum Economist 1979). Although 
the quadrupling of the oil prices has been the immediate cause 
of the financial flows, the extent to which this will continue 
depends on the size of the ensuing cash surplus, the absorptive 
capacity of the oil exporters and the way in which the surplus 
is invested.
The cash surplus is the amount available for government loans,
capital investments and additions to reserves after allowance
has been made for imports, other current transactions and trade
3credit given for oil exports, (Bank of England 1975)
There are difficulties involved in calculating the actual 
size of the surplus and how it has been deployed. The OPEC 
countries are not eager to divulge the size of the surplus 
and in the market economies, it is difficult to monitor the 
flows because of the large size of private flows. Another 
problem is that some of the funds are not invested directly 
by an OPEC country, but by investment agents acting on behalf 
of the OPEC investors (Sobhan 1980 b). Bank of England 
estimates will be the main source of information on the OPEC 
surplus, used here.
The size of the cash surplus has varied over the 1974 to 
1980 period. The factors which primarily affect the size of 
the surplus are threefold. The first is the size of the oil 
revenues, the second is the value of other export revenues 
and the third is the value of imports of the OPEC countries.
The oil revenues rose dramatically in 1974 because of the 
price rise. There was a decline in revenues in 1975, mainly 
because of a decline in the demand for oil mainly from the 
industrial countries. Exports per day declined from 29.5 
million barrels a day in 1974 to 25.7 million per day in 1975. 
The second dramatic increase in the surplus was in the 1979/80 
period when the price of oil doubled. The strength of oil 
revenues in determining the cash surplus depends also on its 
weight in total exports. Libya and Saudi Arabia depend 
totally on fuels, minerals and metals for their merchandise 
export revenue. Venezuela, Iraq and Algeria depend on this 
category of exports for at least 95% of their export earnings. 
Only Ecuador and Gabon depend on oil for less than 50% of 
their export earnings (World Bank^l981), OPEC countries 
can be categorised on the basis of the extent to which their 
revenues are abosrbed by imports. The high absorbers i.e. 
Nigeria, Algeria, Gabon Venezuela, Ecuador and Indonesia 
spend almost their entire export earnings on imports. They 
are more populous than the low absorbers i.e. Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Qatar which spend only a 
small proportion of their revenues on imports despite their 
high import growth rates.
Table 2.1
Trade and Current Account Balance for Groups of Oil Exporters 
(Billions of US Dollars)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
High Absorbers
Trade Balance 4 18 7
Current Balance -1 11 -1
Middle Tier 
Absorbers
Trade Balance 5 24 13
Current Balance 1 18 6
Low Absorbers
Trade Balance 10 42 34
Current Balance 6 38 24
7
- 2
18
11
39
26
7
-6
21
12
38
21
-14
14
3
30
10
23
9
37
29
60
36
Source: Bank of England (1980) ’ The Surplus of Exporters
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, June p 154
The low absorbers account for a large amount of the total 
current account surplus. The high absorbers only experienced 
a current account surplus in 1974 and 1979, The volume of 
imports of the oil exporters grew over the period 1974 - 
1978, declining in 1979 (Bank of England 1980). The reduction 
in import volumes in 1979 has been attributed to factors such 
as the lack of sufficient managerial and technical skill and 
uncertainty about the future availability of finance to continue 
the projects (Bank of England 1980 pp 157). The initial 
absorptive capacity of the OPEC countries, especially the 
Arab countries, was considered to be very low and gave rise to 
fears about a world recession since the trade surplus would not 
be easily reduced by increased imports by the OPEC countries.
The low absorptive capacity of OPEC has been attributed to a 
weak and poorly organised market and the shortage of a skilled 
work force and technical and managerial skill (Hour 1974). The 
absorptive capacity as measured by the growth of imports has 
increased over time. For example the reduced investible surplus
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for Saudi Arabia in 1981 is due to the large financial 
requirements of the development plan. Looking at the merchandise 
imports alone will give a lower estimate of the ability of OPEC 
to use it s cash surplus. For instance the services account of 
the US vis a vis the OPEC countries was in surplus from 1972 
to 1977 (Survey of Current Business 1978p.Z7)This was made 
up of military transactions which, in the case of Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, rose from 0,2 billion dollars to 4 billion 
dollars over the period. The surplus was also made up of 
income from US direct investments and foreign assets.
The wealth of the OPEC countries differs from that of the 
developed economies because it depends on a non renewable 
resource, whilst for the latter group of countries it is due 
to an industrial capacity and structure which has been developed 
over several years and can be changed with some costs to adapt 
to new circumstances. The investment of financial resources 
derived from this non renewable resource should be such that 
it will yield returns when the resource is diminished. The 
investment decisions of individual OPEC countries differ, 
depending on the circumstances of each country in terms of 
population and the longevity of oil reserves (Mabro 1982).
This will also affect their attitudes towards pricing policy.
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Table 2*2
Deployment of Oil Exporters Cash Surplus^ (Billion US Dollars]
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Bank Deposits 
of which:
28.6 9.9 12.0 13.0 3.9 37.3 47.3
In currency of 
issue 7.0 2.0 0.5 2.3 2.8 6.3
Eurocurrency
deposits 21.6 7.9 11.5 10.7 1.1 31.0
Short Term 
Government 
securities (b) 8.0 -0.4 -2.2 -1.1 -0.8 3.3
Long Term 
Government 
securities (b) 1.1 2.4 4.4 4.5 -1.8 -0.7
Other Capital 
flows (c) 7.1 12.8 13.2 9.8 5.8 9.0
IMF and IBRD (d) 3.5 4.0 2.0 0.3 0.1 -2.0 4.9
Flow and funds 
to developing 
countries (e) 4.9 6.5 6.4 7.0 6.2 6.9 6.7
Total identified 
deployed net cash 
surplus 53.2 35.2 35.8 33.5 13.4 53.8 60.6
Residual of
unidentified
items 1.9 1.1 2.8 4.1 5.4 25.2 16.4
Total net cash 
surplus 55.1 36.3 38.6 37.6 18.8 79.0 110.0
Note: Flows are mainly differences between opening and
closing stocks, but adjusted to remove the estimated 
effects of exchange rate movements of currencies other 
than the US dollar.
Oil exporters comprise of the OPEC member countries, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Bahrain, Brunei and Oman.
Table 2.2 (continued)
(a) Equal to current account balance, less changes in 
liabilities and trade credit and oil export.
(b) Coverage of these items is confined to the UK and the US.
(c) Comprises other portfolio investment, direct investment 
loans and other items.
(d) Comprises investment in the IMF oil facility, supplementary 
financing facility, holding of SDK's and direct 
purchasing of IBRD bonds.
(e) Comprises bilateral loans and contributions and 
subscriptions to regional and international development 
agencies other than the IMF and IBRD,
Source: Bank of England (1980) The Surplus of the Oil
Exporters Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, p« 13A 
June.
In 1974, at the time of the first oil price rise, the oil 
exporters found themselves with large amounts of cash on 
their hands, greater than what they required. They lacked 
a developed financial system within their economies or within 
the rest of the developing world for that matter and had not, 
except possibly for Kuwait, developed an investment strategy^.
As a result of this the bulk of the funds was put into financial 
institutions in the developed market economies ; the bulk of 
this being deposited in the US and the UK. 53.75% of the 
identified deployed net cash surplus was put in bank deposits 
in these two countries (see Table 2.2.). More than half of 
these bank deposits were placed in the Eurocurrency market.
The developing countries directly received 9.2% of the 
identified deployed surplus and the IMF and IBRD received 
6.5%. After 1974 there was a shift away from short term
liquid assets to longer term assets. This diversification of 
the portfolio was due to an investment strategy being outlined 
by the countries as well as an awareness of the different 
instruments available as well as the different rates of return 
on the different markets. Over the 1974-1978 period, the value 
of the funds going to the US increased. This was mainly due 
to the increasing role of the dollar in OPEC trade ^. The 
share of funds going to the developing countries has been 
facilitated by the creation of agencies to disburse funds to 
these countries. In 1978 when the surplus had declined to 
13.2 billion dollars, 6.2 billion dollars was directed towards 
the developing countries. At the time of the second oil price 
rise in 1979 there was again a large shift towards short term 
deposits. This was due primarily to the lack of an identified 
long term strategy in the face of the increased surplus, as 
well as the high short term interest rates prevailing at the 
time (Bank for International Settlement 1980). There was a 
greater diversification of deposits within the developed 
markets with a shift away from the UK and the US, In 1979 the 
share going to the developing countries increased slightly 
to 11% of the identified deployed surplus. In absolute terms 
the value of the funds going to the developing countries from 
OPEC did not vary much, although in relative terms there was a 
large variation, especially in 1978 when about half the cash 
surplus was deployed to the developing countries(See Table 2.2).
2.2 OPEC Financial Flows to the Non Oil Developing Countries
2.2.1 The Channe1s
OPEC financial flows to the non oil developing countries are 
on a bilateral and multilateral basis and on concessional and 
non concessional terms. Flows through multilateral agencies are 
either to existing ones or else agencies set up by the OPEC 
countries. Chart 2,1 shows the channels whereby the funds 
get to the non oil developing countries.
-JU-
Chart 2.1
Channels of OPEC Flows to the Non Oil Developing Countries
OPEC
1
CONCESSIONAL
1
NON CONCESSIONAL
BILATERAL
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MULTILATERAL
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AGENCIES
OPEC CREATED 
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REGIONAL
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1
INTERNATIONAL
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V NON OIL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES<g=
BILATERAL
V
NATIONAL
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EUROCURRENCY
MARKET
1, This refers to either all the countries which make up 
OPEC or else a subsection of countries within OPEC.
2. The single line shows the channels through which funds 
placed mainly for the benefit of the non oil developing 
countries pass. The double lines are the flow of funds 
which get to the developing countries, but not as a 
result of a policy objective of OPEC
By 1973 the OPEC countries had already achieved the goal 
set up for the DAC countries by the Pearson Report (1969) 
i.e. to achieve concessional flows to the developing countries 
equivalent to 0.7% of the donor country GNP. The disbursement 
of concessional flows from the OPEC countries is not equally 
divided amongst the countries and reflects,to a great extent, 
the distribution of the cash surplus among them. The Arab 
members of OPEC contributed a large absolute value and a large
percentage of their GNP to concessional flows compared to 
the non Arab members. In 1973, the Arab donors had allocated 
3,46% of their GNP in contrast to 0,04% by the non Arab members. 
With the increase in the cash surplus in 1974, the non Arab 
donors increased their contribution by giving away the 
equivalent of 0.47% of their GNP. This was still far lower than 
the performace of the Arab donors. In 1975, even with the 
decline in the current account surplus, there was an increase 
in the total OPEC commitments. (8405 million dollars from 5949 
million dollars in 1974 - OECD 1983), As a percentage of GNP 
concessional assistance in 1974 was the highest for the period 
1973 to 1980 (See Table 2.3).
By 1980 concessional flows had declined to 1.35% of the GNP 
which was the pre first oil price rise level i,e, in 1973 
(See Table 2.3). Total concessional flows had increased in 
nominal terms through to 1978 when it declined to 4611 million 
dollars. It however, picked up again in 1979, at the time of 
the second oil price rise. The low GNP ratio in 1980 was 
therefore a reflection more of the rise in GNP than a fall in 
total concessional disbursements.
Bilateral concessional assistance has been the main form through 
which the concessional loans have been disbursed since 1974.
In 1974 it was 3108 million dollars and rose to 6114.7 million 
dollars in 1980 (0ECDal981). The amount disbursed through 
the multilateral institutions grew over the period 1974 to 
1977. In 1974 about 34.5% of the OPEC contributions to 
multilateral institutions was to UN agencies. In 1977 the 
amount disbursed through OPEC created agencies had increased to 
89% of the multilateral concessional flows. This was primarily 
due to the growth in the number of these agencies. However, 
in 1978 there was a decline in multilateral concessional flows 
for the first time since 1974. This was mainly due to the 
reduction in disbursement through the Gulf Organisation for 
the Development of Egypt (GODE) in 1978 for political reasons.
In 1980 disbursements from multilateral agencies was down to 
862 million dollars (OECD^ 1981).
Table 2.3
Concessional Assistance by OPEC members to the Non Oil 
Developing Countries. Net Disbursements
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Arab Donors
Actual (million 
dollars) 1283
% of GNP 3.46
Non Arab 
Donars
Actual (million 
dollars) 25
% of GNP 0.04
Total OPEC 
Actual (million 
dollars) 1308
% of GNP 1,35
2974 4878
3.80 3 4.99
482 639
0.47 0.55
3456 5516
1.92 2.59
4670 5585 4187 5968 6802
3.84 3.80 2.56 2.79 2.34
939 338 425 138 175
0.67 0.21 0,24 0,07 0.08
5609 5923 4611 6106 6978
2,14 1,92 1.37 1,48 1.35
Source: OECD (1981) Development Co-operation Efforts and
Policies.Paris T>o 2^6
Table 2.4
Non Concessional Flows from OPEC to the Non Oil Developing 
Countries, (million US Dollars)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Total Non Concessional
flows. 438.1 2442.3 2652.1 2543.9 1593.6 1433.3
Bilateral 143.1
Multilateral (OPEC 
finance agencies) 295
1432.1 1413.2 874.7 1012.5 
1220 1130,7 718.9 420.8
Sources : OECDg, (1979) Development Co-operation Efforts and 
Policies, Paris. pi ?69
UNCTAD (1980) Handbook for International Trade 
and Development Statistics Supplement, Geneva
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ISbn concessional flows have increased over the period 1973 
to 1978, but have always been lower than the concessional 
flows. Bilateral non concessional flows are also larger 
than the multilateral flows as is the case for concessional 
flows (see Table 2.4).
The bulk of OPEC financial flows was therefore on concessional 
terms and on a bilateral basis. Concessional financial flows 
to developing countries has been justified on ethical, 
political and economic grounds (Shihata 1982 pp 54-56).
Aid on ethical grounds can be illustrated by the fact that 
OPEC gives aid to countries which are of no direct political 
interest to the donors (Shihata op cit). That there is a 
political reason for giving concessional finance is evidenced 
by the large amount of aid from OPEC going to non oil Arab 
countries, Kuwait in 1961, began giving aid to its neighbours 
as part of its foreign policy. Aid for economic motives is 
not as strong for the OPEC countries as it is for the DAC 
countries. On the other hand, funds were poured into Sudan 
in order to develop it as a bread basket for the Arab countries. 
Due to the underdeveloped structure of OPEC economies, they 
cannot benefit from tied aid. This would be a reason for the 
OPEC countries to increase disbursements of non concessional 
flows. The ethical reasons for giving aid are somewhat weakened 
if the disbursement of concessional loans to the developing 
countries is looked at as an attempt on the part of the OPEC 
countries to maintain the allegiance of the developing countries 
in the face of the disequilibrating effect which the oil price 
rises has had on their economies.
The earliest agency to be se.t up by a member of OPEC to disburse 
funds to the developing countries was the Kuwait Fund for Arab 
Economic Development in 1961, The aim of the Fund was to 
improve the relations with the neighbouring Arab countries.
In 1974, after the first oil price rise, the range of activities 
of the Fund was extended towards other developing countries.
By 1976, the share of non Arab countries receiving finance from 
the Fund had increased to 62% from 1% in 1974 (Scharf 1978p.JSs).
The Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development was another 
national agency set up in 1971 to provide financial flows to 
the developing countries in the Arab world, Africa and Asia.
After the oil price rise, there was a growth in the number of 
agencies which were to direct funds, especially concessional 
finance to the developing countries. The Saudi Fund for 
Development set up in 1974, acts as the government agency to 
provide loans to the developing countries. It gives mainly 
project assistance on concessional terms and sometimes 
gives loans on a regional basis, provided the countries concerned 
are willing to co-operate. Another national agency set up to 
allocate funds to the developing countries is the Iraqi 
Fund for External Development,
The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development was set up 
in 1971 just before the first major oil price rise. Its 
members are the 21 members of the Arab League and some of 
its main objectives are to help members remove development 
constraints, increase their absorptive capacity and achieve 
higher growth rates. The Fund is also concerned with the 
administration of the OAPEC Special Account which was established 
in 1974 to help Arab oil importing countries which had balance 
of payments difficulties due to the oil price rises. The 
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa was set up by 
the Arab League countries, but does not include the Yemens, 
Somalia and Djibouti, It began operating in 1975, The main 
recipients of the finance are the non Arab African countries 
and by 1979 Cameroun, Ghana, Mali and Upper Volta had received 
finance from this bank. The purpose of the bank is to foster 
financial and technical co-operation between the Arab and 
African countries. The Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa was 
set up in 1974 and was later affiliated to the ABEDA in 1976,
By 1977, 35 African countries had received assistance from the 
SAAFA of which 13 fell into the category of most seriously 
affected countries (Scharf 1978p,f^Another agency which is 
concerned primarily with African countries is the Arab Fund 
for Technical Assistance in Africa which was established in 1974.
The OPEC Fund for International Development  ^ established 
in 1976, is the only agency which has a membership of the 
thirteen OPEC countries. It had an initial capital base of 
800 million dollars. The main function of the Fund is to 
co-ordinate the joint OPEC members policies and activities in 
the field of external assistance and to act as collective aid 
donor (Shihata 1982 p 86). The Fund provides both project 
lending and balance of payments assistance. When the balance 
of payments loan is received, the borrower must agree to 
deposit an equivalent amount in local currency to finance the 
local costs of development projects. Failure to do this will 
result in the maturity of the loan being shortened. The 
philosophy of the Fund is to reduce the possibility of 
duplicating work already being done by established international 
agencies. All project financing is done in co-operation with 
other agencies. The advantage of this, apart from reducing 
the possibility of duplicating assistance efforts, is that it 
makes available to the Fund, technical expertise and information 
which it may not already have. The OPEC Fund has not only 
financed country projects and balance of payments, but has also 
contributed to other agencies. In 1977 it committed 435.5 
million dollars to the creation of the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development and it has also granted 20 million 
dollars to specific UNDP projects (Shihata op cit). The 
objective of the Fund is to assist the poorer of the developing 
countries. The sectors which obtain a lot of finance are 
agriculture and energy. By October 1981, 163 loans had been 
disbursed and 103 were still in the process of being disbursed.
The majority of the funds were allocated to Africa, followed 
by Asia and then Latin America (Shihata op cit).
Other multilateral agencies for channeling funds to the 
developing countries are the Islamic Development Bank and the
Arab Monetary Fund, The former was set up in 1974 with the objective 
of channeling funds to all Islamic states world wide. The 
Arab Monetary Fund was set up on the same basis as the IMF and 
is to provide credits to member countries to finance their 
balance of payments. Between 1976 and 1978 CODE was responsible
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for more than half of the OPEC disbursements through the 
multilateral institutions. The fund was set up by Kuwait, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emeriates to help 
finance Egypt's five year plan of 1976-1980, However, due to 
political reasons, disbursements were stopped in 1978.
Hence the sharp drop in disbursements through the multilateral 
institutions in 1979,
Table 2.5
Concessional Net Aid Disbursments from OPEC Financed Multi- 
Lateral Institutions (Million US Dollars)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Arab Fund for 
Economic and Social 
Development 7
Arab Technical 
Assistance Fund
Arab Bank for 
Economic Development 
in Africa
Gulf Organisation for 
Development of Egypt
Islamic Development 
Bank
Islamic Solidarity 
Fund
OAPEC Special Account 79
OPEC International 
Fund 1
Special Arab Aid for 
Africa
40 64 87 183 106 73 89
6
37
29 42 36 29
250 825 650
10 15 24 27
10 10 10
162 85 88 144 254
31 118 59 13
Total 117 158 419 1107 973 265 294 415
1. Not including contributions to IFAD, IMF Trust Fund and 
UNDP through the OPEC Fund
Note: AFESD, ABEDA and Is. Dev, Bank also provide loans on
non concessional terms. Net disbursements by these three 
institutions amounted to 157 million dollars in 1978 
and 219 million dollars in 1979 , The OPEC Fund began 
giving non concessional finance in 1980.
Source: OECDg (1982) Development Co-operation Efforts and
Poicies, Paris. p, 160
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The Latin American countries have not been well served with 
agencies compared to say the African and Arab countries. This 
is mainly because they are not considered to require much 
concessional assistance* Given that the bulk of countries 
described as least developed are to be found in Africa and 
Asia,on an aggregate basis the agencies have been set up to 
finance the needs of the poorer countries. This will be discussed 
in detail in a later section.
The OPEC countries have channelled some of their funds through 
already existing multilateral agencies. For example the OPEC 
Fund made contributions to the IMF Trust Fund, the UNDP and 
to IFAD, A wide array of the UN agencies have received 
funds from OPEC, In 1976, concessional finance to the agencies 
was 68,4 million dollars. By 1980 this had risen to 120,9 
million dollars (OECD^ 1981). Other agencies which the OPEC 
countries give concessional funds to are the IBRD, IDA, the 
African Development Bank and African Development Fund, They 
also give non concessional finance to some of these agencies.
The World Bank received $4140,6 million in non concessional 
flows from OPEC countries over the period 1973 - 1981 (OECDp/57 
1983). Over the period 1973 to 1981, the African, Asian, Inter 
American and Carribean Development Banks and the Central 
American Bank for Economic Integration received non concessional 
loans of 786,9 million the OPEC member countries (OECD 1983p. 157)
The developing countries have also had access to some of the 
OPEC cash surplus which has been placed on the Eurocurrency 
market. It is quite difficult to determine how much the 
developing countries have received from this source, since the 
OPEC countries are just a group out of the several countries 
and institutions which deposit on this market. About 40,6% 
of the investible indentified surplus was placed on the 
Eurocurrency market in 1974, This declined over the period 
1974 to 1978 until the second oil price rise in 1979. In 1974 
OPEC countries were net suppliers of funds on the market. They 
deposited about 29.1 billion dollars which was equivalent to 
about 16,4% of the total supply of funds on the market (BIS 1978).
In December 1980 their deposits were 19% ofthe total supply. 
Developing countries were net users of funds over the period 
1974 to 1980. On the basis of this, it can be concluded that 
some of the OPEC surplus was redirected to the developing 
countries. This is especially relevant to the middle income 
countries, since they had greater access to funds on this 
market than did the low income countries.
2.2.2. The Direction of Flow of OPEC Resources to the 
Non Oil Developing Countries ; Based on the Geographical 
Distribution and Income Groups.
OPEC financial flows are geographically concentrated with a 
large percentage going to the Arab countries. In 1975 net 
disbursements of bilateral concessional assistance to Arab
7countries was equivalent to approximately 78.9% of the total , 
with the largest allocation of 2072.7 million dollars going to 
Egypt. The large percentage of bilateral assistance going 
to Africa is heavily weighted by the dominance of the Arab 
countries. In 1975, 54.5% was allocated to Africa. This 
declined to 20.2% of the total because of the reduction of 
disbursements to Egypt, The countries in the Americas only 
received 0.014% i.e. 0.7 million dollars of the bilateral 
assistance in 1975. This rose to 1,4 million dollars in 
1980 i.e. 0.18% of the total bilateral assistance. In 1979 
Oceania received the first allocation of bilateral ODA from 
OPEC of 2,1 million dollars. (This went to Papua,New Guinea.) 
The recipients of multilateral assistance were more widely 
dispersed. The Latin American developing countries received a 
larger amount of their concessional flows from multilateral 
sources than from bilateral sources. In 1977 six American 
developing countries received 7.6 million dollars amongst 
them (UNCTAD 1980). Even though the Arab countries received 
more than 50% of the total concessional flows, there was 
some diversification away from them. In 1973 they received 
96.3% of the total concessional flows. By 1976 this had 
declined to 64.5% of the total (Shihata op cit pp50).
The Latin American countries received more of their flows 
from OPEC on non concessional terms. In 1975 they received 
207 million dollars of bilateral non concessional flows.
However, they did not receive any flows from multilateral 
sources over the period 1974 to 1978 from Arab/OPEC multilateral 
agencies (UN CTAD 1980). Most of the non concessional flows 
going to Africa were to Egypt, In 1975 it accounted for 
about 50% of African non concessional flows from Arab/OPEC 
agencies.
The skewedness of the geographical distribution of the funds will 
also affect the distribution on the basis of income. The 
importance of attempting to describe OPEC flows on the basis of 
geographical distribution and on the basis of income groups is 
that it will help in analysing the size of the OPEC flows to 
non oil developing countries in Section 2.1. The large 
absolute values of the flows as well as the ratio of the flows 
to GNP give a very favourable impression of the OPEC efforts 
to assist the developing countries on a concessional and non 
concessional basis. However, when the flows are disaggregated, 
then the relationship between OPEC and the developing countries 
on a financial basis looks less favourable.
The developing countries will be divided into three main 
income groups. The first group is the low income countries.
Lie, and consists of 61 developing countries (OECD 1982). In 
1976 they had a per capita GNP of less than 400 dollars.
Within these group of countries there is a sub group of 31 
countries, described as the least developed countries, LLDCs.
They have a low per capita income (100 dollars or less in 
1968), a low share of manufacturing in GNP(10% or less in 
1968), and a low literacy rate (20% or less for persons 
above 15). See OECD (1978) for a discussion of LLDCs, The 
second main group of countries are the middle income countries 
with incomes greater than 400 dollars in 1976, The third 
group are the newly industrialising countries, NIC, which 
may have per capita incomes similar to some MICs but which 
are differentiated because of the large percentage of 
manufactures in their GNP and exports^.
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Between 1976 and 1978 the share of bilateral ODA going to 
the low income countries was greater than that going to the 
middle income and the newly industrialising countries. In 
1979 the middle income countries received a larger share than 
did the 61 low income countries. This can be explained by 
the distribution on a geographical basis and by political 
reasons. The decline in the allocation of funds to Egypt 
resulted in an increase in funds going to other Arab countries 
which can be classified as middle income countries, for 
example Syria. The NICs did not receive bilateral ODA until 
1977. Even then, their allocation was very small compared to 
the other groups of countries. Given that the bilateral ODA 
is equivalent to at least 75% of the total concessional 
assistance it can be said that on an income basis, the 
distribution was favourable towards the low income countries 
until 1979 when the middle income countries received more 
than 50% of the total flows. The flow of concessional finance 
mainly to the low income countries is considered favourable 
because, due to the fragile nature of some of the economies 
they are less likely to repay loans on hard terms , Secondly, 
it is likely that the low income countries will use some of 
the external finance they receive for consumption purposes, 
thus justifying the need for concessional assistance.
In 1975 the low income countries not including the LLDCs, 
received 1002 million dollars in bilateral non concessional 
flows (UNCTAD 1980). This can be explained by the large 
amount going to Egypt in that year. After 1975 the middle 
income countries had the largest amount of non concessional 
flows receiving 452 million dollars in 1977 and 209.1 
million dollars in 1978, The newly industrialising countries 
received the least amount over the entire period.
Table 2.6
On the Basis of Income Groups.(Million US Dollars)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Least Developed Countries 638.4 774.3 523.8 596.4 822.3
Other Low Income Countries 2546.4 1242.4 1023.3 339.6 823.8
Middle Income Countries 1014.1 1207.1 1305.1 3264.1 4038.4
Newly Industrialising 
Countries 54.5 35 70.1 18.2
1, This includes the European developing countries as defined 
by OECD.
Source: OECD^ (1981) Development Co-operation Efforts and
Policies, Paris t)
Table 2.7
Total Official Flows from OPEC to Non Oil Developing Countries 
(Million US Dollars)
1975 1976 1978
Least Developed Countries 830.2 859 .4 5S0.S
Other Low Income Countries 3855.6 3227.3 1889.4
Middle Income Countries 1478.1 1524.6 1136.2
Newly Industrialising 
Countries! 31.8 67.7 74.9
1. Does not include European developing countries.
Source: OECD^ (1979) Development Co-operation Efforts and
Policies, Paris, p 278-79
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The lower income countries received the greatest percentage 
of the OPEC financial flows going directly to the developing 
countries between 1975 and 1978, As the information on 
bilateral ODA has shown in Table 2,6, this situation changed 
after 1978. Given that concessional flows form the bulk of 
OPEC financial flows to the developing countries, it could 
be concluded that OPEC flows were assisting the poorer 
countries in their development programme. However, the 
information on the geographical flows has shown that only a 
small number of developing countries actually benefited 
directly from the OPEC cash surplus and the disbursement 
of funds.
The decision on how to disburse the OPEC cash surplus was 
taken mainly on political and economic grounds. The ethical 
motive for disbursing concessional finance is rather limited 
after the analysis of the flows on the basis of geographical 
distribution. The discussion of OPEC financial flows to 
the developing countries illustrates the extent to which 
non convergence of interests can affect the international 
economic scene. The poorer developing countries may have 
required more OPEC assistance despite the rise in the oil 
prices since they may have had the need for external finance 
prior to the rise in the oil prices. The OPEC countries on 
the other hand have a differing set of variables to use 
when deciding how to allocate their finance. The lack of 
a developed money market, as well as the political and 
economic instability of the developing countries thus increasing 
the risks of investments, have all been ci ted as reasons why 
the bulk of the funds obtained due to the oil price rise were 
deposited directly within the financial markets of the 
developed economies. It has also been suggested that the 
developing countries need for long term project investment, 
did not necessarily coincide with the portfolio choice of 
the OPEC countries^!llick and Sutton .1982) . These factors- thus 
explain to some extent why the OPEC countries disbursed 
their cash surplus in the manner that they did and they give 
some indication as to what the possibilities are of changing 
the distribution of future cash surpluses.
2.3 The OPEC Cash Surplus and the External Indebtedness of
the Non Oil Developing Countries
The rise in the oil prices in 1974 and in 1979 were associated 
with sharp increases in the current account deficits of the 
non oil developing countries. The industrial countries 
also experienced large oil deficits in both periods. In 
Chapter 1, it was shown that given that some adjustment did 
take place on the part of the developing countries to the 
shock of the oil price rise, the manner in which they financed 
the rest of the existing deficit, i.e. between debt and non 
debt creating flows, can explain to some extent the growth 
of the external debt of the developing countries in the 
seventies.
To the extent that the oil deficits were not the only deficits 
experienced by the developing countries, then the growth of 
external indebtedness cannot be blamed largely on the oil 
price rises and the OPEC countries do not bear the sole 
responsibility of financing the deficits of the developing 
countries. That more direct flows of finance from the OPEC 
countries to the non oil developing countries (with a less 
skewed distribution) would have been to the advantage of the 
developing countries cannot be denied. However, this alone 
would not necessarily have stopped the growth of indebtedness 
because in 1978 when the current account surplus of the OPEC 
countries had declined, the non oil developing countries 
were still experiencing trade and current account deficits.
The contribution of the oil deficits to the total trade 
deficit of the non oil developing countries will be measured 
to show that other variables were at work at the same time.
Table 2.8 shows the trade deficit between the OPEC countries 
and the industrial and non oil developing contries respectively. 
In absolute terms the industrial countries had a larger trade 
deficit with the OPEC countries. This is a function of the
size and structure of the economies of the different groups
of countries ^. In 1975 it was calculated that as a percentage 
1 S
of the GNP the OPEC deficit for the industrial countries 
was 0.3%. At the time of the second oil price rise in 
1980 it was 2.3%. The non oil developing countries on the 
other hand had higher values than this. In aggregate the 
1975 oil deficit was equivalent to 1.5% of their GNP and was 
4.5% in 1980 after the second oil price rise (see Table 2.9).
The impact differed amongst the various categories of developing 
countries. The impact of the price rise for the LLDCs and 
the LICs was lower than the average for the non oil developing 
countries. In 1975 the deficit for these two groups of 
countries was equivalent to 0.73% of the GNP. In 1980 
this was 2.8% and 1,6% respectively. The middle income 
countries had the largest impact of all the groups of 
countries (see Table 2.9). This may be explained by the fact 
that some countries had extremely large imports of oil 
given the average for that group of countries. The Netherland 
Antilles imported the value of 2405 million dollars from OPEC 
and this rose to 6589 million dollars in 1980 (IMF^ 1981).
The NICs had a value of 1.02% in 1975 and the impact of the 
oil deficit rose to 3.92% in 1980.
In 1975 the US managed a trade surplus with the rest of the 
world* equivalent to^4169 million. Thus even though in value 
terms the oil deficit was large, the impact of this on the 
current account of the US was reduced by other transactions.
The trade deficit of the UK was reduced and became a large 
surplus by 1980 so that the initial detrimental impact of 
the oil price rise on the trade and current account was 
removed. For the developing countries on the other hand the 
experience differed. The non oil developing countries 
experienced both a trade deficit with the OPEC countries and 
with the rest of the world over the entire period of 1974 to 
1980. Table 2.10 shows the absolute value of the trade 
deficit of the non oil developing countries with the rest of 
the world for the years 1975, 1978 and 1980. It also shows 
what percentage the oil deficit was of the total trade deficit.
Table 2.8
OPEC Trade Deficit with the Industrial and Non Oil Developing 
Countries. (Million US Dollars)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Industrial
Countries
of which:
United States
United Kingdom
Non Oil 
Developing
Countries of 
which :
LLDCs
LICs
MICs
NICs!
■15104 -63102 -37717 -46944 -42805 -25441 -75108 -111775
-1668 -8065 -5696 -10019 -15977 -11980 -28267 -35566
-1446 -7189 -2209 -1907 -780 3599 1545 2346
-4565 -18998 -15025 -19087 -19043 -16365 -28663 -44374
-240
-1596
-6578
-3489
-397 -405
-1219 -1246
-9606 -10362 
-4230 —4460
-320
-1501
-7349
-4591
-814
-2341
-9284
-8731
-941
-3665
-15726
-13396
1. Not including European developing countries.
Calculated on the basis of IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
Yearbook, 1981, 1982
Table 2.9
OPEC Trade Deficit as a Percentage of the GNP of the Industrial 
and Non Oil Developing Countries
1975 1977 1980
Industrial Countries 0.3 0.5 2.3
United States 0.3 0.63 1.89
Non Oil Developing Countries 1.5 1.6 4.5
LLDCs 0.73 0.98 2.8
LICs 0.73 0.68 1,68
MICs 2,63 2.9 6.29
NICs 1.02 1.34 3.92
Calculated on the basis of IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
Yearbook 1982 and UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and 
Development Supplement 1980
Table 2.10
Non Oil Developing Countries Trade Deficit with the rest of 
the World (million US Dollars) and the Contribution of the
OPEC Trade Deficit to the Total Trade Deficit (%)
1975 1978 1980
Non Oil Developing 
Countries -53770
(27.9)
-54140
(30.2)
-95736
(46.3)
LLDCs -3585.75
(6.69)
-6074.83
(5.26)
-10412.9
(9.03)
LICs -6774.44
(23.5)
-9276.95
(16.17)
-12515.8
(29.2)
MICs -13789.2
(47.7)
-16171.4
(45.4)
-30366.3
(51.7)
NICs -9002
(38.75)
-5642
(81.37)
-16604
(80.6)
Calculated from IMF-y Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook
1982.
The oil deficit for the non oil developing countries in 
aggregate was just over a quarter of the total deficit in 
1975 and rose to 46.3% of the trade deficit in 1980. There 
was some relationship between the income group and the size 
of the oil deficit as a percentage of the total trade deficit. 
The LLDCs experienced the smallest impact in all the years 
shown. There was a reduction in the proportion of the deficit 
as a percentage of the total deficit for the LLDCs in 1978 
reflecting the decline in the oil deficit in that year. The 
extremely large value of the oil deficit of the total deficit 
for the NICs may be explained partly by the fact that these 
countries may have to some extent adjusted their balance of 
payments to the external shock without reducing their oil 
deficits . The impact of the first oil price rise on 
the external account of the developing countries on the basis 
of the evidence in Table 2,10 was smaller than was the second 
oil price rise. The OPEC countries did have a large impact on
non oil developing countries in the aggregate but as the 
evidence in the table shows, it was not the only cause for 
the balance of payments disequilibrium which they experienced. 
The major trading partners of the non oil developing countries 
are the industrial countries, thus the oil prices would have 
had to rise higher than they did for the position of the 
industrial countries in the trade league of the non oil 
developing countries to be usurped by the OPEC countries, 
Michalopoulos (1975) gave figures to show that the deterioration 
in the current account of the non oil developing countries was 
due mainly to their trade with the industrial countries.
Within the sphere of international adjustment the industrial 
countries were more likely to reduce their deficit with the 
OPEC countries because they have a capital goods industry with 
which to supply the OPEC countries with the needed imports to 
embark on their development programmes. As evidence earlier 
in the chapter has shown the industrial countries were even 
more likely to reduce their deficit with the OPEC countries 
because they would have a service account surplus with them.
For these same reasons the industrial countries were able 
to maintain surpluses with the developing countries. The 
industrial countries were able to adjust to the increase in 
the oil price rise by increasing the export of manufactures 
to both the oil and non oil developing countries (Gatt 1980).
For the group of non oil developing countries this was made 
possible largely by the external borrowing which they had 
undertaken during the period. The non oil developing 
countries on the other hand are less likely to have increased 
their trade relations with the OPEC countries mainly because 
the demand for their exports from OPEC would not increase by 
much since they exported a narrow range of products. The 
OPEC countries have always had stronger trade links with the 
industrial countries. It would be the newly industrialising 
countries which would have a greater opportunity of increasing 
their trade with the OPEC countries because they produced 
manufactures for export which have a high income elasticity 
of demand.
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The current account deficit which the non oil developing
countries had with the industrial countries was larger than
it might have been if the OPEC countries had financed the
deficits of the non oil developing countries directly. By
depositing the bulk of their cash surplus with private banks
in the industrial countries OPEC transferred the function
of directly lending to the non oil developing countries to
the banks. The recession in the world economy after the
first oil price rise was associated with an increase in
12protectionism by the industrial countries . This made it 
more difficult for the non oil developing countries as a group 
to reduce the oil deficit, and hence given the choice between 
reducing incomes or else financing the deficit, those countries 
which had access to the international capital market chose 
to finance most of the deficit thus leading to more indebtedness 
In the late seventies, there was a rise in interest rates 
which was primarily due to the domestic policy adopted by the 
major industrial countries to fight inflation. This put 
further pressure on the current account deficits of the non 
oil developing countries. In discussing the external debt 
of the developing countries within the international framework 
of the 1970s these factors need to be considered.
The scenario after the first oil price rise could have been 
different depending on how countries responded to this shock.
If the bulk of the non oil developing countries had decided 
to adjust more to the shock than they had done it is possible 
that indebtedness would be less than it is at present but at 
the cost of a deeper recession. As it happened it was the larger 
developing countries which decided to adopt more financing 
than adjustment to the shock, for instance Brazil which is the 
world's tenth largest economy. The advantage of this for 
the world economy in general and the industrial countries in 
particular was that it contributed to some amount of growth 
in the world economy and was quite important in contributing 
to the profits of the banks in the industrial countries in 
particular,
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In Chapter One the distribution of the debt amongst creditors 
was discussed and it was shown tha: a large percentage of 
the debt was owed to the private lenders in the DAC 
countries. The OPEC countries formed only a small part 
of the group of creditors since the bulk of their surplus 
was deposited with the banks. Amongst the group of developing 
countries it was the low income countries which held 
the largest amount of OPEC debt. In 1975 they owed 4.7 
billion dollars to the OPEC countries. By 1980 the 
amount of the debt owed to OPEC by the low income countries 
was larger than that owed to the private lenders. This 
illustrates the skewed nature of the distribution of the 
private financial flows as well as the OPEC flows.
However, given that the private flows were the larger 
of the two this shows to what extent the low income countries 
were left out of the new trend in the international financial 
system. The position was reversed for the newly industrial­
ising countries which in 1975 had less than one billion 
dollars of debt being owed to the OPEC countries but on 
the other hand had more than three quarters of their debt 
owed to the private lenders (OECD 1982).
Since only s percentage of the trade deficit of the non oil
developing countries was owed to the OPEC countries, it will
not be suggested here as has been done in some areas (see
Bhaduri 1982) that the OPEC countries should have taken
measures to alleviate the indebtedness of the non oil developing 
13countries . However, an increase in the direct lending by 
OPEC countries to the developing countries in the past could 
have been possible. Most of OPEC lending to the non oil 
developing countries was on concessional terms. It could have 
been possible to increase lending on non concessional terms to 
a wider category cf developing countries than was done in the 
past. Several writers have suggested that there should have 
been a diversification away from the developed countries in 
the deployment of the OPEC cash surplus (Saddy 1982; Shihata 
1982; Sobhauc 1980). It is possible that direct lending by OPEC 
on non concessional terms would have benefited the OPEC countries 
This is evidenced by the profits of the banks, made by lending
OPEC funds to the developing countries. Secondly, the 
denomination of a large percentage of OPEC liquid assets 
in dollars implies that the capital value of the deposits 
depends on the strength of the dollar. It has been shown 
that over the period 1974 to 1978 the purchasing power of 
OPEC assets declined by 42% due to the declining value of 
the dollar. (Aburdene's evidence mentioned in Petroleum 
Economist 1979). Sobhan (1980^) also aho.wed that assuming a 
certain distribution of OPEC deposits, the current value of 
OPEC holdings in 1978 fell by 18 billion dollars (p 406).
Their evidence shows that some diversification away from liquid 
assets would benefit OPEC investors. Given the reluctance 
of the industrial countries to allow the OPEC investors to 
buy up real estates or else to have substantial holdings in 
businesses within their economies, the OPEC investors could 
move to the developing countries and form partnerships with 
government or local entrepreneurs to set up projects and 
businesses etc., instead of having middle men do the job 
for them. The rates of return on commercial investments of 
OPEC have not kept up with the rate of inflation of OPEC’s 
imports. In 1976 the rates of return on total OPEC investments 
was 5.04%, it rose to 5.35% in 1977 but declined to 3.72% in 
December, 1978 (Sobhan 1980^ pp 405 - 406). The experience 
varied amongst the different member countries. Venezuela had 
the lowest rate of return in 1976 of 2.44%. By 1978 it had 
declined to 2% (Sobhan op cit). This would further indicate 
that a diversification of the OPEC portfolio may have earned it 
higher rates of return. There is a hesitance to invest in 
the developing countries because of the economic and political 
risks. However, given that the World Bank and the IMF have 
been able to lend to the developing countries without
incurring large costs it is possible that the OPEC countries
with the co-operation of the former institution could have 
invested in projects in the developing countries. The political 
risk of investing in the developing countries may be no greater
than investing in the industrial countries as the freezing of
the Iranian assets by the Americans in 1979 has shown. The 
benefits to the developing countries of getting a larger 
percentage of the OPEC funds directly is that they may have been 
able to obtain, loans with longer maturities to finance their
-Di­
projects, Secondly by receiving the funds directly from the 
OPEC countries they may not have had to pay for the costs of 
intermediation of the private lenders. The diversification 
of the OPEC portfolio investments does not necessarily 
imply that the role of the banks would be reduced. This is 
because the private sectors has the advantage of disbursing 
funds with speed. It is doubtful that the OPEC agencies would 
have been much faster than the existing international 
agencies.
An increase in OPEC direct lending to the non oil developing 
countries may have changed the structure of the debt.
However, this would not necessarily have influenced the growth 
of developing country indebtedness for the reasons discussed 
above.
Chapter One and Two have attempted to discuss the external 
indebtedness of the non oil developing countries within the 
framework of the international financial system of the 
seventies. Chapter Three will be a study of the Brazilian 
indebtedness within this framework. Brazil is chosen because 
its experience reflects some of the changes which took place 
over the seventies. Secondly in discussing the external 
indebtedness in the present situation it is the experience 
and position of a small group of countries which seems to be of 
major interest. Brazil is one of the countries within this 
group which has taken prominence in the present situation.
-DE­
NOTES
1, The OPEC countries are included amongst the group of 
countries described as developing despite their large 
financial wealth due to their oil revenues. This is 
because the structure of their economies is similar to 
that of other developing countries. In 1960, the life 
expectancy at birth for the oil exporters was about 45 years. 
This was lower than the average for middle income countries 
which was 51 years. By 1980 the life expectancy at birth 
for the OPEC countries had risen to 56 years, though it
was still lower than the average for the middle income 
countries which was 60 years (World Bank^1982). The 
population growth rate is typical of other developing 
countries. It was 2.6% between 1970 and 1980. 39% of the
population lived in urban areas in 1980 although the high 
income oil exporters (Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait and the 
UAE) have a percentage of 66%, The percentage of the 
population with access to safe water in 1975 was 42% which was 
lower than the average for middle income countries, i.e. 50%, 
High income OPEC countries had a percentage of 88. 47% of the
labour force of the oil exporting countries is still employed 
in the agricultural sector in 198C although this had declined 
from 65% in 1960 (World Bank^l982).
2. See Sampson (1981 pp 137-142) where he describes the American 
officials reaction to the large amount of OPEC funds deposited 
in the large US banks. The officials feared that the OPEC 
countries might be able to hold the USA to ransom because of 
this.
3. Sobhan ^ (1980 pp204 - 208) criticises the definition of the 
OPEC cash surplus which is normally given, as being biased 
to suit the needs of the western bankf
This is because they only consider that part of the OPEC 
revenues available for investment primarily within the 
banking system. The result is that the size of the cash 
surplus is underestimated.
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4. Singapore, Hong Kong, and other Asean countries have 
developed financial centres yet there does not seem to 
have been any significant shift to these centres over time.
The OPEC countries in their investment strategy were typical 
of other developing countries in maintaining a strong
bias in their external relations towards the industrial countries 
and former colonists, despite the potential for stronger 
links elsewhere. This may be attributed to lack of 
information, prestigious reasons dr a mixture of both.
5. There was a great investment in dollar holdings because other 
major currencies were protected from being used by the 
authorities of the countries concerned. For example the 
Japanese yen and the German mark (Aburdene and Stoga 1979).
6. It was formerly called the OPEC Special Fund and was set
up initially as a temporary institution.
7. These figures have been estimated from OECD tables.
8. This is based on information from OECD sources.
9. The smaller the size of the economy (GDP) ceteris paribus,
the smaller the amount of energy used. For example, <n
Tanzania, one of the LLDCs, fuels and combustibles form 
8,5% of its total imports in 1970. This rose to 18.5% 
in 1974. Brazil, a newly industrialising country had 
12.3% of its imports in 1970 as fuels and combustibles.
This rose to 33.9% in 1976 (UNCTAD 1980). Thus the large 
amount of oil already imported by the middle income and 
newly industrialisation process meant that they would have
a proportionately larger oil bill and hence a larger deficit 
with OPEC. Some countries, for exas^le Brazil experienced 
large oil deficits because their economies are based on 
energy derived from petroleum. Large importers of fertilisers 
would also be more exposed to the rise in oil prices than 
would other countries.
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10. The GNP used was for the year 197 7.
11. The large oil deficit also illustrates the extent to which 
some of these economies are dependent on oil. Brazil, for 
example, reduced its non oil imports between 1974-1978, 
whilst the value of it s oil imports was still rising (see 
Chapter Three) to 51362 million dollars.
12. Change in Exports to and Imports from Industrial Countries of
Exports To Imports From
Actual Percentage Actual Percentage
Value Change Value Change
75/76 16313 22 -3318 -2.9
76/77 13714 15,6 17291 15.7
77/78 12556 12.3 28283 22.3
78/79 33323 29.1 34112 22
79/80 30993 20.8 46035 24.3
'80/81 3637 2.0 23020 9.7
Source: Calculations based 
of Trade Statistics
on information from 
Yearbook, 1982
IMF Direction
The above table shows that the growth of imports from the 
industrial countries to the non oil developing countries was 
greater than was the growth in their exports to the industrial 
countries except in 1975/76 and in 1978/79 when the growth of 
exports was greater than that of imports. If it had been 
possible for the non oil developing countries to increase 
their exports to the industrial countries (through domestic 
policies and improved world trade conditions) the trade 
balance would have improved and there may have been less 
need for external finance. This is no attempt to put the 
blame of low export performance of the developing countries 
only on external sources.
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13. On the basis of the absolute size of the trade deficit of the 
industrial countries the flow of the surplus to these countries 
may be accepted. However, given the impact of the deficit as 
measured by the deficit to GNP ratio and the fact that the 
industrial countries could reduce the impact of the oil 
deficit by transactions on the services account,a greater 
amount of the flows could have been directed towards the non 
oil developing countries.
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Chapter Three 
The Brazilian Experience 1970-1981
The Brazilian economy has been experiencing a positive real 
annual rate of change of its GDP since 1968. It was only 
in 1981 that the Central Bank estimated that there was a 
negative real annual rate of change of 3.5%. The period 
1968-1973 was characterised by rapid growth, with an average 
annual real growth rate of 10%. In 1973 the real annual 
rate of change of the GDP was 14% (Central Bank of Brazil
1981). There was an immediate slowdown in the growth rate 
after the quadrupling of the oil prices. The real annual 
growth rate declined to 9.5% which was still very high when 
compared with other countries. On average the real annual 
rate of change between 1974 and 1978 was about 7%. In 
1979 the annual real rate of change was 6.8% rising to 7.9% 
in 1980. The decline in the growth rate in 1981 was mainly 
due to a decline in the industrial and services sectors. 
(Central Bank of Brazil 1981). The high growth rate of 
Brazil in the seventies compared to other middle income, 
countries may be attributed partly to a decision by the 
authorities not to allow a large decline in the growth rate 
and Brazil’s access to large amounts of external finance 
which reduced the need for adjusting downwards to the balance 
of payments disequilibrium which occurred after 1974.
The high growth rates experienced in the 1968-1974 period 
have been attributed partly to the inflow of external finance 
and the growth of external indebtedness (Cline 1981 p 105; 
Malan and Bonelli 1977 p 24)^.
The structure of the Brazilian economy has been changing since 
1960. The contribution of agriculture to the GDP has declined 
from 16% in 1960 to 11% in 1979. Industry and the service 
sector have been growing rapidly and in 1979 were contributing 
39% and 51% each to the GDP. This change in the structure 
of production is reflected in the export sector. Industrial 
products formed about 56.5% of total exports in 1980 whereas 
in 1970 they comprised only 20% (UNECLA 1980).
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Brazil’s experience has differed from that of a majority of 
the developing countries, especially those in Africa. For 
example Tanzania experienced a growth rate of 2.3% over 
the period 1960-1979 whilst Ghana had a negative growth rate 
of 0.8% over the same period (World Bank^ 1981). These 
countries still depend on primary products for more than 60% 
of their total exports and have a very small industrial 
sector. Despite the differences in the growth and structure 
of production Brazil still has some common features with the 
other developing countries. For example it had a high 
population growth rate of 2.2% in 1970-1979 compared to 
0.7% for the industrial countries. This is lower than 
Tanzania and Ghana which had population growth rates of 3% 
and 3.4% respectively over the same period. It has a high 
infant mortality rate of 92 per thousand comparable to Kenya 
which has a rate of 91 (World Bank  ^ 1981).
The World Bank (1981^) categorises Brazil as a middle income 
country. The Brazilian economy can be described as one in 
transition. This because it has strong features of growth 
and its structure of production is changing to become 
similar to that of the industrial countries. However, it s 
socioeconomic features are still similar to that of other 
developing countries, but are likely to change gradually 
over time. It will be suggested here that describing Brazil 
as a developing country is quite adequate since the economy 
has been experiencing growth and structural change. In fact 
some other countries described as being developing countries 
may be inappropriately categorised since, despite the fact that 
they may have low per capita incomes, they are not experiencing 
any growth or structural change at least within the past ten years
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The Brazilian External Debt: Its Size, Structure and
Growth 1970-1981
Brazil has a long history of borrowing abroad to finance 
investments and balance of payments deficits. It has 
experienced some debt problems in the recent past when in 
1961 it had to reschedule it s debt to prevent a declaration 
of default and again in 1963 (Donnely 1972; Syvrud 1974 p ./82-86.)
The size of it s debt outstanding has grown since then so 
that by 1981 it had the largest outstanding debt disbursed 
(65.6 billion dollars) and the largest debt service of the 
non oil developing countries (17.3 million dollars). (OECD
1982). The growth of debt varied over the period under review. 
Table 3.1 shows the different estimates of disbursed debt 
outstanding made by the Central Bank of Brazil and the World 
Bank. The real debt was calculated by deflating the nominal 
debt figures by Brazil’s export unit value.
The Central Bank of Brazil figures include private non 
guaranteed debt. Between 1970 and 1973 the annual rate of 
change of nominal debt rose continuously as measured by the 
World Bank. In 1974 the annual change peaked at 44% over the 
previous year. It was not until 1978 that there was another 
sharp rise in the growth of the nominal debt outstanding.
This was 49% for World Bank estimates and 35.8% for the Central 
Bank of Brazil estimates. This increase in 1978 was mainly 
because the Brazilians were taking advantage of the favourable 
conditions existing on the international capital market (Central 
Bank 1978 pp 157-158). Between 1979 and 1981 the annual change 
in the growth of nominal debt was less than it had been in 
the previous periods. The real debt rose less fast than did 
the nominal debt, even though it began from a larger base.
The larger real debt figures between 1970 and 1973 is 
because of the rather low export unit value during this 
period compared to the following periods.
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Table 3.1
Total Outstanding Debt Disbursed of Brazil 1970-1981 
Nominal and Real ^Million US Doliars)
World Bank Central Bank of Brazil
Year Nominal Real Nominal Real
1970 3680 6943 5295 9905
1971 4349 8527 6622 12984
1972 5444 9386 9521 16415
1973 7479 9467 12572 15913
1974 10794 10794 17166 17166
1975 13168 13168 21171 21171
1976 17224 14977 25985 22595
1977 21450 15212 32037 22721
1978 32028 24824 43511 33729
1979 35928 25301 49904 35413
1980 39153 25929 53847 35660
1981 43998 30984 61411 43247
Source: World Bank World Debt Tables 1977, 1980, 1982
Washington D.C.
Central Bank of Brazil Annual Reports
Brasilia,
The growth of debt outstanding was not due only to the external 
shocks experienced by the Brazilians in the seventies.
External debt was growing rapidly in the 1970-1973 period 
before the first oil price rise. Except for the surge in 
the rate in the 1973-1974 period the average annual rate of 
change from 1975 to 1977 was less than in the 1970-1973 
period.
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Debt per capita was rising with the total debt outstanding.
Real debt per capita, based on Central Bank of Brazil
estimates rose from 107.05 dollars in 1970 to 199.29
dollars in 1975 to 289.94 dollars in 1980. Given that the
total population is not of working age and that within the
15-65 age group there is unemployed labour the burden of
debt on the actual working population was higher than these 
2figures indicate .
During the seventies there has been a gradual shift towards
private sources of lending. In 1970 about 42% of the external
debt was owed to private lenders, by 1974 this had risen to
68.2% and was 84% of the total in 1981 (World Banky).
Brazil represents those few developing countries which have
had access to large amounts of finance from the international
private capital market. Very few low income countries were
able to borrow large amounts from these sources. For
example Tanzania in 1970 had 37% of its debt outstanding owed
to private lenders. By 1975 the amount owed to private
lenders declined in both absolute and relative terms
(World Banky 1980). On the other hand there was a continuous
disbursement from official sources so that by 1979 about
95% of it s debt outstanding was owed to official lenders.
Tanzania may be considered as a special case since even
though some countries may have a large percentage of debt
owed to official sources they did not have large access to
such sources of finance when official debt is measured on
3the basis of population or GDP . Borrowing from commercial 
sources was a deliberate policy of the Brazilians. They 
have been described by Wellons (1977) as 'eager' borrowers on 
the capital market.
In a pamphlet published by the Central Bank of Brazil, 
in September 1973 borrowing from the private capital market 
was justified on the basis of reduced official flows. It 
could be argued that if the private lenders were not willing
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to lend to Brazil on the scale which they did the Brazilians 
would have had to reduce their targeted resource gap and 
possibly the external debt would have grown at a slower pace 
than it did.
Financial (currency) loans were the main types of loans 
negotiated. In 1973 they accounted for 62.3% of the debt 
outstanding. This rose steadily to 73.2% in 1981 (Central 
Bank of Brazil 1981). Suppliers credit accounted for 11% 
of the debt outstanding. Bond financing became important 
in the late seventies. The bond market is limited to very 
few developing countries. Borrowing on the bond market 
became a deliberate policy of the Brazilians in the mid 
seventies in an attempt to improve the debt profile because 
of the relatively favourable conditions of this type of loan 
(Central Bank 1978 p 159). Very little of the Brazilian 
debt was owed directly to OPEC. As Chapter Two has shown, 
the Latin American countries and the newly industrialising 
countries received a minimal proportion of the direct OPEC 
flows. Given that Brazil is one of the largest oil importers 
it would be assumed that there would be a larger flow of 
non concessional finance to this country. Even if the 
criterion suggested by Crocket and Ripley (1975) is used 
Brazil should have received a greater amount of direct OPEC 
flows. However, as Chapter Two showed, due to political 
as well as economic and financial considerations, the direct 
funds from OPEC to the developing countries went to the Arab 
and Muslim countries and a large percentage of the cash 
surplus was deposited in the financial markets of the 
developed market economies. Thus in 1975 Brazil owed 25 
million dollars to OPEC which was equivalent to 0.1% of 
the Brazilian debt. In 1980 debt owed to OPEC rose to 57 3 
million dollars equivalent to 1% of the debt owed (OECD 1982p.58), 
It is impossible to discover how much of the OPEC funds 
deposited with the banks got to Brazil. However, Brazil 
was one of the large recipients of recycled OPEC funds from 
the banks.
Brazil has a large private sector debt. This is debt which 
is not guaranteed. In 1978 the public sector accounted for 
63% of the total debt outstanding. Private debt was 16 
billion dollars in that year and had grown by 25% above the 
1977 level. Most of it was currency loans and debt incurred 
by multinational companies (UNECLA 1978 p 123). The World 
Bank figures do not take account of this large amount of debt 
outstanding. In a situation of exchange controls it is 
important to take account of this type of debt since the 
holders of this debt will also require foreign exchange to 
service their debt and so will also have claims on the 
foreign exchange reserves of the country. This can put 
additional pressure on the exchange rate.
Debt service payments have been growing with debt outstanding, 
although after 1977 the annual rate of change of debt 
service payments was faster than the annual rate of change of 
debt outstanding. In the period 1978-1979 the nominal debt 
service payments rose by 32% whilst the debt outstanding 
rose by only 10% (Central Bank of Brazil 1981). Interest 
payments have also been growing faster than amortisation of 
the debt over the period 1973 to 1981. In 1973 interest 
payments on the debt was 514 million dollars and equivalent 
to about 20% of the trtal debt ser\'ice payments (Central Bank 
of Brazil 1981). This increase in the weight of interest 
payments in the total debt service can be explained mainly 
by the structure of the Brazilian debt. A large percentage 
of Brazilian debt is owed to the private lenders and at 
least 60% of the debt has floating interest rates. Thus 
with the increase in the interest rates in the late 
seventies as well as increasing spreads above the London 
Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) being put on the Brazilian loans, 
the interest payments have been increasing rapidly. The 
increasing interest payments has put some rigidity into the 
Brazilian current account. This is because the interest 
payments have to be paid. It indicates that if the export 
earnings do not rise very fast for some of the interest 
payments to be made out of these earning it is possible
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that the Brazilians will be locked into a long term debt 
simply to pay off for financing the debt service payments.
The debt service ratio and other indicators of the debt 
burden have been increasing over the period 1973-1981. The 
debt servide ratio, i.e. the ratio of debt service payments 
to export earnings, was 42% in 1973 (Central Bank 1981). This 
is high above the critical level of 20% above which a country 
is assumed to have debt problems (see Chapter One for a 
discussion of the - effectiveness of these measures as an 
index: of a country's indebtedness). These high debt 
service figures did not stop the foreign bankers from 
lending to Brazil indicating that despite the high debt 
service ratios the bankers still considered Brazil to be 
a good risk. In 1977 the debt service ratio had risen to 
51% and in 1981 it was 72% (Table 3.2). Other indicators of 
indebtedness for example the ratio of debt outstanding to 
GNP and debt outstanding to exports were rising over the 
period. The net flow of funds rose rather slowly over the 
period 1972-1977 (see Appendix Table 1). It rose sharply 
in 1978 but there was a continuous decline after that year 
until 1981. This to some extent may explain the growing 
ratio of debt outstanding to GNP. This is because even 
though the debt outstanding and disbursements were growing 
a large amount of the disbursement was being used to service 
the debt so that the amount left for investment (assuming 
that all external funds should be used for investment) to 
generate growth of income was less than would be expected.
The ratio of debt service to disbursement has been increasing 
over the period and in 1979 this was 70.5%. This growing 
dependence on external finance to service the debt indicates 
that if there was a supply constraint given that in the 
short run exports cannot rise fast enough to make up for 
the loss, there would be difficulty in meeting debt service 
payments. The present situation of a large portion of the 
debt not contributing to either domestic consumption or
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investments means that future generations will have to pay 
for external loans which did nothing to contribute to growth 
in the economy. They will be working to pay off loans which 
themselves were incurred to pay off past debts. There is thus 
an outflow of resources from the economy which should have 
been retained. This form of indebtedness in the latter part 
of the 1970's may be described as a dead weight loss.
Table 3.2
Indicators of the Debt Burden of Brazil (Percentage) 1973-;1981
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Debt Service 1. 13,2 13.1 16.6 18.1 21.3 31 36.2 34.4 31.9
Debt Service 2. 42.0 33.0 42.0 48.0 51.0 64 70.0 65.0 72.0
Interest Service 
Ratio 6.3 8.5 8.9 12.8 16.2 18.0 18.5
Debt Outstanding/ 
GNP 10.1 11.4 12.6 15.0 15.8 16.3 16.0
Debt Outstanding/ 
Exp 116.7 156.2 163.7 209.7 198.0 168.1 163.0
Re se rve s/De b t 
Outszancinz 50.0 37.8 33.7 40.2 27.6 17.6 17 .0
Source:1. World Bank World Dqbt Tables 1980, 1982 Washington D. C.
2.Central Bank of Brazil Annual Report 1981 Vol 18 No.2 Brasilia
Brazilian Policy Towards External Borrowing 1970-1981
In 1973 the Central Bank of Brazil published a pamphlet 
entitled 'The External Sector and National Economic Development' 
which outlined the authorities policy towards external borrowing. 
It stated that a country could develop faster when it had access 
to both domestic and foreign savings. This could be done by 
maintaining a resource gap with imports larger than exports 
but with both growing over time (Wellons 1977pp 104). It was 
also recognised that debt would increase over time since exports
could not grow very fast; but this debt need not be detrimental 
to the economy. The external resources were also required to 
finance the debt service and build up international reserves. 
The purpose of borrowing by Brazil was not to direct all 
resources so obtained to the export sector, but to ensure 
growth within the entire economy Domestic policy would 
ensure that resources were available for servicing the debt.
The success of the Brazilians in increasing their international 
reserves as a result of the borrowing policy can be seen from 
Table 3.3. The decline of the reserves in 1974 and 1975 is 
due to the large trade and current account deficits experienced 
by the Brazilians in those years and the lack of sufficient 
flows from abroad to finance the deficits. At the end of 
1972 the authorities had been concerned about the possibility 
of the large flow of funds contributing to increasing the money 
supply and inflation; as a result they put restrictions on 
the inflow of external resources (UNECLA 1975 pp 122) ^ .
Thus at the time of large deficits they needed to reduce the 
barriers to the inflow of external finance as well as draw 
down on their reserves to finance the deficit.
Table 3.3
International Reserves and Total Change in Reserve Holdings 
of Brazil 1970-1981 (U.S. Million Dollars)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
il Reserves
IS Gold 1142 1696 4133 6360 5216 3880 7192 11826 8966 5769 6604
ige in
îrves -530 556 -2437 -2227 1144 1235 -712 -4638 2860 3321 -752
(-) Increase in reserves over previous year
Source : IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1982 p 124
Washington D.C.
There was another decline in reserves in 1979 and 1980 during 
the time of the second oil price rise. The large trade 
deficits at the time as well as reduction in disbursements 
in 1980 contributed to the decline in reserve holdings. For 
external borrowing purposes the need to increase international 
reserves is based on the 'confidence effect'. An increase in 
international reserve holdings is an index of creditworthiness. 
Large reserves will encourage an inflow of external resources 
since it indicates that creditworthiness has improved. This 
explains the Brazilian policy of holding large reserves. However, 
international reserves are only one out of several variables 
which influence creditworthiness ^. The holding of international 
reserves also needs to be considered in terms of their 
opportunity costs. Instead of being held these funds could be 
invested in projects which would earn a real rate of return. Even 
when these funds are redeposited in the international capital 
market there is still a cost in terms of the difference between 
the rates at which the funds were borrowed and the deposit rate. 
However, insofar as the creditors realise that their loans are 
available to be repaid when they fall due this may cause them to 
continue lending to the borrowers. These costs and benefits 
need to be considered by the borrower.
The Brazilians borrowed abroad on the basis that there would be 
a continuous roll over of the debt as well as an adequate
debt management policy to ensure that there would be no il­
liquidity problems. The Central Bank of Brazil in its 
September 1973 publication used the coefficient of vulner­
ability  ^ to show that despite continuous borrowing and a 
rising debt service ratio the economy was less vulnerable to 
illiquidity problems due to interruptions in the inflow of 
external resources. The coefficient of vulnerability is:
' the proportion of annual exports receipts 
needed to meet any part of the annual debt 
service remaining after international reserves 
(reduced by their trade component an amount
needed to finance three months imports) have
been liquidated to service the debt '
(Wellons 1977 p 104)
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In 1972 the coefficient of vulnerability as measured by the 
Central Bank of Brazil had declined to 35% from 59% in 1968 
(Wellons op cit pp 105). The debt service had at the same 
time risen from 960 million to 2302 million dollars. The 
coefficient is favourable the higher the export earnings, 
the lower the trade component of the interntional reserves 
and the more favourable the loan conditions. Between 1968 
and 1972 the imports grew faster than exports. The coefficient 
became more favourable mainly because of the growth in 
international reserves reducing the trade component. The 
coefficient of vulnerability declined further after 1972 until 
1976 when it rose again (Central Bank of Brazil 1978 pp 168).
It became favourable again in 1977 although it rose in 1978. 
Over the entire period there was a downward trend in the 
coefficient thus implying that the policy of borrowing for 
the Brazilians was a safe one. Although the coefficient may 
be an indicator of past and present situations it cannot 
be used to predict future occurrences. For instance the 
rise in the oil prices increasing the value of imports and 
the rundown of reserves would cause the coefficient to 
deteriorate immediately. It also does not take into account 
the opportunity cost of holding such reserves. Thirdly the 
improvement in the Brazilian index over the period was more 
a function of external borrowing itself and the resultant 
build up of reserves than an improvement in export earnings.
To encourage foreigners to supply working capital to the 
Brazilian economy Instruction No. 289 was passed by the 
authorities in 1965. It provided short term credit mainly 
to subsidiaries of foreign firms in Brazil. The inflow of 
funds was subject to certain ceilings but it was possible 
to obtain the equivalent foreign exchange free of restrictions 
or guaranteed deposits on the spot exchange market with an 
authorised bank between 60 and 360 days after the inflow of the 
funds. The Instruction was removed in 1972 because it was 
found that local Brazilian firms were not benefiting from it. 
The multinational corporations because of their global 
operations were more well known in the international private
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capital markets, as most likely they were closely linked with 
the banks. They were therefore more likely to receive the 
loans from abroad. Secondly the local Brazilian firms required 
small sums of finance which would not be dealt with on the 
international capital market (Wellons ibid ,p 288). The 
existence of this facility also had an effect on the domestic 
money supply. This however, was more a function of the 
management of the exchange rate system than the Instruction 
itself (Syvrud 1974p.l9i)There was another channel whereby 
external resources could enter the Brazilian economy. In 
1967 the National Monetary Council (NMC) issued Resolution 
No 63 which allowed commercial, investment and development 
banks to borrow from external sources and then on lend the 
cruzeiro equivalent to local borrowers with the borrowers 
bearing the risk. The purpose of the Resolution was to give 
local industry access to funds from abroad. The amount which 
the banks could lend to a single borrwer was limited and 
the conditions of the loans which the banks undertook from 
abroad was determined by the NMC (Wellons ibid). The 
ultimate borrowers of the loans were to be enterprises involved 
in manufacturing or the distribution of goods and services (Wellons 
ibid). The domestic banks could not provide sufficient 
funds to meet local demand becuase due to the composition of 
their assets they could only lend on a short term basis. State 
institutions were the main source of medium and long term 
finance. The procedure involved in obtaining these funds 
however, was very long (Wells 1973). Thus allowing the banks 
to borrow on the international capital market to on lend to 
domestic borrowers increased their participation within the 
domestic economy. The inflow of funds under Resolution 
No 63 has increased rapidly as Table 3.4 shows. The largest 
source of external finance and a third channel whereby 
financial loans enter Brazil is Law 4131 of 1962. Under this 
law companies can directly negotiate for foreign finance 
themselves. The outflow of finance under this law is by 
arrangement made when the loan was registered. The advantage 
of this is that it encourages the inflow of capital. The
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disadvantage is that it does not take into account what the 
future situation of the balance of payments could be so that 
it is possible that undue pressure can be put on the balance 
of payments. All foreign capital which enters Brazil has to 
be registered with the Central Bank of Brazil in accordance 
with this Law. Foreign currencÿ loans entering Brazil under 
Law 4131 account for at least 60% of the total foreign currency 
loans.
Table 3.4
Foreign Currency Loans in Brazil 1970-1981(US Million Dollars)
1970 1972 1973 1974 1975 1977 1978 1980 1981
3. No. 63 of 
.8.1967
struction No.
9 of 14.1.1965 381.2 207.4
w No. 4131 
3.9.1962
653.2 2018.4 2398 3319 3734 5240 7273 9924 13456
71.1 68.9 46.1 26.8 27 9 8
1250.2 3302.5 5379 7823 10781 16262 22200 27886 31520
Source: Central Bank of Brazil Annual Report various issues
Brasilia.
Foreign currency loans accounted for 62% of the total foreign 
debt of Brazil in 1973 (Central Bank of Brazil). By 1981 they 
accounted for 73.2% of the total. The growth of debt owed to 
the international private capital market is due to the inflow 
of finance primarily through these channels. The Brazilian 
authorities by making these laws encouraged the borrowing from 
the Eurocurrency markets.
The favourable policy of the Brazilian authorities towards 
external borrowing especially in the early seventies explains 
to some extent the large external debt which they presently 
have as well as some of the debt service problems. This is 
because loans incurred in the early and mid seventies were due 
for repayment in the early eighties. The policy of maintaining
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a balance of payments surplus to some extent did not have the 
advantages which one would assume, since it resulted in the 
growth of indebtedness and made Brazil more vulnerable to the 
changes in the international environment in the late seventies 
and early eighties.
The Conditions of the Loans Undertaken by Brazil Between 
1970 and 1981
The conditions of the loans borrowed by Brazil over the period 
is also important in explaining the increasing indebtedness as 
well as the growing burden of debt measured by the debt 
burden indicators. It can be shown that unless the period 
of borrowing is strictly limited and the conditions of the 
loan favourable, it is doubtful that repayment of debt can 
occur in the medium term (Ohlin 1966pd^^^educed loan terms 
make the period of borrowing longer for a given repayment 
period. The second advantage of soft loans is that the net 
flow of resources is larger so that gross borrowing is lower 
and the growth of debt outstanding reduced. Chart 3.1 
illustrates this. Under the softer loan terms of the International 
Development Association there is about an 83 dollar resource 
inflow in the fifteenth year. Under the harder terms on the 
other hand net inflow falls to zero by the ninth year and by 
the thirteenth year the borrower is making a net outflow of 
about 47 dollars (see iOhartS-i),
Brazil has been borrowing continuously over the seventies. This 
would indicate that even if a single lender or loan package is 
repaid, it will be difficult for the Brazilians to reduce their 
debt outstanding without there being a large reduction in the 
growth of income.
The terms of the Brazilian loans from the private capital market 
were a function mainly of the state of the capital markets and 
the view which the lenders had of Brazil. Loans from the official
CHART 3.1
Decline in Net Flow of Resources if Gross Lending is Maintained 
at a Fixed Level of $100 per year
Dollar 100
80- IDA Terms
60- 60
INFLOW \ 
to Borrowe-r
40- -40
20- -20
Point at 
which NET 
Sflow drops 
V o  zero
AID Medium Terms
-20
Net Resource 
OUTFLOW 
from Borrowe40- -40
Hard Terms
60
lOyrs ISyrs5 yrs
International Dev. Association Terms (IDA) | of 1% interest 
and 50 yr maturity (including a 10 year grace period.
Medium AID Loan terms 3^% interest and 20 year maturity, 
including 3 year grace period.
Hard Terms. 5|% interest and 13 years maturity including 3 
year grace period.
Source: AID (1965) Loan Terms, Debt Burden and Development
AID April
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sources would to some extent also be a function of conditions 
existing on the international capital market.
The International Capital Market 1970-1981
The period 1970-1973 was one of rapid growth in the international 
capital markets and it saw also the growing participation of the 
developing countries in the market. The increase in commodity 
prices of the developing countries during this period increased 
their creditworthiness. They were also experiencing high growth 
rates which further improved their creditworthiness. The 
increasing use of syndication as well as roll over credits 
further lowered the risk of lending to the developing countries 
thus encouraging more banks to participate. Conditions of lending 
were quite favourable during this period. There was not much 
difference between the rates of interest on the private and 
official loans, thus making borrowing on the capital markets 
more attractive to the developing countries. The loans had grace
periods and the average maturity of the loans was about 10-12
>a
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years with small spreads above the LIBOR (Bird 1980„, Wionczeck
1979).
Growth in international lending continued until the first 
half of 1974. The relative excess supply of loans which had 
previously existed was removed due to large current account 
deficits and the need for financing resulting from the rise in 
the oil prices. The supply of funds on the market was increased 
due to the placement of a large percentage of the OPEC surplus 
in the Eurocurrency market. On aggregate a greater percentage 
of the current account deficit of the middle income countries 
was financedby commercial loans. International net lending from 
banks to both the developed and developing countries rose from 
an average of 27 billion dollars in the 1970 to 1973 period to 
50 billion dollars in 1974 (Williams 1980 pp 24). Activity on 
the bond market was low in 1973. This is because there was a 
situation of inverse yield curves thus making investment in the 
bond market unattractive (Versluysen 1981 pp 106-108)^. This 
weakness in the bond market contributed to growth in the credit 
side of the market.
•73-
In the second half of 1974 there was a slowdown in the international 
capital market and conditions hardened considerably. There 
was a banking crisis in the second half on 1974 due mainly to 
losses made on the foreign exchange market (Versluysen 1981 ppioif— lOS). 
This created uncertainty within the interbank market and it 
became difficult for banks to obtain funds for refinancing 
purposes. The premium the banks had to pay on the loans was 
2% above the LIBOR which was above the yields they would receive 
on their own loans (BIS 1975). The uncertainty in the market 
caused depositors to shift their funds into short term, 
overnight and call deposits leading to a mismatch in the medium 
term loans of the banks. Some banks withdrew from the market 
and there was a shift away from ‘balance of payments financing 
to project loans (BIS 1975; Williams 1980pZ6)_The result of 
these actions was to reduce the supply of funds available 
on the market for lending, increase the cost of lending and 
shorten the maturities. The average spreads above the LIBOR 
rose from the third quarter of 1974 until the third quarter 
of 1975. Maturities declined over the entire period of 1974 
and 1975 (table 3.5). The spread above the LIBOR is a function 
of several variables. In a study of the factors determining 
this, Johnston (1980) found that the lending risks, level 
of the LIBOR, the banks capital asset ratio and the cost of supply 
of funds from wealth holders were important variables,(Williams 
1980) also includes the intensity of interbank competition and 
the duration of the loan as factors determining the spread above 
LIBOR.
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Table 3.5
Publicised Medium Term Credit Commitroents. Evolution of Volume 
and Terms 1974 and 1975
Credit Commitments 
(million US dollars)
Average 
Spread(%)
Average 
Maturity(%)
1974
First Quarter 
Second " 
Third 
Fourth ”
6450
12392
4575
3593
0.82 
0. 71 
0.87 
1.25
8.73
7.92
7.60
7.13
1975
First Quarter 
Second " 
Third 
Fourth "
3114
4830
4830
7202
1.44
1.51
1.53
1.49
5.63
5.25
5.23
5.10
Source: Williams, R.C. (1980) International Capital Markets.
Recent Developments and Short Term Prospects pp 26 
International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
The maturities of the loans are a function more of the 
state of the market than of lenders’ risk perception (Williams 
op cit). The contraction in the market is reflected in the 
decline in commitments made in the third quarter of 1974. The 
reduction in the supply of finance available on the international 
capital market coupled with the increased demand due to the balance 
of payments deficits made the criteria for lending to countries 
more stringent. Countries with low ratings on the creditworthiness 
scale which would previously have had access to funds no longer 
qualified for them.
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The impact of the higher spreads was to some extent offset by 
the decline in the six month Eurodollar rate which fell from 
11.2% in 1974 to 7.6% in 1975 (Table 3.6). In 1976 the reduced 
balance of payments deficit of the industrial countries reduced 
the pressure of demand for loans and made possible an increase 
in the funds going to the developing countries. Confidence in 
the Eurocredit market had been restored due to the Governors of 
the Central Banks of the Group of Ten promising to give backing 
to the banks. The Federal Reserve Bank was willing to act as 
lender of last resort to banks facing illiquidity problems 
(BIS 1975). The improvement of the bond market at the same time 
also meant that industrial countries could tap that source of 
finance, so reducing pressure on the Eurocredit markets.
Table 3.6
Terms on Publicised Medium Term Credit 1973 - 1982
Six Month 
Eurodollar
Average
Industrial
Spread (%) 
Developing All
Average Maturity 
Developing
(yrs)
All
1973 9.32 0.64 0.99 0.78 9.64
1974 11.20 0.69 1.02 0.83 8.19
1975 7.61 1.37 1.56 1.47 5-2.C
1976 6.13 1.31 1.57 1.47 5.33
1977 6.42 0.96 1.40 1.22 6.17
1978 9.36 0.75 1.16 0.98 8.10 8.25
1979 11.99 0.60 0.83 0.75 8.75
1980 14.15 0.55 0 . 86 0.69 8.0
1981 16.51 0.48 0.93 0-71 7.75
1982 X 15.17 0.49 0.80 0.64 7.0
1: First Quarter 
Source: Williams (1980) International Capital Markets. IMF
Washington D.C.
Williams and Johnson (1982) International Capital Markets Il'fF p 69 
Washington D.C.
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In 1976 there was a decline in the average spread above the 
LIBOR and maturities began to lengthen. There was also a return 
of banks to the international capital market. Banks were 
encouraged to move here because of slack in the domestic 
economies of the industrial countries. Increased competition 
by the banks for borrowers induced a fall in the spreads above 
the LIBOR (see Table 3.6). The higher spreads above the LIBOR of 
the developing countries compared to the industrial countries is 
an indicator of the higher risk which was attached to the 
developing countries by the lenders. Commitments and lending 
increased. Commitments of medium term credit to all countries 
rose from 34185 million dollars in 1977 to 73724 million dollars 
in 1978. For the developing countries this increased borrowing 
was due mainly to a build up of their reserves (Williams 1980). 
Brazilian reserves peaked in 1978 and borrowing was to take 
advantage of the increased liquidity (Central Bank of Brazil 1978) 
Increased lending by the US banks and an easy stance on capital 
outflows by the industrial countries contributed to the increase 
in the supply of funds in 1978 (BIS 1979). 1979 saw the re-
emergence of the OPEC cash surplus and global balance of payments 
disequilibrium. The rise in nominal interest rates had a 
dampening effect on activity on the Eurobond market, thus 
increasing activity on the Eurocredit market. The high rates 
had a dampening effect on the growth of demand for finance due 
to balance of payments disequilibrium. There was scepticism 
about whether the banks would recycle the OPEC cash surplus on 
the scale of the first oil price rise (BIS 1979, 1980). This 
was because banks were already highly exposed to some of the major 
deficit countries. Medium term commitments declined slightly in 
1980 to 32.3 billion dollars, but rose again in 1981. In 1981 
maturities shortened slightly and there was a slight rise in the 
spreads above LIBOR for the developing countries compared to the 
previous year. Spreads above LIBOR for the industrial countries 
fell in 1981 (Table 3.6) The increase in spreads of the non oil 
developing country loans is in response to the increased risk 
threshold of the lenders vis a vis the developing countries
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because of their increased exposure. Concern about bank exposure 
within the Central Banks resulted in certain guidelines being 
established by the Central Banks of the UK and the US (Williams 
and Johnson 1982).
Lending to Individual Countries
The interest rate and spreads above the LIBOR are used as 
measures to protect the lender against the risk of default.
There are limits beyond which the spreads can rise. In such 
circumstances the lender may impose credit rationing (Kapur 1977).
The bankers estimation of the creditworthiness of borrowers 
determines the conditions and the supply of loans. In a study 
made by Kapur (1977) to find the factors which determined the 
supply of funds to the developing countries five variables made 
up his index of creditworthiness. The five variables were the 
gross claims outstanding of the banks on individual countries 
at the end of the previous period, the average annual rate of 
growth of real GNP over the current and previous period, exports 
of goods and services and the projected debt service ratio. These 
variables were regressed against the increase in the gross flow 
of funds to individual countries and were all found to be 
significant. Non quantifiable variables are also iiapcrcani in 
determining the supply of funds and the conditions of loans tc 
individual countries. An example of such variables is the 
relationship between the borrower and the industrial countries 
and political stability (Cohen 1981 pp 82 - 84; Wellons 1977 
pp 67 - 70). The variables used by the bankers to measure the 
creditworthiness of the country are similar to those discussed 
by Kapur For example the check list system is used by bankers
to rate or score individual countries using quantifiable and non 
quantifiable variables (Cohen 1891 pp 86-90; Tbomblade 1978),
The variabes used in the check list system described by Themblade fall 
into three main groups. The first group is a measure of develop­
ment . The second group is a measure of the rate of development 
and the third group is a measure of international liquidity.
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In a survey of the different methods used in country risk 
analysis it was found that the banks embarked on this mainly 
to set country exposure limits and improve the quality of their 
portfolio. There were certain variables which were used by 
all banks. These were the GNP per capita or growth, inflation 
rate or growth of money supply the budgetary balance of the Central 
Government, the domestic savings ratio and foreign trade related 
variables (Burton and Inoue 1983). Lomax (1983) has criticised 
the entire recycling process which occurred in the aftermath 
of the oil price rises. The attitude of the central banks and 
governments to this phenomena encouraged low creditworthiness 
standards. He states that the normal creditworthiness criteria 
was not adhered to and the lenders only used methods which were 
subjective to their requirements. Some of the variables used, 
for example the existence of raw materials has been critised on 
the basis that the loan will not be repaid in kind. The credit 
criteria which Lomax suggests is that the country should have 
reserves which result from export activities and not from 
borrowing for revenue building purposes. Secondly the debt 
service ratio should be not more than about 20%. His liquidity 
criterion is a strengthening of the usual measure of liquidity 
used by the banks. In fact it is possible that if this measure
was used there would have been a large slowdown in the rate of
disbursements going to Brazil. However, Lomax's second criterion 
is subject to the criticism made in Chapter One about the
usefulness of the debt service ratios.
Brazil experienced higher spreads than did other developing 
countries in general (Table 3.7). The high spreads for Brazil 
reflect the conditions existing on the interntional capital market 
during the period 1974 and 1975 and after 1979, the risk perception 
of the lenders and the policy of the Brazilian authorities. On a 
scale rating Brazil performs better than most developing countries 
on the basis of the first twotfThomblade's three groups for the 
checklist system. This explains the continuous supply of funds 
to Brazil compared to other developing countries say Tanzania and 
Ghana. However, being one of the largest developing country
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borrowers on the capital markets, it would, over time, become 
of increasing importance in the bank's portfolio. This would 
explain the higher spreads. In 1977 the ratio of Brazilian 
loans to bank capital of the 9 largest US banks was 47.9%.
For all US banks this ratio was 33.2% (Federal Reserve Bank).
By June 1982 Brazil owed 46382 million dollars to the banks 
(Williams and Johnson 1982). In 1976-1978 when the spreads were 
falling for all countries in aggregate they were still rising 
for Brazil. It was not until 1979 that they began to fall but 
were still higher than the average for the developing countries. 
Brazilian authorities preferred to trade off longer maturities for 
higher spreads. This is evident that from Table 3.7 (see also 
Euromoney . 1981 where there is an interview with J.C. Madera 
Serrano). The extent to which the Brazilians can arrange this 
depends also on the lenders, since as their exposure to a country 
rises, they may be less likely to lend for long periods.
The terms of official loans to Brazil were more favourable 
compared to the private loans. Official loans however, became 
harder over the period. In 1972 the interest rate of official 
loans was about 6.8 (World Bank^ 1982).
This rose slowly over the period tc 9,8% in 1981. Maturities 
also declined from 19.5 years in 1972 to 13.8 years in 1981. The 
value of the grant element on new commitments was 19.7% in 
1972 but declined to 2.1% in 1981. This contrasts with the private 
loan commitments which in 1981 had a grant element of -28.4%
(World Bank|^1982).
The increasing hardness of the Brazilian loans shows that to 
receive a certain net flow of resources gross borrowing had to 
rise continuously. This explains partly the growth of debt 
outstanding. It is however, also a function of the general 
policy towards external borrowing.
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Table 3.7
Lending Conditions for Brazil Compared with Other Countries
Developing Countries Brazil France
Spread (%) Maturity(yrs) Spread(%) Maturity(yrs) Spread(%)
1974 1.02 8.19 1.23 10.2 0.58
1975 1.56 5.20 1.70 6.9 1.42
1976 1.57 5.35 1.91 9.1 1.09
1977 1.40 6.17 1.96 8.1 0.92
1978 1.16 8.10 1.59 9.2 0.63
1979 0.83 1.08 11.1 0.39
1980 0 . 86 1.18 8.9 0.39
1981 0.93 1.92 8.0
Sources : First two columns are from Table 3.6
Information on Brazil and France obtained 
from Bacha and Alejandro (1982). International Financial 
Intermediation : A Long and Tropical View p 19. Essays . 
in International Finance. Princeton Universitv Princeton
The Effect of the Loan Conditions on the External Account of Brazil
The average maturity of the loans and the debt profile is 
important in its effects on the balance of payments. A 
bunching of the repayments implies that not long after the loan 
is negotiated there is a large outflow of funds from the capital 
account which if there is also a current account deficit needs to be 
financed as well. In 1968 the debt profile was highly unfavourable. 
26% of the debt had to be repaid in the first year. The KMC in 
1971 stipulated that the inflow of short term funds in one month 
should not be greater than those maturing that month. In 1972 
minimum maturity requirements of about 8 years was imposed on the 
loans coming into Bïrazil to help improve the debt profile (IMF^ 1973)
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The percentage distribution of repayments improved, although 
the value of amortisation increased over the period (Table 
3.8). The maturity profile of the currency loans is less favour­
able compared to other loans (Table 3.8). This reflects the 
fact that they were obtained from private lenders. In 1979 the 
debt profile was slightly less favourable compared to other years. 
65% of the debt was to be amortised in the following 5 years.
It improved slightly after in 1980. The Annual Report (1979) of 
the Central Bank of Brazil recognised that the growth in 
amortisation and the condition of the debt profile was the result 
of
'domestic policy with regard to the foreign
capital inflow and the degree of liquidity
existent on the international market'
(Central Bank 1978 p 169)
Nominal amortisations increased by about three times over the 
period 1970 - 1981. This reflects the growth of debt outstanding 
as well as the maturity structure of the loans. Real amortisations 
grew less fast than did the nominal amortisation. Real 
amortisation was equivalent to about 4548 million dollars in 1981 
compared to nominal amortisation of about 7690 million dollars 
(Table 3.9).
Interest payments have been growing rapidly over the period 1973- 
1981. They grew faster than did amortisation payments over the 
same period (Table 3.9). The impact of interest payments on the 
external account is shown by the ratio of interest payments to 
the current account deficit. This has increased from 23% in 
1973 to 78% in 1981 (Table 3.9). This growth in interest payments 
is due mainly to toe rise in the LIBOR in the late seventies and 
the high spreads above the LIBOR experienced by Brazil. A 
reduction in the spreads and the LIBOR would reduce the interest 
payments and the current account deficit so reducing the need for 
adjustment and financing of the deficit. The disadvantage of the 
large interest payments is that they are contractual obligations 
and thus take priority of the export earning. This indicates that 
in order for the import requirements to be met, borrowing would be
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Table 3.8
1Foreign Debt Profile of Brazil - Fixed Maturity Debt
Item 1st yr 2nd yr :3rd yr 4th yr 5th yr After 5th yr
1968-DEC 26 8 8 6 5 46
Currency 83 7 3 1 1 5
Other 10 9 11 7 6 57
1973-Dec 14 13 12 12 10 39
Currency 17 14 15 14 12 28
Other 10 10 9 8 7 56
1974-Dec 11 12 12 11 11 43
Currency 12 12 13 13 12 38
Other 11 11 10 9 8 51
1979-Dec 13 14 14 11 9 39
Currency 14 16 15 12 8 35
Other 12 11 11 9 10 47
1980-Dec 14 13 12 10 10 41
Currency 15 13 12 10 10 40
Other 14 13 11 10 8 44
1981-Dec 12 11 11 12 13 41
Currency 11 11 11 13 14 40
Other 14 12 12 10 10 42
1. The payment schedule of the principal is 1distributed on a
percentage basis in relation to the balance. The component
'currency ' corresponds to financial loan operations carried ou
under the terms of Resolution No .63 (21.8 .67) , Instruction No.
289 (14.1 .65), and Law 4131 (3.9 .62) .
Source: Central Bank of Brazil Annual Report 1981 Vol 18 No.2
p 108, Brasilia.
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required to cover these payments. Since, in almost all the
years between 1973 and 1981 the imports of goods and services
was greater than the exports, it indicates that external finance
was needed to cover the payment for the imports. The disadvantage
of the interest payments of Brazil is that they encourage further
indebtedness. Even though the real interest payments as deHaied by the
consumer price index was lower than the nominal values (Table 3.9)
the net barter terms of trade deteriorated in 1974, 1975 and
between 1978 and 1980. This indicates that the burden of the
debt service payment in those years was greater than the lower real
debt service payments would indicate. It would be difficult
for the Brazilians to try and maintain their debt service payments
by an increase in exports alone. A reduction of imports would
be at the cost of a slow down in growth. Some new borrowing
would be required if only just to fill the gap left by export
earnings. Imports can only be reduced to a certain limit since
the slow down in growth of output which would occur should not be
such as to reduce the potential for exports.
The decline in the interest payments as a percentage of the current 
account deficit in 1974 may be attributed to the rise in the 
deficit due to the rise in the oil prices and the value of non 
oil imports which occured. Between 1974 and 1975 the value of 
nominal interest payments more than doubled thus making its
impact on the external account equivalent to the 1973 level.
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Table 3.9
Net Interest Paymerts and Amortisation (Nominal and Real) of 
Brazil (Million US Dollars)
Nominal Net (1) as a (%) of Real Net
Interest the current Interest
Payments account deficit Payments
Nominal Real
Amortisa- Amortisa­
tion tion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1973 514 23 646.5 2063 2594.9
1974 652 8 724.4 1943 2158.8
1975 1498 21 1498.0 2168 2168.0
1976 1810 27 1671.8 3004 2773.7
1977 2103 41 1789.8 4123 3508.9
1978 2696 38 2141.3 5426 4309.7
1979 4186 39 3046.5 6527 5123.2
1980 6311 52 4106.0 6689 4351.9
1981 9170 78 5422.8 7690 4547.6
Real net interest payments is nominal payments deflated by the 
consumer price index of industrial countries from IMF International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1982. Columns (1) and (4) were 
obtained from Central Bank of Brazil Annual Report 1981 Vol 18,
No. 2 p 108 Brasilia.
The Central Bank of Brazil includes short term debt in its 
calculation of the total foreign debt. This comes under tne 
heading of Sundry Loans. (Central Bank of Brazil 1981 p 87).
It is however, not the sole component under this heading. Sundry 
Loans in 1973 were 266 million dollars equivalent 2.2% of the 
debt. In 1981 this was now 157 million dollars equivalent 0.3% 
of the debt (Central Bank 1981 p 104). The Grindlay Bank Group 
estimated that Brazil's short term debt in 1981 was 8 billion 
dollars. This is larger than the official Brazilian figures..
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The Brazilian authorities however, were not very worried 
about the growth of this debt since it was supposed to be made
up mainly of trade credit which was a roll over phenomena
and it also reflected the activities of Brazilian banks within 
the international financial system. There was no firm control 
over this debt. By 1982 it was found that the Brazilian short
term debt was twice that which the authorities claimed it to
be. The amount of short term debt for trade financing was 
15.5 billion dollars and interbank emergency loans were 4.5 
billion dollars which brought the short term debt to 20 
billion dollars (The Guardian 1982 pp 18). These emergency 
loans were required for rolling over the medium term debt 
and it was found out that a cut by the international banks on 
short term loans of about 10% would be equivalent to about a 
2 billion dollar loss of funds required to roll over the longer 
term debt (The Guardian 1982). This development had thus made 
the Brazilians vulnerable to a supply constraint since as 
current developments have shown reluctance of the international 
banks to continue their interbank line with Brazil has resulted 
in arrear in their payment.
3.4 The Oil Price Rises in 1970's
The oil price rise of 1973/74 and 1979/80 also contributed to 
the growth of the Brazilian external debt. The immediate 
impact of the first oil price increase was a large trade 
deficit. The value of oil in total imports took on a larger 
weight. In 1970 oil imports were equivalent to 12.35% of the 
total. In 1973 this had risen slightly to 15.07% and doubled 
after the oil price rise to 31.59% of the total imports (UNCTAD
1980). The second oil price rise did not cause the value of 
oil imports in total imports to rise by as much. In 1980 they 
were about 41.2% of the total (IMF^ , 1982). Brazil was highly 
dependent on oil for most of its energy needs, thus making it 
quite vulnerable to the price rise of the seventies.
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To find out the effect of the oil price rise on the external 
account of Brazil the additional cost of net oil imports was 
calculated and its relationship with the trade account 
considered. The trade balance is used here because it is a 
function of fewer variables than is the current account. The 
additional cost of net oil imports is the difference in value 
betweeen a given volume of oil imports at an initial price 
and the value of the same volume of imports at the new price.
It is thus possible to capture the effect of the price change.
The analysis was done for two periods 1973-1977 and 1978-1981.
In the first period the given volume of oil imports used was that 
of 1973 and in the second period it was the 1977 net imports.
The reason for the division of the 1973-1981 period was to 
take into account the effect of the two major oil price rises 
in that period (see Appendix Table Two). The prices of the 
net oil imports were obtained by dividing the volume of imports 
by their total value. The ratio of the additional cost to 
the trade account and the value of imports shows the extent 
to which the oil price rise contributed to the deterioration 
of the trade account and the rise in the value of imports.
In 1974 the cost of a metric tonne of oil was about 88.66 
dollars rising from 26.57 dollars in 1973. This was a rise of 
about 233% (see Appendix Table Two). At the same time the 
volume of imports only rose by 3% so that the 162% increase in 
the value of oil imports was due mainly to the rise in price. 
Between 1974 and 1977 the average annual percentage change in 
the price of oil was about 3.5%
The value of the additional costs was of increasing influence 
on the trade balance (Table 3.10). The additional cost them­
selves were rising and the trade balance declining thus increasing 
the weight of the former. If there had been no oil increase 
but assuming all other variables to behave as they did after 
1974, the trade balance for Brazil would have been more favourable 
For example in 1974 the trade deficit would have been 4481 
million dollars and would have declined until 1977 when it would 
become a surplus of 823 million dollars. (This however, is merely
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a hypothetical, situation. This is because non oil imports 
could have behaved differently than they did, had there not 
been an oil price rise causing the trade balance to depreciate 
or improve more than hypothesised. Variation in export 
earnings would also affect the trade balance.)
Table 3.10
The Impact of the Oil Price Rises On The Trade Balance and
Imports of Brazil
Additional Trade Balance Additional Imports Additional
Cost USm US dollars m Cost/Trade 
Balance (%)
(c.i.f.) 
US m
Cost/Imports 
(%)
1974 1854 -6354 29 -14168 13.0
1975 1887 -5100 37 -13592 14.0
1976 2026 -3766 53 -13726 15.0
1977 2155 -1334 161 -13257 16.0
1978 30 -2581 1 -15054 0.2
1979 1321 -4560 29 -19804 6 .6
1980 5310 -4829 110 -24961 18.1
Source: Calculated on the basis of:
Washington D.C.
UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics
various issues. New York.
The oil price rise caused the value of Brazilian iaborts to 
rise by 13% in 1974. This progressivley became higher until 
1977. The growing influence of oil in the imports was made 
larger by the decline in the value of non oil imports in 
the period 1975-1977.
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It has been suggested that the deterioration in the trade 
deficit of 1974 was not due largely to the oil price rise 
(Balassa 1979 <p 1035; Cline 1981 p 107; Malan and Bonelli 
1977 pp26). The trade deficit would have been reduced if 
there had not been a simultaneous rise in the unit value 
and volume of non oil imports. In 1973 the value of non oil 
imports was 6013 million dollars. The value of non oil 
imports rose to 10935 million dollars in 1974 and declined 
in 1975 until 1977 (IMF^  ^ 1982) . Between 1973 and 1974 there 
was a rise of 82% in the value of Brazilian non oil imports. 
The volume of total imports rose by 35% over the period and 
the unit value by 46%. Given that the volume of oil inç>orts 
rose by only about 3% over the 1973-74 period, the main reason 
for the rise in total import volumes was due to the non oil 
imports. It was found that in 1974 oil imports were 28% of 
the increase in the value of total imports and rose to 35% 
in 1975. This is corroborated by Cline (1981) who states 
that a third of the total increase in the value of imports 
during the period of the first oil price rise was due to the 
rise in the value of oil imports. According to Balassa (1979 
p 1035) in 1974 the increase in the oil prices and 1.5 
billion dollars of the increase in the import-prices could be 
offset by the increase in the value of exports. However, the 
rest of the deterioration in the trade balance was attributed 
to 'increased imports at high levels of capacity utilisation’. 
The rise in the value of oil imports has been attributed to 
speculative stockpiling, the investment requirements of the 
First National Development Plan, the excessive expansion of 
domestic credit and failure to allow the exchange rate to 
depreciate fully (Balassa 1979; Malan and Bonelli 1977 pp 30 
and Wells 1979). There was an increase in stocks held between 
1972 and 1975. As a percentage of the GNP these were 2.5%, 
4.2%. 7.1% and 2.3% for each year respectively (IMF^ 1982).
The economy at the time of oil price rise has been described 
as being overheated (Wells 1979). The potential capacity and 
actual capacity were almost the same (Malan and Bonelli 1977 
pp 27 - 28). To continue with growth imports were required
—89—
on a large scale since the demand was larger than domestic 
supply of capital goods. The oil price rise thus aggravated 
a very unstable situation.
In the second period 1978 - 1980 although the price of oil 
only doubled in 1979/80, the impact on the trade balance was 
similar in effect compared to the first oil price rise (Table 
3.10). The value of imports rose by much more in 1980 than 
they had done in 1974, The situation was similar to that of 
the first oil price rise because imports had again risen in 
value. In 1979 non oil imports were 12886 million dollars 
and 14670 million dollars in 1980. The rise in the oil 
prices further contributed to a deterioration in the trade 
balance.
The oil price rise contributed to the growth in the external 
debt of Brazil because by increasing the trade deficit or 
reducing a potential surplus, it had reduced the import 
capacity of export earnings. The oil price rise also affected 
the external account via the reduction in import demand of 
the industrial countries. To finance the import requirements 
external borrowing had to occur. Whether or not the oil price 
rise would cause the debt to rise by an amount equivalent tc 
the oil deficit depended on several factors. From the 
Brazilian point of view it depended on their policy decisions 
and the choice of the mix of adjustment and financing.
Although the oil price rises contributed to*an increase in 
the Brazilian trade deficit, it cannot be expected that the 
OPEC countries take full responsibility for the disequilibrium 
which occured in 1974 and again in 1979. This is because any 
difficulties experienced by any country after the first year 
of the disequilibrium depends mainly on how the country responded 
to the initial shock. Secondly the discussion in Chapter Two 
showed that since the industrial countries are the main trade 
partners of the developing countries, their actions in the 
international economy would be of extreme importance to the 
developing countries. A greater co-operation between the OPEC
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countries in terms of financing the deficit through projects 
and even financial loans would have been to the advantage 
of the Brazilian economy. Even then domestic policy decisions 
taken by the Brazilians as well as the actions of the industrial 
countries would have also been important in determining the 
success of such co-operation between OPEC and Brazil.
Policy Response to Oil Price Rise
There was a reluctance to allow a large fall in the growth 
of income in response to the oil price rise of 1973/4.
Cline (1981 pp 124) has attributed this to political reasons 
as well as an attempt on the part of the policy makers to 
respond to this shock in the same way they had done to 
internal shocks in the past. The Minister of Planning at 
the time J.P. dos Reis Valloso, has been quoted as saying 
that the Brazilian alternative to a recession was to have 
' moderate deceleration of economic growth, 
together with measures aimed at limiting 
imports, promoting diversified exports and 
reducing oil consumption’ (Balassa 1979 p 1028).
Apart from these policies the Brazilians also encouraged an 
inflow of foreign finance to cover the deficit (Balassa 1981; 
Lawrence and Dell 1980 p7^-) Prior to the first oil price rise 
i.e. 1972 the Brazilians began to restrict the inflow of 
foreign capital. It was suggested that the increase in reserves 
was contributing to the expansion of the domestic money supply 
(Cline 1981 pp 105-6; UNECLA 1975). The NMC issues guidelines 
which are to be followed as part of the debt management strategy. 
In 1972 it imposed a minimum maturity requirement of 10 years 
on loans entering Brazil and a cruzeiro deposit of 25% of the 
cruzeiro equivalent of the loan. The cruzeiro deposit was 
raised to 40% in 1973 and the maturity period raised to 
12 years (UNECLA 1975 pp 122) . However, in 1974 with the large 
trade deficit and current account deficit experienced the 
reserves were run down and the authorities reduced the minimum 
maturity period of the loans to 5 years and removed the cruzeiro 
deposit. The authorities appealed publicly for the petrodollars 
to be invested in Brazil, and in August to further encourage
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the inflow of finance the Central Bank permitted the banks 
to deposit with them the loans which the banks had negotiated 
under Resolution No.63 but which had not been taken up by 
local borrowers. The interest payment on these deposits was 
the LIBOR and the loan interest was remitted on the banks* 
behalf (IMF^ 1975p..8^The witholding tax on interest was 
reduced from 25% to 5%. In 1974 disbursements were 3755.6 
million dollars and rose to 4978.3 million in 1975 (Appendix 
Table One). To further encourage the inflow of funds the 
interest on bank loans under Resolution No.63 held by the 
Central Bank rose to 1.75% above the LIBOR. The witholding 
tax was put back at 25%. The willingness of the bankers 
to lend to the Brazilians made it possible for them to finance 
the deficit on such a large scale.( See also Cohen 1981 pp 191- 
5.) In 1978 there was a large rise in disbursements and total 
commitments. Actually commitments from official lenders in 
1978 declined. The international reserves of Brazil rose 
higher than it had done since 1970 (Table 3.3). 1978 saw the
beginning of a period of restrictions placed on the inflow of 
finance by the NMC. Foreign currency loans had to be deposited 
with the Central Bank for a mandatory period of 30 days. This 
was later extended to 120 and then 150 days. The deposits were 
not earning any interest and the Bank would only release them 
at stated intervals. The reason for this action was mainly 
because of the authorities fear that the rise in the interna­
tional reserves would have an expansionary effect on the domestic 
money supply (UNECLA 1978 pp 128-130). The minimum maturity 
period of public or publicly guaranteed currency loans was 
raised from 5 to 8 years. The implication of this however, 
was that unguaranteed debt could grow unrestricted. In 1980 
there was a reduction in the restrictions placed on the inflow 
of external finance. This coincided with the large deficits 
at the time of the second oil price rise. The mandatory 
deposit of funds by private enterprises was reduced to 75% of 
the value of the loan and the conditions of release of the loan 
was improved (IMF 1981 p. 85 )
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The authorities had also followed a policy restricting the 
amount of finance the commercial banks could lend to publicly 
owned companies or foreign companies so as to encourage them 
to borrow from abroad. The cost of domestic borrowing was 
raised to make external borrowing more attractive and it was 
required that certain imports be financed by external loans 
with a maturity of between 3 to 8 years (UNECLA 1980 p 117).
In 1980 there was a decline in disbursements from 9511.9 
million dollars in 1979 to 7406.6iniHi on dollars. This was 
part of a general decline in net lending in the international 
capital market (Williams and Johnson 1982).
The Brazilians received the petrodollars indirectly through 
the international capital market. They were better off than 
most developing countries which did not have access to such 
large sources of finance. It is possible that for some developing 
countries the low debt to GNP ratio or the low absolute of the 
debt is not so much due initially to domestic policy, but is 
a reflection of the skewed nature of the flows from the 
international system.
Balassa (1981 p 84) has calculated that the Brazilians needed 
an additional net external finance of 4569 million dollars due 
to the oil price rise in 1974. Given the large flow of 
disbursements to Brazil it can be assumed that the Brazilians 
were able to meet a large proportion of their financing requirements.
A system of incentives in the form of subsidies and tax relief 
as well as easing the bureaucratic procedures was introduced 
in order to encourage exports (Balassa 1979;UNECLA various 
issues; IMF^ various issues). For example in 1973 before the 
oil price rise, a Resolution was passed which allowed the commercial 
banks to release a certain percentage of their reserve assets 
to finance the activities of the export firms. In 1974 certain 
imports which were to be used for the export of manufactures 
was made exempt from customs tax and the industrial products 
tax until 1977. A commission for Export Incentives (CIEX) was 
set up in 1976 to be responsible among other things for administ­
ering incentives and financing exports of capital goods and 
consumer durables. An arrav of incentives was introduced in 1975
to encourage exports some of these included deducting from 
profits liable to income tax the foreign exchange earnings arising 
from a firm’s exports and the provision of insurance cover to 
exporting firms of capital goods and services to protect them 
against the breaking of contractual obligations.In 1975, about 
71% of the value of textiles exported was covered by subsidies 
amd 66,2% of the value of vehicles exported was also a subsidy. 
The subsidies and tax credits etc., continued until about 1979 
In that year the authorities removed the subsidies and devalued 
the cruziero dollar exchange rate by 30%. This was mainly due 
to pressure from the large trading p^ rtnens. In 1980 there was a 
further devaluation of 40%
Table 3.11
Brazil's Export Subsidies (% of value exported)
Exemption Subsidies in the
from Tax Form of Credit Total
Textiles 29.0 42.2 71.2
Footwear 20.9 30.5 48.5
Machinery 24.0 26.5 50.5
Electronic
Equipment 26.5 26.3 52.8
Furniture 5.0 30.9 35.9
Vehicles 28.8 37.4 66.2
Source: UNECLA Economic Survey of Latin America 1978 p 1
Santiago.
The volume of exports grew between 1972 and 1976 in response 
to the incentives and despite the recession in the world 
economy in 1975 and 1976. There was a decline in the volume 
of exports in 1977 although volumes rose again in 1978 to 
the 1976 level (table 3.12). The unit value of exports did 
not rise in 1975 so that the increase in the value of exports
in that year was due to the rise in the volume of exports 
Prices rose after 1975, although they fell again in 1978. 
At the time of the second oil price rise both the unit
Table 3.12
Unit Value and Volume Indices of Exports and Imports and 
Terms of Trade 1972 = 100
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Exports 
înit Value 100 136.2 172.0 172.0 198.0 243.0 222.4 244.8 260.0
Volume 100 114.8 117.0 129.0 148.1 131.2 148.1 162.1 199.3
Imports 
Jnit Value 100 136.9 200.0 217.0 223.9 232.0 247.0 297.8 380.0
Volume 100 120.0 163.4 154.7 153.4 141.9 157.4 168.1 152.6
let Banker 
Terms of Trade 100 99.2 86.1 79.3 88.5 103.0 89.6 81.7 68.2
Lncome Terms 
)f Trade 100 113.8 100.2 102.3 102.3 136.1 132.7 132.4 136.4
source : Based on IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1982. 
Washington D.C.,
value and volume of exports were rising. In 1980 just after 
the first maxi devaluation of 30% the annual growth rate of 
the volume of exports was the highest that had occured since 
1972.
Imports fell continuously after 1974 until 1978 when they rose 
again. It was the non oil imports which fell since the value 
of oil inports was rising continuously over the period. To 
some extent the amount of the adjustment can be overestimated 
since given the amount of stockpiling undertaken in 1974 
it could be assumed that the decline in the value of the 
1975 imports is not much below the trend. After the oil 
price rise, the authorities imposed a wide array of measures 
to restrict imports. In 1974 Government owned enterprises 
and enterprises with government majority holdings were mandated 
to purchase imports only where no domestic alternatives existed.
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About 400 items had an import duty of about 100% imposed 
on them (IMF^ 1975). In 1975 another 2000 items had import 
duties of about 100% imposed on them. An advanced deposit 
requirement of 100% of the f.o.b. value of the import was 
imposed before the import certificate could be obtained and 
the deposit held for six months. The effect of these 
measures can be seen in the decline in the volume index of 
imports in Table 3.12, and the decline in the trade deficit.
In 1978 however, there was a resurgence in the volume of 
imports. This was mainly of the non oil imports. The 
Central Bank of Brazil in its Annual Report 1978 (p 129) 
attributes the rise in the value of imports to the growth in 
industrial production and investment in that year. It is 
interesting to note that 1978 also experienced a large rise 
in the disbursement of loans from abroad. It is possible 
that the availability of finance made it possible for the 
increase in imports. The reduction in the volume of imports 
between 1974 and 1978 may have been due not only to the 
restrictions imposed on imports during that period but 
due to a running down of the stocks which had been formed 
during 1974. The upsurge of import demand in that year 
could have been due to a decline in the stocks held.
The two measures of the terms of trade both declined in 
1974. The import prices continued to be higher than the 
export prices in 1975, thus further maintaining the adverse 
barter terms of trade (Table 3,12). In 1976 there was an 
improvement in the barter terms of trade. The unit value 
of exports rose in 1976 as a result of rising coffee prices.
This rise in the coffee prices was maintained in 1977, further 
improving the barter terms of trade. The result of the decline 
in import volumes and the rise in export values was that by 
1977 the trade deficit was a sixth of its 1974 value. The rise in 
export volumes in 1975 made it possible for a slight improve­
ment in the income terms of trade compared to 1974. In 1977 
however, the improvement in the income terms of trade was the 
result of the higher export unit values and not the result
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of volume effects. At the time of the second oil price rise 
in 1979 there was a decline in the price of coffee from the 
high levels of 1977. Even though the unit value of total 
exports rose this was less than the rise in the unit value of 
imports thus causing a further reduction in the barter terms 
of trade from the high levels of 1977. A further decline in 
the prices of coffee and soybeans in 1980 during the time of 
the second oil price rise contributed to increasing the impact 
of this price rise on the external account. The increase in 
export volumes at the same time however, made it possible for 
the level of the income terms of trade to be maintained. 
Immediately after the oil price rise there was a clampdown 
in the volume of imports causing a decline in import values 
in 1980 and 1981.
The policy of mini devaluations was continued after the oil 
price rise of 1974. It has been criticised on the grounds 
that a real devaluation did not occur in order to encourage 
the export sector(Cline 1981ppl27-30; Wells 1979). The 
hesitance on the part of the authorities to devalue the currency 
has been attributed to a reluctance to impose the necessary 
restraint on monetary and fiscal policy, the need to encourage 
the continued flow of external finance and a need to protect 
domestic holders of external liabilities as well as to reduce 
the domestic cost of servicing the debt (Malan and Bonelli 1977; 
Bacha 1977; Wells 1979). A real devaluation was not considered 
necessary by the authorities since it was thought that the 
incentives in the export sector would make up for the difference
Despite the incentives which were initiated in 1974 after the 
first oil price, Brazilian policy towards the external sector 
has been criticised as being biased against exports. The 
incentives were not sufficient to make up for the negative 
effects of the overvalued exchange rate on the export sector.
The whole array of incentives towards the export sector and 
restrictions in the import sector have worked out to the dis­
advantage of the export sector (Balassa 1979; Tyler 1981 p 19; 
Tyler* 1983). Tyler (1983) argues that commercial policy was
directly responsible for the slow export performance after 
1974. He showed that nominal tariffs were significant in 
explaining the difference in export growth between 1970- 
1974 and 1974 - 1977.
Despite pursuing a policy of import substitution after the 
first oil price rise, indebtedness was still growing. This 
was because of the continued high growth rates relative to 
other countries and the policy to maintain a balance of 
payments surplus. Import values rose in 1978 until 1981 
at a rate faster than export values. After 1980 the rise in 
import values was due primarily to price effects.
An attempt to reduce the real growth rate and hence the 
investment rate and demand for foreign savings and imports 
could have resulted in a slow down in the growth of gross 
earnings. Borrowing could have been limited primarily to 
service the debt. Apart from that greater care in the conditions 
of the loans incurred would also have reduced future external 
financing requirements.
The Recession in the Industrial Countries and its Impact on 
Brazils External Sector.
The export earnings of the Brazilians are influenced not only 
by domestic policies but also by the growth in the world 
economy, especially the industrial countries. The domestic 
policies provide an initial framework, making it possible for 
individual firms to decide whether or not to produce for 
export. Whether or not there is a demand for Brazil's exports 
and the price for these exports is also important in determining 
the growth in export earnings and the volume of exports.
The period after the first oil price rise was follwed by a 
recession in the economy of major trading partners of Brazil.
The impact of the oil price rise on Brazil can be considered 
to be bigger than the additional cost ratios imply, because of 
the effect of the reduced export earnings due to the recession
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in the industrial countries in 1975 and 1976. The recession 
in the industrial economies affects the rest of the world 
mainly through trade channels. The reduction in the demand 
for imports by the industrial countries will be reflected 
firstly in a decline in the price given that supply is 
relatively inelastic compared with the speed with which 
demand changes. This will then be followed by a fall in 
export volumes.
The growth in income in the industrial countries is important 
to the developing countries because they are their main trading 
partners. At least 60% of the trade in goods and services of 
the developing countries is with the industrial countries. The 
extent to which a decline in income and hence demand for imports 
has an impact on the external sector of the developing countries 
depends on five main variables. The first variable is the share 
of the industrial countries in the trade of the developing 
countries. The second is the share of imports from the developing 
countries in the total imports of the industrial countries; 
thirdly the structure of the developing country exports; fourthly 
the price competitiveness of their exports and finally the trade 
barriers imposed on imports from the developing countries. The 
link between developing country export performance and growth 
in the industrial countries is not a direct one because extraneous 
variables can also affect the relationship. For exaaxle supply 
constraints may reduce export earnings even though the industrial 
countries are experiencing high income growth rates.
These five variables will be discussed in the context of the 
Brazilian experience to determine how they were affected by 
the decline in growth in the industrial countries.
Brazil is typical of most non oil developing countries because 
the bulk of its exports are to the industrial countries.
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Table 3.13
Direction of Brazilian Exports 1974 - 1981 (Percentage)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Industrial 68.1 60.2 65.7 64.7 65.2 61.3 57.3 63.8
Oil Exporting 7.0 7.6 5.5 6.5 7.2 5.2 7.3 7.3
Non Oil 
Developing 19.1 23.5 20. 7 21.8 21.6 25.9 28.6 21.7
Centrally
Planned 4.7 7.5 6.9 6.1 4.7 5.5 5.4 5.5
Source: IMFj^  Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1982 p qy
Washington D.C,
There has been a slight decline in the exports ,going to the 
industrial countries since 1974. In 1980 the percentage going 
to these countries was lower than 60% for the first time since 
1974. On average the proportion going to the OPEC countries 
has remained about the same, although there have been slight 
upsurges during the period of the oil price rise. Whilst 
reducing the proportion going to industrial countries Brazil 
has diversified towards other non oil developing countries.
Unless it is a direct policy of the OPEC countries to encourage 
trade with the non oil developing countries they may have some 
difficulty in competing with the industrial countries for the 
markets of the OPEC countries. More exports to the OPEC 
countries could have helped reduce the oil deficit and the need 
for external financing. However, the fact that finance which 
the Brazilians received was used mainly to finance imports from 
the industrial countries would indicate that the recycling of 
the petrodollars by the banks to Brazil and other developing 
countries was to the advantage of the industrial countries.
Brazilian imports as a percentage of the total imports of the 
industrial countries has ranged from 1% to 0.82% over the period 
1974 - 1981 (IMF^1982). Even though the importance of Brazil 
to the industrial countries is not as important as these countries 
are to Brazil, the Brazilians still have a significant proportion 
of the total industrial country imports compared to non oil
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developing countries. This can be considered favourable to 
Brazil on the basis of a study which showed that the growth 
in the volume of imports from the non oil developing countries 
over the period 1973 - 1980 was greater than the growth in the 
total volume of imports (Goldstein and Khan p 11), However, 
it could also indicate that when there is a reduction in the 
demand for imports from the non oil developing countries, the 
Brazilians will be more seriously affected. The extent to 
which this can happen depends however, on the structure of 
Brazil's exports. In 1970, 24.3% of Brazil's exports were 
manufactures and semi manufactures. By 1980 this category of 
exports was now 56.5% of the total (UNECLA 1980). Brazil has 
been diversifying into a growing sector, since imported 
manufactures has been the fastest growing sector of the 
industrial country imports. (Goldstein and Khan 1982 p 12).
However, since the bulk of the trading in manufactured products 
of the industrial countries is amongst themselves, the Brazilians 
face stiff competition in this sector. This may explain the 
subsidies on the exports of manufactures in Brazil. They would 
thus reduce the price of the exports to make them more competitive. 
However, the success of this move depended also on whether trade 
barriers were imposed by the developed industrial countries. 
Protectionism grew in the seventies and this was mainly against 
the import of manufactures coming from the newly industrialised 
countries. To that extent, therefore, although Brazil's exports 
were from a growing sector, since this would create competition 
for markets amongst the industrial countries as well as make 
some labour in certain sectors of the industrial countries 
unemployed, a recession in the industrial countries would affect 
the Brazilians to a large extent. This could explain the 
diversification towards the non oil developing country markets.
A study was carried out by Balassa (1981) which measured the
effect of the recession on the Brazilian exports. It was
found that the reduction in export volumes was equivalent to
$179 million in 1974, rising to $530 million in 1975 and
$770 million in 1977. As a ratio of actual Brazilian exports-^ p a A-A6)
this was 3.7% in 1974 and 13.3% in 1977. It is thus possible
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to hypothesise from this information that the trade deficit 
could have been reduced if there had been a continuous demand 
for Brazilian exports. This would then have contributed to 
a decline in the current account deficit and the need for 
external finance. The debt service ratio would also have 
been reduced and this would have further contributed to a 
reduction in the need for disbursements for balance of payments 
purposes.
The potential export earnings of the Brazilians were further 
reduced because the decline in the growth of the industrial 
countries was also affecting the exports of other developing 
countries, hence their demand for inports. Unless they had 
reserves or else access to external borrowing their import 
capcity would have declined. Brazil was the seventh largest 
exporter within the developing countries for non fuel exports 
in 1963. By 1977 it was the largest exporter within the developing 
countries (Goldstein and Khan 1982 p 20). A reduction in 
import demand of these countries would, therefore, reduce its 
potential export earnings.
The impact of the recession in the industrial countries is 
reflected in the service account of Brazil. In 1978 debits 
on the service account were S6991 million. Of this,interest 
payments were $3342 ini 1lion and larger than the value of the 
receipts in the service account (Central Bank of Brazil 1979).
In 1980 the debit had risen to $13296 million and interest pay­
ments were $7457 million and more than twice the receipts on 
the services account. The bulk of the interest payments goes 
to the industrial countries since they are the main lenders 
to Brazil. In 1979, in order to reduce inflationary pressures 
within the domestic economy the US and UK embarked on restrictive 
monetary policies. The effects of these were high interest 
rates, a slow down in industrial activity and unemployment. The 
rise in the interest rate was reflected in the LIBOR so that the 
rise in the interest payments of Brazil was due mainly to these 
developments, Brazil had at least 60% of its external debt in 
floating interest rates so that the rise in the nominal rates 
was reflected in its. interest payments. A reduction in the 
interest rates would have reduced the payments made by Brazil
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after it s debt outstanding hence reducing the current account 
deficit and the need for more finance.
3.6 Evaluation of the Debt Accumulation Process in Brazil
The previous sections of this chapter have described Brazilian 
policy towards external borrowing and the different factors 
which worked towards increasing the need for borrowing. It 
is important that a country be able to manage the growth of 
its debt. This is because if the debt should grow faster than 
does the domestic economy, there is the possibility of diffi­
culties in servicing the debt. Unmanageable debt has been 
defined as that which puts a cost on the economy because the 
export expansion or import substitution required to service the 
debt uses up the resources to an extent that there is a decline 
in aggregate income (Hayes 1964 p 174). It is possible however, 
that whether a country will reach that stage or not, depends on 
whether it has sufficient finance to roll over the debt.
For borrowing to be beneficial to a country it is usually 
required that the cost of borrowing be less than the rate of 
return on the investment for which the borrowing was carried 
out. The critical interest rate was suggested as an indicator 
of this. This is because it was believed that in order to 
compare the domestic rate of return with the international 
interest rate it is necessary to measure the shadow exchange 
rate. There are several problems associated with this, hence 
the derivation of the critical interest rate (Hayes 1964 p 165). 
The critical interest rate is that rate at which the rate of 
growth of debt is equal to the growth of the GDP (Hayes 1964 
pp 166 - 173). If loans are negotiated on the basis of 
interest rates higher than this rate then the possibility of 
cumulative debt greater than the growth of GDP occurs.
The main shortcoming of this indicator is that it does not 
take into consideration the ability of the country to direct
some of the extra GDP into exports so as to earn foreign
13exchange to service the debt . On the other hand it dot 
indicate that the capacity to service the debt without
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incurring a reduction income is being reduced.
Dhonte (1979) developed the concept of the borrowing capacity 
to indicate how a country should proceed with its borrowing.
The borrowing capacity is the highest level of borrowing 
relative to exports that can be maintained without allowing 
the debt service ratio to rise above a certain ceiling (p65).
The variables which determine the borrowing capacity are the 
terms of the loans, the continuous supply of loans and the 
growth of exports. The borrowing capacity is a function of 
the ceiling on debt and the refinancing ratio. This is the 
ratio of debt service to disbursements. Lower interest rates 
and longer maturities will result in a lower refinancing ratio 
for a given level of exports. The optimal borrowing policy 
outlined by Dhonte is that which allows for the maximum transfer 
of resources without allowing the refinancing ratio to decline 
(p.71). The difficulty with Dhonte’s condition is that it is 
difficult to identify what level the debt service ratio should 
not rise above. This is because a debt service ratio of 20% 
may bring about severe problems for one country but not for 
another.
Avramovic (1964 pp 89 - 90) has suggested six conditions which 
need to be met for borrowing on hard terms to be done success­
fully. The conditions cover the Hayes and Dhonte criterion.
He groups the conditions under two main headings. The first 
group are the financial conditions and these comprise of a 
continuous supply of credit despite the size of debt outstanding, 
management of the debt,in such a way that payments can be made 
when required, and a mimimisation of fluctuation of export earnings 
The second group of conditions are headed ’growth’ and comprise 
of a rate of return higher than the cost of borrowing, plough 
back of profits in order for savings to meet the debt service 
payments and finally that there should be sufficient invest­
ment to generate growth.
In sum the conditions of borrowing state that the funds 
obtained should be utilised in such a way that repayment 
of the loan is made possible without allowing the income
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of the country to be below what it would have been had 
borrowing not taken place. These conditions thus allow for 
some consumption to take place. What is important is that 
the authorities be able to obtain the domestic cost of paying 
the loan and that the export policy is such that given a 
favourable international trade environment, the required 
foreign exchange is obtained.
It is not necessary for external funds to be directed only 
to the export sector. What is important is that exports 
are generated within the economy irrespective of whether the 
particular business is financed by foreign capital or not. 
Exchange rate policy during a period of borrowing and repayment 
is important. The advantage of a floating exchange rate, 
regime is that it does not allow for rigidity in the current 
account to arise thus generating a balance of payments 
disequilibrium. What is important however, is the real value 
of the exchange rate. During the period of net repayment it 
would be to the advantage of the economy to have a slightly 
overvalued exchange rate so as to reduce the domestic cost of 
repaying the loan. The disadvantage of this, however, is 
that it will be a disincentive to the export sector thus 
thwarting the attempts by the authorities to service the debt 
smoothly. The problem may be amended by allowing the effective 
exchange rate to differ between the trade and service sector. 
This may be possible by using incentives to encourage exports. 
This policy was attempted by the Brazilians, however, the 
export sector was still experiencing a bias against it until 
the maxi devaluation of 1979 which also coincided with a rise 
in the growth rate of exports.
The commitments made to the Brazilians over the period 1972 
to 1981 rose from $2592.1 million to $12,024.9 million 
(World Bankg 1982)^ There was a reduction in commitments 
made in 1980, mainly due to a decline in commitments from 
private lenders which was part of an overall decline in 
commitments made in the private capital market. The terms 
under which the Brazilians received their loans hardened
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considerably. This meant that the Brazilians were rolling 
over their debt with loans m t h  harder conditions, implying 
that a greater flow of funds would be needed in the future.
Thus, even though Avramovic's condition was being met, 
because of the increasing hardness of the loans it implied 
that the debt burden was increasing as well as the dependence 
on external finance.
The Brazilian debt management policy was carried out by the 
NMC. In order to improve the maturity profile of the loans, 
the authorities had minimum maturity requirements. In 1971 
a resolution was passed which stated that the short term loans 
registered in a particular month should not exceed the value of 
those maturing in that month. Despite thi^, there has been a 
growth in short term debt. Even assuming that the maturity 
requirements and other stipulations were strictly adhered to, 
the ability to pay debts in Brazil, increasingly became 
dependent on the supply of new funds. In 1973 the refinancing 
ratio was 42%, it improved slightly in 1974 to 33% but rose 
again until it was 70.5% in 1977. Given also that export 
earnings were not rising as fast as debt service payments, 
the ability to pay was declining in the late seventies. The 
increased hardness of the loans due to the rise in the interest 
payments did not contribute to help the Brazilians in their debt 
management. The export earnings of the Brazilians, although 
growing over the period, were not growing at a constant rate 
or faster than the debt service payments. The debt outstanding 
to exports ratio was growing over the period. Thus the third 
condition of Avramovic was not fully met. The financial 
conditions facing Brazil were, therefore, not very favourable 
for it to continue borrowing on hard terms on such a large 
scale. Higher growth rate in export earnings with less 
fluctuations and a decline in the interest payments would have 
made conditions more favourable; especially since to some 
extent, they would have reduced the gross borrowing 
required.
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The first condition under the growth variables is that the 
rate of return be greater than the international interest 
rate. No direct attempt has been made to measure this in 
the case of Brazil. The ICOR was obtained and will be used 
as an indication of the efficiency of capital investments 
In the 1970-1973 period the ICOR was 1.7. In 1973-76 it 
was 3.1 and in 1976-1979 it rose to 4.3 (Bsilassa 1981 p 
The Brazilians borrowed to finance a lot of large scale and 
long gestating projects in the 1970’s. This might be part of 
the explanation for the increasing ICOR. It will be 
suggested that given the nature of the investments and the 
fact that the ICOR was increasing, borrowing on increasingly 
harder terms was not the best policy the Brazilians had 
chosen. What would have been the more favourable borrowing 
terms would have been loans with long maturities and lower 
interest rates. Even though the Brazilians had favourable 
maturity terms compared to other developing country loans, 
when the use to which some of the loans were being put to 
is also considered, then one realises that the maturity of the 
loans was not that favourable. The high interest rate of loans 
to finance projects which would not be immediatly generating 
some output meant that extra pressure was being put on the 
rest of the economy and not enough income would be generated 
to finance the domestic cost of repayment etc. The second 
condition was that the plough back of profits on investment 
be enough to generate savings within the economy. The 
possibility of this happening would first depend on how the 
rest of the economy was performing. Foreign savings as a 
percentage of the gross capital formation rose from 18.8% 
in 1975 to 24.7% in 1980 declining to 21.4% in 1981. This 
increase in the participation from foreign loans could 
indicate that domestic savings were not rising by enough to 
finance the investment requirements. In fact, between 1974 
and 1979 the savings ratio was always lower than the investmnet 
to GNP ratio. Even though investments were declining, there 
was an increasing dependence on external sources. This could 
dedicate that the authorities were not fully tapping the 
savings potential within the economy.
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The nominal growth rate of the Brazilian economy rose between 
1973 and 1979. In 1973 it was 11% rising to 19% in 1976 
and falling slightly to 18.2% in 1979. Although investment 
as a percentage of GNP was declining, there was some 
nominal growth within the economy.
External borrowing did contribute to some growth within the 
domestic Brazilian economy. However, the borrowing conditions, 
as well as the reduced export potential due to conditions 
existing within the world and domestic economy, have 
contributed to some of the present difficulties facing the 
Brazilians. A reduction in its borrowing during the period 
of the external shocks would have reduced the growth of debt 
outstanding and the resulting decline in growth rates would 
also have reduced the need for investment. Apart from this 
however, the hardening borrowing conditions, as well as the 
mismatch in financing projects implied that not enough 
growth was being generated within the economy to reduce the 
pressure of the debt.
Over the period the nominal GDP was growing faster than the 
Eurodollar interest rate, indicating that debt was within 
managable proportions. However, when the Eurodollar rate is 
added to the cruzeiro dollar exchange rate to find its 
equivalent in cruzeiros, it indicates that the growth of the 
nominal GDP was not as fast as the cruzeiro equivalent of the 
Eurodollars rate.
A successful attempt to reduce the growth rate would have 
reduced the foreign exchange requirements of the economy. The 
rise in the interest rates, as well as the reduction in the 
export potential, would then have had less of an impact on 
the Brazilians. However, easy access to funds at increasingly 
hard terms, as well as the possible belief that there would 
be a continuing supply of funds, may have contributed to the 
growth of indebtedness in the Brazilian case. Both the oil 
price rises contributed to the external disequilibrium faced 
by the Brazilians. It is possible that if they had received
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non concessional finance directly from the OPEC countries 
the cost of the finance may have been lower and would have 
reduced the burden. However, given that the OPEC countries 
would not have financed the entire of the deficit of the 
Brazilians, it is doubtful that the resulting situation would 
have been much different from what it is today.
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Notes
1. For a discussion of the factors which influenced the high 
Brazilian growth rates in 1968 - 1973 see Bacha (1977),
Malan and Bonelli (1977), Syvrud (1974) and UNECLA (1974 
pp 53 - 75).
2. Brazil’s nominal debt per capita in 1979 was $302. This 
is slightly favourable compared to Argentina with $319 and 
the Ivory Coast. However, compared to Zaire it is very high, 
$137.4. As a percentage of the GNP Zaire'é debt is 60% 
whilst Brazil’s debt was 16%. Brazil then on the basis of 
these figures, would seem to be capable of holding its debt 
better than Zaire. In fact Zaire has had more reschedulings 
of its debt than has Brazil in the seventies.
3. In 1980 official debt per capita for Tanzania was $116.8.
Ghana had an official debt per capita of $97.03 whilst Chad, 
a low income country with a per capita GNP less than that for 
Tanzania, had an official debt per capita equal to about 
$47.72 (Calculated on the basis of World Bank figures).
4. It is not a requirement that external finance should go to 
exporting firms. It is important however, that domestic 
policy encourage exports in order to earn foreign exchange with 
which to pay off the debt.
5. The Brazilian money supply is a function of several variables. 
However, there is the view that growth in reserves has played 
a large role in increasing the money supply, especially when 
sterilisation has not occurred (Cline 1981, Lembruger 1979).
6. See Section 3.3.2 where there is a discussion of variables 
which determine creditworthiness and the flow of private 
funds to individual countries.
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7. Another indicator, the coefficient of protection is also 
used by the Brazilians. This is the ratio of net flow to 
disbursements.
8. The LIBOR is determined by the domestic rates of the currency 
in which the loan is being negotiated (for example the 
Eurodollar rate). It will be directly related to this assuming 
that there is a free flow of capital between the domestic
and offshore markets. Other costs involved in the loan are 
the management, negotiation and drawdown fees.
9. This occurs when the short term rate is higher than the
long term rate. It is not profitable to buy bonds when this 
occurs because bonds are financed by the short term market.
10. Some of the methods used by the bankers in country risk
analysis are (i) The fully Qualitative System which is a 
general report of the country’s economic, political and 
social conditions and prospects (11) Structural Quantitative 
System. This has a uniform format to enable comparison 
among countries. - . . . (iii) The
Checklist System, This involves grading the country on the 
basis of quantitative criteria. (See Cohen 1981, Thomblade 
1978).
11. This was obtained using the following calculation
AP Pt - Pt-1
AM Mg - Mg_i
where Ft the value of oil at time t
Mt the value of total inports at time t
t-1 the previous period.
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13 . The critical interest rate is:
r(s: - s')
 ^ . S« - Kr
where i “ critical interest rate 
r = rate of growth of GDP
Sf = gross domestic savings as a percentage
of GDP in year 0. 
s' = marginal gross domestic savings rate.
K = gross IGOR, linking the increase of
the growth of product between two 
consecutive years with the rate of 
investment in the first of these two 
years (Hayes 1964 pp 171).
13. The critical interest rate concept is limited by the validity
of it’s assumptions and by the fact that borrowing can become 
a burden to the domestic economy before the critical rate is 
reached (Hayes op cit). Solomon (1977) also derives the 
threshold of borrowing for a group of countries, including 
Brazil based on Hayes concept.
14. The ICOR does not take into account excess capacity, the
contribution of other variables e.g. labour, skilled or 
unskilled and whether the investments are long gestating or 
not.
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Chapter Four
Review of Possible Solutions to the Present Debt 
Situation of the Developing Countries
The discussion of the Brazilian debt experience in the 1970’s 
shows that the oil price rises of 1973/74 and 19 79/80 were not 
the only causes of the growth of indebtedness of the non oil 
developing countries, Sachs (1981) has shown that except for 
the years immediately after the oil price rises there is no link 
between oil imports and the current account deficits of oil 
importers. He explains the distribution of current account 
deficits and the debt among the non oil developing countries on 
the basis of their various investment to GNP ratios.
On the basis of his calculation the Brazilian investment ratio 
actually increased over the 19 74-19 79 period compared to the 
1965-1973 period (Sachs 1981 p.234). The savings ratio on the 
other hand did not keep up over the period. The results from 
Sachs would strengthen Avramovic’s debt cum growth model (Avramovic 
1964) which has as one of its main assumptions an increase in tne 
savings ratio in order for the debt process to come to an end.
The reduction in the savings to GNP ratio would also contribute to 
the growth of indebtedness in Brazil in the seventies.^ Although 
the Brazilians experienced large oil deficits, these were not 
financed directly by financial flows from the OPEC countries to 
any large extent. The deployment of the OPEC cash surplus has 
been criticised by Saddy (1981) and Sobhan (1980) who both suggest 
that a greater amount of direct OPEC financial flows to the non oil 
developing countries would have benefited both groups of countries 
to a great extent, compared to the direction of actual flows in the 
aftermath of the first oil price rise. Alternative suggestions 
regarding how the OPEC financial resources could be deployed to the 
advantage of the non oil developing countries have been put forward. 
The viability of these suggestions is rather limited or non-existent
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in the present situation given the current account deficits
experienced by most of the OPEC countries due mainly to the fall in
the oil prices and the increased absorptive capacity of the OPEC
countries. However in the case of Brazil, the reduction in the oil
prices has contributed to a decline in the value of its oil imports
and other factors remaining constant in the value of its trade 
2
deficit. Suggestions towards improving the possibility of the 
developing countries (with special reference to the Latin American 
countries) to service their debts have also been made. These will 
be discussed later in the chapter.
4.1 The use of OPEC financial resources to directly finance the current 
account deficits of the non oil developing countries
Before the present decline in the nominal oil prices occurred,
proposals were put forward to increase the financial resources from
OPEC going to the non oil developing countries.
An Iraqi proposal to the OPEC ministerial meeting in June 1979
suggested the creation of a joint development fund comprising OPEC
member countries, the industrial countries and the non oil developing
countries. OPEC’s contribution was to be based on the inflationary
component of the oil price increase and the cost of oil exported to
the other developing countries. The industrial countries’
contribution was also to be based on the inflationary component of
their exports to the non oil developing countries (Shihata 1982 p. 5^~35)
This proposal is no longer viable given the present current account
deficits experienced by OPEC countries and the financial problems
facing some of them. In the same year the Algerians and Venezuelans
also put forward a proposal which involved changing the OPEC Special
Fund from its then temporary status into a permanent body with an
3international legal status. This was accepted and in 1982 the 
OPEC Fund became a permanent body. However other suggestions 
regarding the new role of this institution were not accepted. The 
principal aim of the new Fund as envisaged by the Algerians and 
Venezuelans was to provide finance directly to the non oil developing 
countries for project assistance. The agency would provide both 
concessional and non-concessional assistance and banking facilities.
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The funds of both OPEC and the other developing countries would be 
held by the banking side of the agency and a Third World capital 
market would be organized to obtain funds from the international 
capital market. The agency would issue inflation-proof bonds 
with high rates of return onto the international capital market. 
Initially the agency would purchase a large amount of the bonds in 
order to create a market for the bonds as well as gain the 
confidence of international investors. The agency was also 
envisaged to act as a guarantor of loans from the industrial 
countries to the developing countries which would not normally have 
access to the international capital market (Ahmed 1982). Sobhan 
(1980a) also recommended the creation of a Third World Agency which 
was on similar lines to the one suggested by the Algerians and 
Venezuelans. He justifies the development of the agency on the 
basis of the shortcomings of the international monetary system 
vis a vis OPEC and the other developing countries. The skewed 
nature of the recycling process and the depreciation of OPEC assets 
deposited in the financial institutions of the developed market 
economies as well as insufficient funds of the IMF and EEC 
compensatory facilities were pointed out as some of the disadvantages. 
He recommended that the new agency be created by channeling a large 
increment of the funds tied up in the international capital market. 
This is rather difficult given that the OPEC assets were devaluing 
and a large shift in funds away from the international capital market 
could be destabilizing. Most likely the source of finance would 
have to come from funds which would have been deposited in the 
international capital market from the sale of oil.
The proposals were quite ambitious and if feasible^ may have 
encouraged the redirection of a large amount of the OPEC cash surplus 
directly to the non oil developing countries. The dependence of the 
creation of the agency on oil revenues would have made the stability 
of the agency vulnerable to the development within the oil market as 
well as to the absorptive capacity and domestic policy decisions of 
the OPEC countries which would be the main contributors to the agency 
This weakness could only be reduced if the initial capital was 
invested in high yielding projects which would allow the finance 
available to the agency to be increased and so reduce this dependence
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Secondly, the investors on the international capital market, 
realizing the dependence of the agency (in the short term at least) 
on the oil revenues, may themselves be hesitant to lend to the 
agency even if the loans were guaranteed by OPEC. The main question 
of importance regarding the creation of the institution is whether it 
would generate the additional loans. The reluctance of the 
international investors would reduce this possibility. Even in the 
case where confidence in OPEC is maintained, additional loans would 
not be generated if the loans which would have gone to the developing 
countries through other channels are simply redirected to this one 
since it reduces the risk. (seep,il9 for a discussion of the extent
to which guarantees can generate additional loans). On the other 
hand, by investing in projects which generate high rates of return 
international investors might be willing to lend more to the agency.
In creating the agency the decision makers would have to decide on 
the mix between project and programme loans and what proportion of 
the finance is to be allocated to interest subsidies (Stewart 1982).^
The decline in the oil prices, thus affecting the size of the OPEC 
cash surplus, has made these proposals redundant. However there 
is a limited role which the OPEC countries can play in the present 
circumstances. Concessional loans of the already established 
national and international agencies can be continued and directed 
mainly towards the lower income countries. Whether or not these 
agencies will continue to be able to disburse funds depends on how 
the subscribed capital was utilized. Most of the finance from these 
agencies however was on concessional terms so that it is possible 
that the rate of disbursement from some of the agencies may decline. 
Directing the concessional flows which may exist to the low income 
countries will help alleviate some of their balance of payments 
problems as well as reduce pressure on other parts of the 
international financial system. Even though in the present situation 
the middle income countries, for example, Brazil, have taken the 
centre of the stage because of their large debt outstanding and 
payments arrears, the low income countries, especially the least 
developed countries, are a silent majority whose financial needs 
should not be forgotten altogether. The middle income countries 
are eligible for non-concessional flows. Since 1974 the bulk of
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OPEC's direct financial flows to the other developing countries 
has been on concessional tersm, with the bulk of its cash surplus 
going to the financial markets in the developed countries. The 
national and international agencies set up by OPEC may try to 
increase the proportion of funds to the developing countries which 
are on non-concessinal terms. The advantage of this is that it 
may widen the coverage of countries as well as encourage governments 
and private investors within the OPEC countries to allocate some of 
their budget and portfolio towards these agencies. Loans on 
non-concessional terms would increase the revolving nature of the 
agencies and make them less vulnerable to developments in the oil 
market and domestic policies. Shihata (1982 p.58) was more optimistic 
regarding the survival of the OPEC agencies in the face of a decline 
in the price of oil and the OPEC cash surplus. This optimism was 
based on the existence of authorized capital. However, when there 
was a large cash surplus some of the agencies were limited in their 
operations because subscriptions were not fully paid.
The OPEC countries could finance projects with commercial institutions
within the developing countries. Some such cooperation has been 
achieved between Arab and Latin American countries.^ The possibility 
of such ventures occuring depends on the extent to which the non OPEC 
country or commercial institution can make a contribution of substance 
towards the financing of the project or business. This could act as 
a guarantee against default since the OPEC member would be assured of 
the interest of the other partner in making the partnership a growing 
concern. There needs to be viable projects and opportunities within 
the other developing country which can be identified to attract the 
OPEC investor. This is because it is more difficult to attract 
investors to back up vaguely defined projects or assume that they 
will be willing to support the balance of payments of the country.
The advantage of such cooperation is that it does not necessarily
attract only public funds from the OPEC countries but also private 
investors. Some of the OPEC Arab countries have developed some 
expertise within the international financial system which may be of 
some advantage to other developing countries.
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These proposals may not be effective in the immediate future, but 
if attenpts are made to set them in motion they should benefit 
both the OPEC and developing countries in the short to medium term. 
Had the decline in the oil prices not occured and had there not 
been a decline in the cash surplus of the OPEC countries, the 
recommendations would have been just the same, although the scale 
of the flows may have been appreciably larger.
4.2 The role of the developed countries and the international agencies
in alleviating the debt problem
Several suggestions have been put forward regarding the role which 
the developed economies and international agencies can play in 
helping the developing countries. Some of these suggestions were 
made during the time of the first oil price rise, although they 
continue to be of relevance in the present situation of low oil 
prices and larger developing country debts.
The proposals can be subdivided into three groups, mainly for the 
purpose of exposition. These subdivisions however are not mutually 
exclusive. The first group of proposals is concerned mainly with 
the use of bonds and guarantees to increase the flow of resources to 
the developing countries as well as allowing them to have greater 
access to the international capital market. The second group of 
proposals deals with the possibility of increasing the roles of the 
official agencies and the third group of proposals is concerned with 
the advantages to be obtained by creating a new agency.
4,2.1 Increasing the flow of non-concessional finance to the non oil 
developing countries
Just after the first oil price rise Michalopoulos (1975) suggested 
that the financing needs of the middle income developing countries 
be met by increasing their access to the international capital 
market - the bond market in particular. The least developed 
country's needs could be met by food aid and the distribution of SDR s
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Developing country access to the International bond market has been 
very limited and amongst the group of non oil developing countries 
it has been restricted to a few of them. In 1975, of a total of 
$22,821 million worth of international bond issues, the non oil 
developing countries issued $1,210 million, i.e. 5 per cent.
In 1979 the value of their bond issues had risen to $3,120 million, 
i.e. 7 per cent. Michalopoulos recognized that borrowing on the 
bond market was preferable to bank loans because most of the bonds 
were at fixed interest rates and had long maturities. These 
features of borrowing on the bond market had been appreciated by 
the Brazilians and in 1976 their policy was directed towards 
exploiting this source of finance as much as possible. The 
developing countries have limited access to the bond market because 
they lack to some extent the technical expertise required to place 
bonds on the market. This however is a temporary problem. Given 
the benefits to be achieved from issuing bonds, it is possible that 
the developing country can purchase the services of some institution 
or consultancy to issue the bonds on their behalf. With time the 
developing countries can have nationals trained so that they can 
issue the bonds on their own. The more long term problem facing 
the developing countries is that primary investors consider the 
developing countries to be very high risks and so are reluctant to 
lend to them. The problem exists mainly because the investors may 
not be informed about the developing country, and, secondly, the 
developing country is competing for funds with more well known and 
highly profitable borrowers. Michalapoulos's recommendation was 
that in the case when foreign bonds are issued, the host government 
(the USA government in the case of the US bond market) would 
guarantee the bond issues. This would remove some of the technical 
constraints (for example, registering with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission) which the developing country would have had to face. In 
the Eurobond market a joint system could be operated between the OECD 
and OPEC. The advantage of the guarantees is that they would 
encourage the development of a secondary market. At the present 
time it is doubtful whether an OPEC guarantee will be recognized by 
potential investors. However, the idea of a guarantee system was 
suggested recently by the House of Commons Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee Report on international lending by banks (1983). This was
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based on a scheme suggested by Williamson (1982). It involved 
indexing the bonds issued by the developing countries against 
inflation and guaranteeing the bonds by an existing multilateral 
financial institution, for example, the World Bank or the IMF.
The indexed bond would ensure that the lender would receive a real 
rate of return during the lif e of the bond. It also protected 
the developing countires from increased real amortizations due to 
floating nominal interest rates. The security of the lenders 
would mean that they would not need to cut off flows from the 
borrower when it needed it the most. The bonds would be issued 
by the multilateral financial institution on behalf of the developing 
country borrower. The bonds would be pooled and no one country 
would be allowed to dominate an issue so that the risks would be 
spread amongst the developing countries. It also encourages the 
potential investors to lend to the pool since the risk is reduced.
Bonds would be issued in SDR s with an index based either on the 
consumer price index or wholesale price index with a 50-year maturity. 
As envisaged by Williamson, the World Bank and/or IMF would not alone 
be responsible for providing the loan guarantees. Hopefully as the 
developing countries graduated to become net capital exporters they 
would become eligible to contribute to the guarantee. Interest 
payments on the bonds would be determined by the ability to pay 
based on the normalised terms of trade and divergences away from this. 
Michalapoulos saw the advantages of the guarantee system to be three­
fold. It would increase the total flow of resources to the 
developing countries as well as increasing the amount available to 
the least developed countries on concessionary terms. It would 
also introduce the developing countries to the international capital 
market (Michalapoulos 1975). The guarantee system however has been 
criticized by Stewart and Sengupta (1982 pp.86-89). The 
disequilibrating effects of the guarantee system have been mentioned 
(see Section 4.1). The result would be that countries which were 
not eligible for guarantees would have to pay a higher price to 
attract these funds. To overcome this problem therefore, all countries 
would then have to be eligible for guarantees. This would increase 
the cost of the guarantee system to the guarantors and could result in 
funds which could have been usefully employed being locked up in the 
guarantee scheme. This could result in no additional funds being
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made available to the developing countries. Stewart and Sengupta 
(1982) would thus prefer an increase in the gearing ratio of the 
World Bank to a guarantee scheme. In a Task Force report to the 
Development Committee of the World Bank and the IMF (1982) , a 
guarantee system similar to the Williamson plan was also put forward 
although it did not include indexation of the bonds and a separate 
facility was to be created called the Multilateral Partial Guarantee 
Framework, It would issue partial guarantees to countries which 
did not rank high on the credit worthiness scale but which at the 
same time were eligible to non-concessional flows. When some bankers 
were consulted about the proposals they were not fully acceptable.
It was suggested by the bankers that a new facility or organisation 
was not required, mainly because it would be difficult to operate. 
Secondly, some bankers did not consider partial guarantees as being 
adequate, since there would still be a considerable amount of risk 
to be covered. The Report had recommended partial guarantees in 
the belief that these would allow the banks to become more 
acquainted with the developing country borrower. The bankers on 
the other hand preferred the full guarantees because they believed 
this would encourage non-bank lenders. Unfortunately no evidence 
was given on the extent to which guarantees would cause distortions 
within the bond market. However, there was some indication, contrary 
to the views of Stewart and Sengupta, that guarantees would increase 
the flow of non-concessional flows to the developing countries. The 
bankers mentioned that the guarantees would allow them to extend 
longer loans to the developing countries. This would be of particular 
advantage to countries like Brazil which have relatively shorter term 
debts. The existence of the guarantee is a safety net in the case of 
default so would not necessarily have to be drawn upon. However, it 
would also be important for the guarantors to monitor the loans so 
as to reduce the possibility of irrational lending. This could meet 
with some resistance from the borrowing country. The idea of lending 
to a particular group of countries as defined above was not accepted 
by the bankers. This was on the grounds that the country would be 
difficult to identify. Secondly, the bankers considered the purpose 
and nature of the loans to be more relevant variables. This is 
quite interesting considering that in the recent past loans have been 
given to countries on the basis of credit worthiness only. Several
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more countries could have been served by the banks if the nature 
and purpose of the loan was such an important criterion.^
Co-financing arrangements have also been recommended as a possible 
way of increasing flows to the developing countries. In his 
evidence to the House of Commons Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee, Llewellyn (1983) recommends that there be a shift of 
financing away from the banks to official creditors. In his 
action programme co-financing and parallel financing arrangements 
between the banks and the World Bank and IMF for example are part 
6f the programme to be used. The World Bank has been involved in 
co-financing arrangements with the private banks over a period of 
time.^ According to the World Bank, co-financing
"refers in general to any arrangement whereby funds 
from the World Bank are associated with funds 
provided by other sources outside the borrowing 
country in the financing of a particular project."
(World Bank 1980, p.l)
At present, co-financing arrangements should form part of a medium
term to long term strategy for financial flows to the developing
countries. This is because the projects identified may not be
9sufficient to fill the gap of the immediate financing needs.
Table 4.1 on the next page shows the co-financing arrangements 
undertaken by the World Bank and other financing bodies. This has 
grown in nominal terms over the period 1973-1980, although in 1980 
there was a decline in the number of projects financed. In the 
Task Force Report already mentioned, an increase in co-financing 
arrangements was recommended if it would result in an increase in 
the amount of finance going to the developing countries or if the 
number of countries benefiting from this increased. In consultation 
with the bankers concerning the conditions which would attract them 
to involve themselves in greater co-financing arrangements, four 
suggestions were made by the bankers. The first suggestion was 
that the banks should have greater discussions with the potential 
borrower. Secondly, there was to be a streamlining of the 
co-financing procedures. Their part of the loan should have more 
commercial terms and the cross default clauses were to be strengthened
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(Task Force Report 1982 p.lol),The advantage of increased discussion 
with the potential borrower is that the banks would become more 
familiar with the countries and may themselves be willing to 
invest in these countries without the assistance of the World Bank 
or other official agencies. In the House of Commons Treasury and 
Civil Service Committee report (1983, p.xxxiv) it was recognized 
that one of the problems facing the banks whilst lending to the 
developing countries was lack of information. The co-financing 
arrangements could make it possible for the banks to havemore 
up-to-date as well as relevant information to assit them in their 
decision making before lending to a developing country. Co-financing 
could have another advantage if the funds which would have been used 
by the development agency had the other co-lenders not participated, 
be used either as concessional loans to the least developed countries 
or else increase the flow of more non-concessional loans to other 
countries. Table 4.1 shows that the greater bulk of World Bank 
co-financing arrangements was with other official agencies. It 
was not until 1977 that co-financing with private institutions was 
comparable to that with export credit institutions, and even then 
it was a small percentage of the total. These figures would 
indicate that if the terms of the co-financing would be such as to 
attract the lenders and satisfy the borrowers, there would be greater 
scope for more private bank participation.
4.2.2 Increasing the role of the Official Lending Agencies
The two reports of the Brandt Commission (1980; 1983) have both 
stressed the need for an increase in the resources of the World 
Bank and the IMF. In its recommendations for the IMF, the 
Reports suggest that this objective can be achieved through an 
increase in the quotas, an enlargement of the Fund’s General 
Agreement to Borrow (which will benefit the developing countries 
as well), and an increase in the Fund’s Subsidy Account (Brandt, 
1983). The question of Fund conditionality has become an 
important one in recent years. Quotas were only equivalent to 
about 3 per cent of the world’s imports in 1980. As a result of 
this, a country does not need to have a large balance of payments
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deficit before it becomes liable to the conditional credit tranche 
of the IMF. Following on from this, the size of the funds from 
the higher credit tranches did not seem to justify the increased 
conditionality from the point of view of the developing country.
This resulted in countries resorting to the IMF when there seemed 
to be no other alternative. These arguments thus justified the 
need for increased quotas. The need for increased Fund resources 
has been highlighted recently by the growing number of countries 
going to the IMF in the face of their debt problems. Brazil has 
had some negotiations with the Fund recently, the first time in a 
very long time. The concept of conditionality itself is not 
questioned here although some changes in the terms of conditionality 
may make the Fund more acceptable. Williamson (1983) has made some 
suggestions regarding how IMF conditionality can be modified. (See 
also Brandt 1983p.65-67)
In the Brandt Report (1983) a substantial increase in the International 
Development Agency’s replenishment was recommended and it was 
suggested that programme lending should rise to 30 per cent of total 
World Bank lending. This would increase the rate at which the 
World Bank disbursed its loans. An increase in the Bank’s gearing 
ratio was also recommended which would increase the resources 
available for lending. In the Task Force Report (1982) the bankers 
did not consider that an increase in borrowing by the World Bank on 
the capital markets would be destabilizing. The indirect result of 
this is that since the World Bank is rated highly as a borrower on 
the international capital markets, the increase in funds from this 
source would increase the access of developing countries to these 
funds through the Bank.
The House of Commons Report (1983) recognizes that finance from the 
commercial banks was not always adequate for the developing countries. 
On the other hand they are doubtful whether some of the recommendations 
concerning the increase in the resources of the World Bank and "the IMF 
will be possible. They support the recommendation to increase the 
World Bank’s gearing ratio but doubt that the increase in callable 
capital which may be required will be supported by some of the member 
governments. (The problems or hesitance to pass through the US
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Congress the Bill to increase quotas to the IMF illustrates this 
point clearly). They thus consider new forms of private lending 
(for example, Williamson's scheme) which will avoid the problems 
made in the past, to be the most likely way to increase resources 
going to the developing countries. Brunner et al (1983) do not 
consider an increase in the IMF quotas to be necessary. This is 
because if the problems of the developing countries are temporary, 
it will be easy to resolve them without a permanent increase in 
the quotas. All countries for which the problems are considered 
to be permanent should be allowed to default and any funds 
available should be directed to those countries in which the 
problem is temporary and can be solved without giving any benefits 
to the debtor or creditor. Brunner et al do not seem to share 
the pessimism of those who believe that the default of one country, 
especially a large debtor can severely damage the banking system. 
This problem is overcome by assuming that the central bankers will 
act as lenders of last resort. This question of the role of the 
central banks in international lending has become of increasing 
importance. The House of Commons Report (1983) has recommended 
that there be increased supervision especially for "consortium 
banks, banks which are subsidiaries of companies registered abroad, 
banks with head offices located outside the competence of the 
Cooke Committee and export-inport banks." (House of Commons 
Report 1983, p.xlii).
The Brandt Report (1983) also recommended that the BIS increase 
its bridging loans. It has extended some such loans during the 
present debt crisis (Brazil received such a loan). However,
there has been some hesitance on the part of the BIS to continue 
with this policy.
The decision to increase official lending is mainly a result of 
the desire to shift some of the lending in the international 
financial system from the banks to the official lenders. Given 
the terms of reference under which banks traditionally operate 
their lending to the developing countries was not always to the 
benefit of the latter. However it may not be possible to force 
a reduction in the banks' activities in these fields. So far
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the banks themselves have reduced their lending to the developing 
countries. However, as the recent Brazilian experiences show, 
some finance from the international banks is still required.
What is required in the future is a complementary existence between 
the banks and the official agencies. A move away from ill-defined 
projects and purposes for which funds are required to well-defined 
commercial projects should be the domain of the banks. The 
finance of economic and social infrastructure and balance of 
payments support programmes should be the main domain of the 
official lenders. The need for infrastructural projects to be 
financed by the official agencies is suggested here because these 
usually have long gestation periods and do not normally directly 
generate any output with which to repay the debt. The longer 
maturity of official loans will thus make it possible for the loans 
for these projects to be financed in the future. Unless the banks 
are willing to sink their funds in a long term project, it is 
doubtful that their type of finance will be adequate for such loans.
4.2.3 The creation of a new multilateral agency to channel funds to the 
developing countries
Brunner et al (1983) state that any losses which should occur as a 
result of borrowing by the developing countries should be incurred 
by those who carried out the transaction. They do not therefore 
support the recommendation that a new institution be set up to buy 
at a discount the debts of the developing countries owed to the 
banks. The possibility of there being such an institution is 
doubtful. There may be little desire on the part of the govern­
ments to set up such an institution. There would also be the 
problem of deciding whether sale of the debt should be voluntary 
or obligatory. Voluntary sales might distort the future flow of 
finance to those countries whose debt was sold at a discount. For 
these reasons the House of Commons Report (1983) did not support the 
proposal.
In the 1980 Brandt Commission Report the creation of a new inter­
national agency called the World Development Fund was suggested 
and an outline of its objective and functions was set out. It
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was envisaged to fill in the gaps which exists in development 
finance as well as to complement the lending of the World 
Bank and the IMF. It is doubtful that the political will exists 
to set up such an institution. There may be no need for this if it 
is possible to change the lending policies of the World Bank and 
the IMF. If these institutions are too inflexible to be changed 
it would be possible for regional agencies, especially those which 
have been recently created, to expand their resources if possible 
or else redirect their lending policies. Being regional agencies 
they may be more aware of the regional needs and so be able to
direct policy to meet those needs.
4.3 An Evaluation of the Recommendations
Most of the recommendations put forward to improve the present 
international financial situation have been financial ones. The 
debt problems of the developing countries is not merely a financial 
problem. Policies which only consider this aspect of it will not 
necessarily lead to the alleviation of the problem in the medium 
to long term. The period since 1973/74 has been described as one 
in which response to current account deficits was biased more 
towards financing than adjustment (Llewellyn 1983 p303). It is 
the choice in the mix of adjustment and financing in response to 
the external shock which have been facing domestic economies which 
can explain to some extent the growth of developing country debt. 
However, a caveat is necessary here. This observation by Llewellyn 
though correct in the aggregate, hides the experience of the 
individual countries. Private financial flows which made up the 
bulk of the financial flows going to the developing countries 
during this period has been concentrated amongst a few countries.
For the other developing countries which did not have access to 
these funds, they had to resort to official sources of financing. 
However, within the same period the OECD countries were experiencing 
low growth and flows from them were not growing very fast. The 
IMF resources, as a ratio of world imports, had also declined so 
that quite apart from the deterring influence of IMF conditionality 
the IMF would not necessarily have had sufficient funds to finance 
the deficits. For those countries therefore, they had to adjust
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more to the current account deficit than finance it. Financing 
a current account deficit by either borrowing abroad or running 
down reserves allows a country to maintain present consumption 
whilst adjustment implies a reduction in present consumption 
(Bird 1980^). In the Brazilian case, the policy was towards a 
large financing of the deficit, although some adjustment, in 
terms of reduced imports and incentive policy for exports, was 
also pursued. This choice of present consumption and an attempt to 
keep the growth rate from declining very far is evident in the 
investment to GNP ratio after 1974. On the basis of Sachs (1981) 
analysis the Brazilian response may be criticised as being sub- 
optimal. An increase in the current account deficit due to a 
temporary shock can be financed. In fact if the oil price rise 
was a temporary phenomena, i.e., the prices would go back to their 
former level, the country could continue to borrow until the trend 
had been reversed. However, since the oil price rise could be 
considered to have been a permanent phenomena on the basis of 
Sach's analysis, the current account deficit need not have persisted 
after the first eighteen months since the economy would have adjusted 
downwards. This, as the evidence in Chapter Three has shown, did 
not happen in the Brazilian case. It may be that the Brazilians 
and other large non oil developing countries had chosen the soft 
option. Given that they had access to large sources of finance 
they could choose not to adjust fully to the deficit. Sellekaerts 
and Sellekaerts (1973) have shown that of three possible ways to 
adjust to a one dollar deficit (i.e. expenditure switching, income 
changing and capital movement policies) the latter has the least 
cost of adjustments. This result was obtained from calculations 
done for fifteen countries, only three of which may be described 
as developing. Sihag (1982) developed further Sellekaerts and 
Sellekaerts analysis and showed that depending on what the source 
of the external disturbance was, the adjustment costs differed if 
the response was that of introducing capital inflow. He showed that 
where the disturbance was due to a change in the foreign rate of 
interest, or the shift in the supply or demand for capital, 
and where it was due to a change in the demand for imports or 
exports, the resort to a policy of capital in flow had less 
adjustment costs compared to an income reducing policy. A 
disturbance due to a fall in foreign income was hard to determine a
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priori since it depended on whether it was felt mainly cn the 
capital or the current account and the size of the foreign income 
coefficients with respect to exports and capital exports.
These analyses are based mainly on the short term since a country 
cannot afford to borrow long term. The immediate cost may be low, 
but if borrowing is not to finance investment which will generate 
real rates of returns and if the environment should change so that 
the conditions which existed when borrowing occurred differs from 
that which exists during the time for repayment, then a country can 
face serious problems.
Borrowing in the face of an external shock should only be a short 
time phenomena so that adjustment can take place. A delay in 
adjustment due to financing may simply delay the costs, if not 
increase them in the future when the country has no other option.
The point of the previous discussion has been to show that dependence 
on mainly financial solutions will not necessarily improve the 
debt position of the developing countries in the medium term. The 
main requirements to help the external payments situation of the 
major debtors is for them to embark on an adjustment programme 
within the domestic economy to reduce the deficit. This should 
be accompanied by a supply of funds to facilitate the adjustment 
programme but not in a quantity to further encourage the 
accumulation of debt. Thirdly, an increase in the growth of output 
in the industrialised countries which will increase demand for 
imports from the developing countries to help them pay the debt 
service is also needed (House of Commons Report 1983). There is 
also the need for some adjustment within the developed market 
economies. It is quite difficult for the developing countries which 
have formed strong financial relations with the rest of the world 
through the process of debt creation to immediately break down that 
relationship without defaulting. The external debt of the developing 
countries ensures that they will necessarily be tied to the 
developed market economies and to some extent will be required to 
maintain a policy which will generate foreign exchange to repay the
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past obligations before the relationship with the developed 
countries can be formally reduced. This cannot occur without the 
developed countries also making certain adjustments to their 
economies. Firstly the developing countries should have greater 
access to the markets of the developed economies in order to earn 
the foreign exchange to pay for their debts. Very little of the 
trade of the non oil developing countries is amongst themselves 
and even if this should increase in the short term it still may 
not generate sufficient funds with which to pay the debt. Thus 
internal adjustment in terms of shifting labour from industries 
for which the developed economies may no longer have a comparative 
advantage should occur. This will enable the developing countries 
which may have developed the comparative advantage to increase 
their production and export from these industries. This restruct­
uring of the domestic economy of the developed countries would need 
to be hand in hand with a decline in protectionism. It is not 
possible for the developing economies to pursue and benefit from a 
policy of free trade when the markets of their trading partners 
are restricted. Secondly the effect of the domestic policies of 
the developed countries on the world economy needs to be taken 
into account by the same countries. This is especially so for 
the USA whose budget deficits and monetary policy has repercussions 
for both the developed and developing countries.
The growth of the developing country debt illustrates the growing 
interdependence in the international economy. This is because the 
indebtedness has caused links between the two parties which 
negotiated the loan. It is in both their interests to make sure
that the ability and willingness to pay the debts exists so that
no partner is put at a disadvantage.
4.4 Brazilian Policy Towards Future External Borrowing
There has been a change in the Brazilian policy towards the external
sector. This has been outlined in a statement made by the National 
Monetary Council
" In previous years one would start from export
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goals to determine the probable surplus in 
the balance of trade, which in turn would define 
the deficit in current account, leaving a 
residual which would be the necessary amount 
of financial loans ....(Now) we try to reconcile 
the available amount of financial loans, estimated 
as the feasible increase of exposure of inter­
national banks to Brazil with the maximum level of 
current account deficit which may be financed 
thus determining the minimum surplus needed in 
the balance of trade implied by this consideration "
(National Mon. Council 1982 pi)
The need to switch the policy has been due mainly to the slow 
down in the growth of Eurocurrency lending during the time of the 
Mexican crisis in August 1982 and the Brazilian difficulties in 
December of the same year. On the basis of the new policy the 
gross volume of loans obtainable has been estimated at $10.6 
billion. The growth of external indebtedness has been restricted 
in 1983 to 8.9%, compared to 17.6% in-1982. A trade surplus of 
$6 billion was targeted for 1983. This was to be achieved by 
a growth in exports and a reduction in import growth. Imports 
in the private and public sector were to be cut down by 21% and 
29% respectively. (Bolsa 1982). So far the Brazilian trade surplus 
appears to be as planned. The reduction in the oil prices has 
reduced the oil import bills, although they are still faced with 
problems in that quarter.
The Brazilian policy has finally turned to adjusting the economy 
so as to fall in line with the amount of finance available.
Previously adjustment came secondary to borrowing. Borrowing will 
still need to occur in the future if only just to help in servicing 
the debt. Further reductions in the interest rate and no further 
increases in the oil prices will reduce both the trade and current 
account deficit. An improvement in world trade will encourage 
exports further increasing the trade surplus. The supply of 
accommodating finance is also important. The Brazilians have had 
some difficulty in maintaining this since they have not fully reached 
the targets set out for the domestic economy.
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The choice of action followed by the Brazilians has been reflected 
in a decline in the domestic growth rate. This should be expected 
since this could be seen as the only way in which the balance of 
payments could be taken care of. Continuous financing of the 
deficit could not continue forever. The three requirements set 
out on p are thus relevant to the present Brazilian situation.
The hesitance of the authorities to embark on a full adjustment 
programme is because of the fear of the social costs. The 
alternative to that would then be a rather slow adjustment process 
so that the impact can be felt only gradually. Whether or not this 
will be possible and whether this will be acceptable to the agents 
lending the finance required to meet the adjustment programme is 
rather difficult to say. A sharp adjustment programme has been 
recommended (Kreuger 1981, this is with special reference to 
liberalisation of the foreign regimes) because it gains
the confidence of the investors who are at once aware of what is 
happening. A gradual approach may be interpreted as reluctance 
thus reducing the response of the economic agents to any incentives 
which may result.
Although there is pressure on the domestic economy; an improvement 
in the international economy, especially the economies of the 
industrialised countries will help in making the adjustment process 
easier for the Brazilians. An attempt on the part of the USA to 
manage its fiscal and monetary policy so as to prevent the interest 
rate from rising very high as well as maintaining the value of the 
dollar will also help the Brazilians ; , since a large percentage of 
their debt was incurred in dollars and floating interest rates. 
Incidentally the domestic policy of the USA is not of importance 
only to the developing countries, but also to the developed 
economies which may be adversely affected due to high interest 
rates in the US and a very strong dollar.
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Notes
1. In a discussion of Sachs paper Stanley Fischer criticises his 
analysis on the basis that he only emphasises investment as a 
cause of the current account deficits without also considering 
the savings ratio to any large extent.
2. In fact, in the first half of 1983 the Brazilians experienced a 
trade surplus. This is due to a change in policy towards the 
external borrowing which will be discussed later.
3. Joint Proposal by the Algerian and Venezuelan Delegations on the 
need for additional Financial Co-operation between OPEC member 
countries and other developing countries.
4. Quite apart from technical matters relating to the creation of 
the agency, there is also the problem of the political will.
The rejection of the Algerian-Venezuelan proposal strengthens 
the suggestion that apart from economic and financial reasons 
OPEC could have increased its flow of resources directly to the 
developing countries. The direction of the flows mainly to the 
industrial countries could indicate a limited world view on the 
part of the OPEC countries (this is also evident amongst other 
developing countries) which consider links between the‘métropole’ 
and the ‘colony’ to be more important than links among the 'colonies’.
It may have been more prestigious to the investors to own assets 
in the developed countries, even if the same could be done in 
other developing countries with the same risks.
5. The mix is important since it decides firstly the rate at which 
loans will be disbursed and secondly it introduces the issue of 
conditionality.
6. For example Arlabank International which has both Latin American 
and Arab interests. It was formerly based in Peru, but has recently 
moved to Bahrain.
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7. In some models which attempt to find out what factors affect 
lending to the developing countries, the purpose and nature of 
the loan is not included as a variable.
8. Another agency involved in co-financing arrangements is the Inter 
American Development Bank. It differs from the World Bank 
because the borrower and co-lender do not interact whereas in 
the arrangements of the World Bank, the borrowers and co-lender 
have loan agreements separate from that between the borrower and 
the World Bank (Cook 1983).
9. Apart from this it is possible that in some countries which need 
to undergo a large adjustment programme, there will not be enough 
projects in the short term to require project loans, especially 
since there may be a need to reduce the investment to GNP ratio.
10. The gaps in development finance identified by the Brandt Report
(1980) were under three main headings. The first set of gaps was 
on the needs of the different groups of countries. The least 
developed countries for instance required a large amount of 
concessional finance. The second gap is in sector needs. In the 
agricultural sector for instance finance was required to keep with 
meeting consumption requirements. Thirdly there is a need for 
more programme loans (pp 227 - 236).
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4.5 Conelas ion
This thesis has been concerned with an analysis of the financial 
flows to the non. oil developing countries in the seventies with 
special reference to the Brazilian case. The role of OPEC financial 
flows has been of interest here since it introduced a new aspect 
to the ihternational financial system and the decision regarding 
the deployment of the OPEC financial flows influenced to some 
extent the direction of flows within the seventies.
The growth of the external debt and distribution of this debt has 
been discussed within the framework of the choice of the mix 
between adjustment and financing to shocks on the external account. 
Those countries like Brazil which preferred to borrow heavily to 
maintain a real rate of growth did so at the cost of incurring large 
amounts of external debt. The oil price rises, although causing 
large external shocks to the individual domestic economies were not 
alone in causing the growth of the debt outstanding.
It was possible for the OPEC countries to channel more concessional 
and non concessional finance directly to the developing countries. 
However, it has bae.a hypothesised that this would not necessarily 
have made a very great difference to the present situation in 
terms of the size of the debt outstanding and payments arrears 
faced by some of the Latin American countries.
For the present, the countries now need to rely more on adjusting 
to the deficit with sufficient finance to enable them to pursue 
this process. For the future the decision as regards when and how 
to borrow needs to be taken with greater care. On the lenders side, 
caution also needs to be taken.
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Appendix Table 2
BRAZIL : NET IMPORTS OF PETROLEUM 1970 - 1980
Weight 
(metric tonnes)
Value 
(Thousand 
US $ )
% Change 
in Value
Unit Value 
US $
% Change in 
Unit Value
1970 15728232 242645
1971 17863981 352781
1972 21891600 470568
1973 30080736 812712 72.0 26.57 25.00
1974 31076626 2129814 162.0 88.66 233.00
1975 33506505 3013728 42.0 89.75 1.23
1976 37467650 3557493 18.0 94.37 5.00
1977 38729034 3829140 7.0 98.66 4.50
1978 44332152 4420829 15.4 99.67 1.02
1979 50158000 6720456 51.6 133.18 34.00
1980 43590000 10200000 51.7 233.99 75.00
Source: Calculated from U.N, , Yearbook of International Trade
Statistics various issues, New York.
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Appendix Table 3
Industrial Countries. Consumer Price Index and Percentage Change
1972 - 1981
Price Index (1975 = 100) % Change over Previous
1972 73.8 4.7
1973 79.5 7.7
1974 90.0 13.3
1975 100.0 11.1
1976 108.3 8.3
1977 117.5 8.4
1978 125.9 7.2
1979 137.4 9.2
1980 153.7 11.9
1981 169.1 10.00
Source : IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1982
Washington D.C.
Appendix Table 4
Export Unit Value of Non Oil Developing Countries
Year
Export Unit 
Value Year
Export Unit 
Value
1970 54 1976 105
1971 53 1977 121
1972 56 1978 125
1973 74 1979 146
1974 101 1980 169
1975 100 1981 -
Source : IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1982
Washington D.C.
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